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ABSTRACT 
 Police-related civilian deaths, caused by direct force or occurring during 
custody, pose one of the central challenges to police legitimacy. This thesis studied five 
police departments that experienced such a crisis of legitimacy, as evidenced by either 
deadly retaliatory violence against police or substantial civil unrest in response. 
Specifically, this thesis examined how each agency implemented expert-recommended 
legitimacy-developing policies before and in response to the challenge of these deaths. 
This thesis then applied the Cynefin framework to these implementations, revealing 
which domains better conform to expert recommendations and sustain legitimacy 
policies in the wake of a crisis. This research recommends and provides a method for 
police leaders to leverage the Cynefin framework to assess their legitimacy policy 
implementations. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Police-related civilian deaths, either by use of force or occurring during law 
enforcement custody, pose one of the central challenges to police legitimacy.1 For 
example, protesters marched against police funding, sporadic episodes of civil disorder 
erupted, and police policy reviews commenced in the wake of the May 2020 death of 
George Floyd while in the custody of members of the Minneapolis Police Department.2 
Police-related civilian deaths are a persistent challenge to the legitimacy of police 
departments. 
Research shows that government institutions function better when they develop 
and maintain legitimacy, which is “a generalized perception or assumption that the 
actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed 
system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.”3 Therefore, police organizations, as 
institutions of government, similarly benefit from establishing legitimacy. Yale 
Professor Tom R. Tyler, an expert in psychology and law, proposes that legitimacy 
represents an essential component of successful police organizations and survival in 
their settings.4 Tyler posits that “procedural justice,” the public’s perception that the 
police treat people fairly and act impartially, positively correlates to their judgments 
of police legitimacy.5 
1 Commission on Civil Rights, Police Use of Force: An Examination of Modern Policing Practices 
(Washington, DC: Commission on Civil Rights, 2018), 131, https://www.usccr.gov/pubs/2018/11-15-
Police-Force.pdf. 
2 Eliott C. McLaughlin, “How George Floyd’s Death Ignited a Racial Reckoning That Shows No 
Signs of Slowing Down,” CNN, August 9, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/08/09/us/george-floyd-
protests-different-why/index.html. 
3 Mark C. Suchman, “Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches,” Academy of 
Management Review 20, no. 3 (July 1995): 574.
4 Anthony Bottoms and Justice Tankebe, “Criminology: Beyond Procedural Justice: A Dialogic 
Approach to Legitimacy in Criminal Justice,” Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 102, no. 1 (Winter 
2012): 120. 
5 Jason Sunshine and Tom R. Tyler, “The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping 




However, perceptions that police unfairly or unjustifiably apply force can harm 
perceptions of legitimacy.6 Such a challenge to a police organization’s legitimacy can have 
severe consequences. Deadly retaliatory violence against police and large-scale civil unrest 
have followed use-of-force incidents perceived as illegitimate, specifically police 
confrontations that have led to a civilian’s death.7 
With the legitimacy challenges caused by police-related civilian deaths providing 
its context, this thesis examines five U.S. police agencies that experienced such events and 
a subsequent challenge to their legitimacy. The police agencies and civilian deaths selected 
are as follows: 
• New York City Police Department: Eric Garner on July 17, 2014 
• Ferguson Police Department:  Michael Brown on August 8, 2014 
• Baltimore Police Department: Freddie Gray on April 12, 2015 
• Baton Rouge Police Department: Alton Sterling on July 5, 2016 
• Saint Anthony Police Department: Philando Castile on July 6, 2016 
Each incident significantly affected the respective department’s perceived legitimacy and 
relationship with the community, and received considerable negative attention. 
Additionally, each provoked either deadly retaliatory violence against the police or 
substantial, large-scale civil unrest. 
This thesis compares each agency’s application of 12 expert-recommended 
legitimacy-developing policies before and in response to each crisis-inducing fatality. 
 
6 Commission on Civil Rights, Police Use of Force, 2. 
7 Steve Giegerich, Jessica Bogan, and Kim Bell, “Ferguson Day Two Wrapup: Day of Protests, Night 
of Frenzy,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, August 11, 2014, https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-
courts/ferguson-day-two-wrapup-day-of-protests-night-of-frenzy/article_f9d627dc-e3c8-5bde-b2ab-
7f0a3d36a083.html; Larry Celona et al., “Gunman Executes 2 NYPD Cops in Garner ‘Revenge,’” New 
York Post, December 20, 2014, https://nypost.com/2014/12/20/2-nypd-cops-shot-execution-style-in-
brooklyn; Holly Yan and Dana Ford, “Baltimore Riots: Looting, Fires Engulf City after Freddie Gray’s 
Funeral,” CNN, April 28, 2015, https://www.cnn.com/2015/04/27/us/baltimore-unrest/index.html; Richard 
Fausset, Manny Fernandez, and Alan Blinder, “Micah Johnson, Gunman in Dallas, Honed Military Skills to 
a Deadly Conclusion,” New York Times, July 9, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/10/us/dallas-
quiet-after-police-shooting-but-protests-flare-elsewhere.html; Steve Visser, “Baton Rouge Shooting: 3 
Officers Dead; Shooter Was Missouri Man, Sources Say,” CNN, July 18, 2016, https://www.cnn.com/
2016/07/17/us/baton-route-police-shooting/index.html. 
xxiii 
Briefly, these include creating civilian police boards or commissions; improving or 
replacing agency leadership; systemically adopting community-oriented policing; 
enhancing community engagement; revising use-of-force guidelines to emphasize 
de-escalation and adopting less-lethal technologies; using a well-structured media strategy 
and publicly directed statements to improve communication with the community; 
transparency on procedural processes; introducing body-worn cameras (BWCs); publicly 
releasing BWC footage related to critical events; leveraging social media to increase 
community interaction; enhancing training; and providing implicit bias awareness training. 
The Cynefin sense-making framework, pioneered by consultant researchers David 
J. Snowden, Cynthia F. Kurtz, and Mary E. Boone, is then applied to categorize each of 
these implementation efforts.8 While the framework was initially designed as a business 
tool, government organizations have used it to assist with sense-making and support 
decision-making in various situations.9 Moreover, although police experts provide 
recommendations to promote legitimacy, implementation varies as police departments 
operate independently of each other. Thus, the framework provides a standard for sense-
making, allowing implementation examination across police departments and individual 
policy dimensions. Using the framework, this thesis categorizes the sense-making 
context—obvious/simple, complicated, complex, chaotic, or disorder—of each agency’s 
implementation of these policies before and after the crisis event, revealing which contexts 
successfully withstood the legitimacy challenge and which did not. 
The analysis resulted in four findings that illustrate the applicability of the Cynefin 
framework to police-legitimacy policies before and in response to police-related civilian 
deaths. Across the five police departments examined, the findings are as follows: 
 
8 Cynthia F. Kurtz and David J. Snowden, “The New Dynamics of Strategy: Sense-Making in a 
Complex and Complicated World,” IBM Systems Journal 42, no. 3 (2003): 462; David J. Snowden and 
Mary E. Boone, “A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making,” Harvard Business Review, November 
2007. 
9 Kurtz and Snowden, “The New Dynamics of Strategy,” 468. 
xxiv 
1. The obvious/simple domain dominated legitimacy-developing policy 
implementations before the civilian fatality, but most shifted into the 
complicated domain in response. 
2. Policy positions that occupied the complicated domain before the crisis of 
a police-related civilian death mostly remained in that context in response. 
3. Most policy positions occupied the complicated domain in response to the 
legitimacy crisis following a police-related civilian death. 
4. Nearly one-quarter of all policy positions before a crisis-inducing civilian 
death could not be categorized with a Cynefin context—largely due to 
absent BWC-associated policies—but most shifted into the complicated 
domain in response. 
The findings reveal that legitimacy-developing polices in the complicated domain 
best sustained the challenge of a police-related civilian death among the police departments 
this thesis examined. Further, after such a crisis, these agencies most often opted for 
sense-making in the complicated domain to enhance their implementation of recommended 
legitimacy-developing practices. 
Based on these findings, this thesis recommends using the Cynefin framework to 
evaluate and strengthen police implementation of legitimacy-developing policies. These 
recommendations comprise surveying policies; categorizing policies into Cynefin 
domains; shifting away from the obvious/simple domain; embracing the complicated 
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I. INTRODUCTION
As government institutions, police organizations function better when they develop 
and maintain legitimacy, which the National Research Council defines as “the judgments 
that ordinary citizens make about the rightfulness of police conduct and the organizations 
that employ and supervise them.”1 Criminal justice researchers Tal Jonathan-Zamir and 
David Weisburd say succinctly that legitimacy is “associated with numerous cooperative 
behaviors such as obeying the law, consenting to police decisions, providing information 
and collaborating with police more generally.”2 In this context, legitimacy provides value 
to both the police and the community. In addition, legitimacy leads to organizational 
persistence. When an organization demonstrates legitimacy, the finite resources that are 
critical for its continued survival, such as funding, are more easily allocated.3 In sum, 
organizations possessing legitimacy are more meaningful, more predictable, and more 
trustworthy.4 
While legitimacy is a desirable quality, it can be challenging to define, acquire, and 
quantify. As Mark Suchman, an American sociologist who studies legitimacy, argues, 
“Legitimacy is more often invoked than described, and it is more often described than 
defined.”5 Still, police agencies seek legitimacy because of how it improves the nature of 
interactions with the public. The efforts to achieve legitimacy often involve seeking similar 
institutional actors and modeling them: police agencies often copy others that are perceived 
to be legitimate.6 For example, law enforcement agencies may seek political actors, 
1 National Research Council, Fairness and Effectiveness in Policing: The Evidence (Washington, DC: 
National Academies Press, 2004), 291, https://doi.org/10.17226/10419. 
2 Tal Jonathan-Zamir and David Weisburd, “The Effects of Security Threats on Antecedents of Police 
Legitimacy: Findings from a Quasi-Experiment in Israel,” Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 
50, no. 1 (2013): 4, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022427811418002. 
3 Mark C. Suchman, “Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches,” Academy of 
Management Review 20, no. 3 (July 1995): 574, https://doi.org/10.2307/258788; Jonathan A. Cooper, In 
Search of Police Legitimacy: Territoriality, Isomorphism, and Changes in Policing Practices (El Paso: 
LFB Scholarly Publishing, 2014), 13, ProQuest. 
4 Suchman, “Managing Legitimacy,” 575. 
5 Suchman, 573. 
6 Cooper, In Search of Police Legitimacy, 3. 
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professional organizations, influential police agencies, or individuals within their 
departments to replicate legitimacy development methods.7 
Researchers have offered various arguments on how police acquire legitimacy. The 
prevailing opinion comes from Tom R. Tyler, a psychologist who has conducted extensive 
research in the field. He argues that people perceiving fair treatment legitimize the police 
in a process he calls “procedural justice.”8 Other researchers suggest procedural justice has 
less value in acquiring legitimacy, claiming it is just one of several components—such as 
police effectiveness or the lawfulness of their actions—that people use to assess a police 
organization’s legitimacy.9 Yet others argue that legitimacy is less of a static state, 
dependent solely on police behavior, than an ongoing dialogue between the police and the 
public.10 
Quantifying legitimacy in police work also presents difficulties. In the early 20th 
century, police associated their legitimacy with quantifiable dimensions of policing, such 
as the number of arrests made, calls for service, and response times.11 However, evidence 
suggests “order-maintenance” policing—the strategy of targeting minor offenses with the 
belief that it deters serious crime—reduces the sense of legitimacy a community feels 
toward the police given the absence of hard numbers.12 Researcher Justice Tankebe says 
more recent attempts to quantify legitimacy consist of evaluating people’s “perceived 
 
7 Cooper, 10. 
8 Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 7. 
9 David J. Smith, “The Foundations of Legitimacy,” in Legitimacy and Criminal Justice: An 
International Perspective, ed. Tom R. Tyler (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2007), 56, 
https://muse.jhu.edu/book/38590#info_wrap; Justice Tankebe, “Police Legitimacy,” in The Oxford 
Handbook of Police and Policing, ed. Michael D. Reisig and Robert J. Kane (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2014), 253, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199843886.013.017. 
10 Anthony Bottoms and Justice Tankebe, “Criminology: Beyond Procedural Justice: A Dialogic 
Approach to Legitimacy in Criminal Justice,” Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 102, no. 1 (Winter 
2012): 169; Ben Bradford, Jonathan Jackson, and Mike Hough, “Police Legitimacy in Action: Lessons for 
Theory and Policy,” in The Oxford Handbook of Police and Policing, ed. Michael D. Reisig and Robert J. 
Kane (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 553, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199843886.
013.002. 
11 Cooper, In Search of Police Legitimacy, 13. 
12 Jacinta M. Gau and Rod K. Brunson, “Procedural Justice and Order Maintenance Policing: A Study 
of Inner-City Young Men’s Perceptions of Police Legitimacy,” Justice Quarterly 27, no. 2 (April 2010): 
273, https://doi.org/10.1080/07418820902763889. 
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obligation to obey the law and expressed allegiance or support for legal authorities.”13 All 
in all, quantifying legitimacy continues to be challenging. 
Still, the concept of legitimacy remains a critical component of policing, despite 
the difficulties in defining, acquiring, and quantifying it. Further, a challenge to a police 
organization’s legitimacy can have severe consequences. Deadly retaliatory violence 
against police and large-scale civil unrest have followed use-of-force incidents perceived 
as illegitimate, specifically police confrontations that have led to a civilian’s death.14 As 
previously stated, legitimacy is essential to an organization’s survival, and a crisis of 
legitimacy threatens its survival. To alleviate this threat and continue as an organization, a 
challenged police agency, in some instances, will look to outside entities to replicate their 
methods for building legitimacy.15 
Comparing how some police agencies implemented legitimacy-developing policies 
before suffering the crisis of a fatal force event with actions taken in response may be 
valuable (for the purpose of scoping, “before” refers to policies as they existed at the time 
of the crisis event). Examining the efforts before and after a crisis-inducing event—by 
applying the sense-making Cynefin framework to categorize the context of these efforts—
may reveal their relative effectiveness.16 Such an evaluation would reveal the sense-
making behind legitimization efforts that withstood the challenge a fatal force event 
presented, as well as those that did not. This approach would provide recommendations for 
 
13 Tankebe, “Police Legitimacy,” 247. 
14 Steve Giegerich, Jessica Bogan, and Kim Bell, “Ferguson Day Two Wrapup: Day of Protests, Night 
of Frenzy,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, August 11, 2014, https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-
courts/ferguson-day-two-wrapup-day-of-protests-night-of-frenzy/article_f9d627dc-e3c8-5bde-b2ab-
7f0a3d36a083.html; Larry Celona et al., “Gunman Executes 2 NYPD Cops in Garner ‘Revenge,’” New 
York Post, December 20, 2014, https://nypost.com/2014/12/20/2-nypd-cops-shot-execution-style-in-
brooklyn; Holly Yan and Dana Ford, “Baltimore Riots: Looting, Fires Engulf City after Freddie Gray’s 
Funeral,” CNN, April 28, 2015, https://www.cnn.com/2015/04/27/us/baltimore-unrest/index.html; Richard 
Fausset, Manny Fernandez, and Alan Blinder, “Micah Johnson, Gunman in Dallas, Honed Military Skills to 
a Deadly Conclusion,” New York Times, July 9, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/10/us/dallas-
quiet-after-police-shooting-but-protests-flare-elsewhere.html; Steve Visser, “Baton Rouge Shooting: 3 
Officers Dead; Shooter Was Missouri Man, Sources Say,” CNN, July 18, 2016, https://www.cnn.com/
2016/07/17/us/baton-route-police-shooting/index.html. 
15 Cooper, In Search of Police Legitimacy, 21. 
16 The Cynefin framework and its application in this thesis are detailed in the research design section 
of this chapter. 
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implementing legitimacy-building policies that incorporate Cynefin sense-making. Police 
agencies could use these recommendations to improve policy weaknesses before the onset 
of a legitimacy crisis or implement them to recover legitimacy once a crisis is underway. 
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Using the Cynefin framework, what is understood about the 
implementation of police legitimacy policies before and in response to 
police-related civilian deaths? 
2. What type of policy implementation sustained the legitimacy challenges 
that arose from these crises? 
3. What recommendations does that analysis reveal to effectively implement 
policies that develop police legitimacy? 
B. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Police-related civilian deaths, either by use of force or occurring during law 
enforcement custody, pose one of the central challenges to police legitimacy.17 Beginning 
in the summer of 2014, a series of such events in the United States gained nationwide and 
international attention, dominating media headlines.18 These incidents sparked intense and 
wide-ranging discussions on police use-of-force issues and law enforcement’s interaction 
and engagement with the community.19 Most recently, protesters marched against police 
funding, sporadic episodes of civil disorder erupted, and police policy reviews commenced 
in the wake of the May 2020 death of George Floyd while in the custody of members of 
 
17 Commission on Civil Rights, Police Use of Force: An Examination of Modern Policing Practices 
(Washington, DC: Commission on Civil Rights, 2018), 131, https://www.usccr.gov/pubs/2018/11-15-
Police-Force.pdf. 
18 Department of Justice, “Guide to Critical Issues in Policing: Community Relations Services Toolkit 
for Policing” (Washington, DC: Department of Justice, 2018), 1, https://www.justice.gov/crs/file/836416/
download. 
19 Nathan James et al., Public Trust and Law Enforcement—A Discussion for Policymakers, CRS 
Report No. R43904 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2020), 1, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/
misc/R43904.pdf. 
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the Minneapolis Police Department.20 Police-related civilian deaths present a persistent 
challenge to the legitimacy of police departments. 
With the legitimacy challenges caused by police-related civilian deaths providing 
its context, this thesis examines five U.S. police agencies that experienced such events and 
a subsequent challenge to their legitimacy. The police agencies and civilian deaths selected 
are as follows: 
• New York City Police Department: Eric Garner on July 17, 2014 
• Ferguson Police Department:  Michael Brown on August 8, 2014 
• Baltimore Police Department: Freddie Gray on April 12, 2015 
• Baton Rouge Police Department: Alton Sterling on July 5, 2016 
• Saint Anthony Police Department: Philando Castile on July 6, 2016 
These five events were chosen for two reasons. First, each incident significantly 
affected the respective department’s perceived legitimacy and relationship with the 
community, and received considerable negative attention. Second, each provoked either 
deadly retaliatory violence against the police or substantial, large-scale civil unrest. This 
research focus excludes other police agencies whose legitimacy was challenged by a 
police-related civilian fatality. 
For the purpose of scoping, the five incidents selected occurred from 2014 to 2016 
during a resurgence in the scrutiny of police and community relations.21 The violent public 
retaliation in response to these incidents significantly affected the police and public order, 
making these five events most relevant to this research. Specifically, the assassination of 
New York City Police Officers Wenjian Liu and Rafael Ramos in December 2014 was in 
 
20 Eliott C. McLaughlin, “How George Floyd’s Death Ignited a Racial Reckoning That Shows No 
Signs of Slowing Down,” CNN, August 9, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/08/09/us/george-floyd-
protests-different-why/index.html. 
21 Justin Nix and Justin T. Pickett, “Third-Person Perceptions, Hostile Media Effects, and Policing: 
Developing a Theoretical Framework for Assessing the Ferguson Effect,” Journal of Criminal Justice 51 
(2017): 24, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2017.05.016. 
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retaliation for the deaths of Eric Garner and Michael Brown.22 Riots erupted in Ferguson 
after Brown’s death in the summer of 2014 and in Baltimore after Gray’s death in April 
2015.23 Finally, the killings of five officers in Dallas and three more in Baton Rouge during 
a 10-day period in July 2016 were in retaliation for the deaths of Alton Sterling and 
Philando Castile.24 These five events flow from the resurgence discussions of the use of 
force by police after Garner’s death in 2014 and end in 2016 with one of the deadliest 
periods for law enforcement since 9/11.25 
With the selected police agencies and civilian fatalities creating the space within 
which this thesis answers the research questions, each agency’s implementations (or lack 
thereof) of 12 legitimacy-building policies suggested by police policy “sovereigns” are 
documented.26 The literature review that comprises Chapter II details these policy 
recommendations. Briefly, they involve creating civilian police boards or commissions; 
improving or replacing agency leadership; systemically adopting community-oriented 
policing; enhancing community engagement; revising use-of-force guidelines to 
emphasize de-escalation and adopting less-lethal technologies; using a well-structured 
media strategy and publicly directed statements to improve communication with the 
community; transparency on procedural processes; introducing body-worn cameras 
(BWCs); publicly releasing BWC footage related to critical events; leveraging social media 
to increase community interaction; enhancing training; and providing implicit bias 
awareness training. 
 
22 Benjamin Mueller and Al Baker, “2 N.Y.P.D. Officers Killed in Brooklyn Ambush; Suspect 
Commits Suicide,” New York Times, December 20, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/21/nyregion/
two-police-officers-shot-in-their-patrol-car-in-brooklyn.html. 
23 Sheryl Gay Stolberg and Stephen Babcock, “Scenes of Chaos in Baltimore as Thousands Protest 
Freddie Gray’s Death,” New York Times, April 25, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/26/us/
baltimore-crowd-swells-in-protest-of-freddie-grays-death.html. 
24 Visser, “Baton Rouge Shooting.” 
25 Ryan W. Miller, “Deadliest Attacks on Police in the Last 100 Years,” USA Today, July 17, 2016, 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2016/07/17/deadliest-attacks-police-last-100-years/
87222472/. 
26 The concept of policy “sovereigns” is discussed in the literature review, Chapter II, as referenced in 
Cooper, In Search of Police Legitimacy, 23. 
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With the agencies and civilian deaths identified and policy dimensions for 
examination established, how (or if) each agency implemented these legitimacy-building 
guidelines before and after each incident is discussed. Using these policy dimensions lends 
assessment standards for comparing each agency. This comparison details what each 
agency did to develop legitimacy using the recommended policy suggestions before its 
controversial fatality and in response to the legitimacy challenge. 
The final stage of this research project applies the Cynefin framework to each of 
the five agencies’ efforts at implementing these policy dimensions. The framework is used, 
as Snowden and Boone suggest, as a tool to help organizational leaders sense what context 
they are in before and in response to a police-related civilian death to make better decisions 
and to anticipate and avoid future challenges.27 Once the framework is applied to each 
agency’s pre- and post-event implementation of the 12 policy guidelines, this thesis 
determines which contexts were more or less successful in promoting legitimacy. 
David J. Snowden, Cynthia F. Kurtz, and Mary E. Boone are consultant researchers 
who pioneered the Cynefin framework.28 While the framework was initially designed as a 
business tool, government organizations have used it to assist with sense-making and 
support decision-making in various situations.29 Sense-making is the central component 
of the framework, Snowden and Boone note, as Cynefin is not a method for making 
arguments or empirical verifications. This seems to make the framework a valid technique 
for interpreting police agencies’ implementations of the above legitimacy-promoting 
policies before and after civilian fatalities. The Cynefin framework and its component 
contexts are represented visually in Figure 1. 
 
27 David J. Snowden and Mary E. Boone, “A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making,” Harvard 
Business Review, November 2007, 70–74. 
28 Cynthia F. Kurtz and David J. Snowden, “The New Dynamics of Strategy: Sense-Making in a 
Complex and Complicated World,” IBM Systems Journal 42, no. 3 (2003): 462; Snowden and Boone, “A 
Leader’s Framework.” 
29 Kurtz and Snowden, “The New Dynamics of Strategy,” 468. 
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Figure 1. Cynefin Framework30 
When introducing the Cynefin framework, according to Snowden and Boone, 
successful agency managers and executives mold their responses to the complexity of the 
issues they face.31 They believe failure occurs when leaders maintain a single response 
protocol because it was successful in one situation, but it might be inapplicable when 
applied to another. Snowden and Boone argue the assumption of predictability in events 
causes these leaders to falter in their reliance on “one-size-fits-all” approaches.32 
Moreover, if circumstances change and challenges appear, leaders fail when they rely on 
simplifications rather than pivoting with the complexities, explain Boone and Snowden. 
The Cynefin framework, they say, gives organizational leaders a tool to gain new 
perspectives on issues and address their real-world problems. 
The Cynefin framework is organized into five contexts (or “domains”): obvious 
(formerly known as simple), complicated, complex, chaotic, and disorder.33 Each context 
 
30 Source: Simon Powers, “Cynefin & Sense-Making Framework,” Adventures with Agile, September 
14, 2015, https://www.adventureswithagile.com/2015/09/14/cynefin-sense-making-framework/. 
31 Snowden and Boone, “A Leader’s Framework,” 69. 
32 Snowden and Boone, 70. 
33 “The Cynefin Framework,” Cognitive Edge, accessed November 26, 2020, https://www.cognitive-
edge.com/the-cynefin-framework/. 
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is separate and distinct from the other, as Figure 1 illustrates. The framework’s strength is 
in providing leaders with guidance to identify a sense of the relationships between the cause 
and effect of an event or circumstance and a recommended action response. 
The first context is the obvious/simple, the domain of “known knowns,” where there 
is a clear relationship between cause and effect, the “right” answer is undisputed and self-
evident, and decisions are unquestioned.34 The response process to issues within this 
context is “sense-categorize-respond,” which requires assessing the facts of a situation, the 
proper categorization of these facts, and a response based on established practice. As such, 
Snowden and Boone refer to the obvious/simple context as the realm of “best” or 
“established” practices.35 
Several problems can arise in the obvious/simple context, according to Boone and 
Snowden.36 One such problem is the oversimplification of a problem. Doing so can lead 
to miscategorizing the issue into the obvious/simple domain, Boone and Snowden impart, 
which risks venturing into the chaotic context (discussed below). Another problem that can 
emerge is the entrainment of a leader’s thinking, where crediting old successes in following 
established protocols precludes the exploration of evolved thinking or actions.37 Lastly, 
overreliance on the obvious/simple context can lead to complacency, where leaders are 
slow to react to challenges due to the expectation of smooth operations. Best practice, they 
say, is past practice—and hindsight is not forward-looking. 
The next context represents the realm dominated by experts in the field of the issue 
at hand.38 Complicated is the domain of the “known unknowns,” where there is a clear 
relationship between cause and effect, but not everyone can see it. There may be multiple 
 
34 Snowden and Boone, “A Leader’s Framework,” 70; Kurtz and Snowden, “The New Dynamics of 
Strategy,” 468. 
35 Snowden and Boone, “A Leader’s Framework,” 70. 
36 Snowden and Boone, 71. 
37 Kurtz and Snowden, “The New Dynamics of Strategy,” 70. The authors define entrained thinking 
as “a conditioned response that occurs when people are blinded to new ways of thinking by the perspectives 
they acquired through past experience, training, and success.” 
38 Kurtz and Snowden, “The New Dynamics of Strategy,” 468; Snowden and Boone, “A Leader’s 
Framework,” 71. 
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solutions to issues within this context, but professional expertise is needed to decipher the 
path forward. Whereas the obvious/simple context is that of established “best practice,” 
“good practice” guided by experts is more valuable in the complicated context. According 
to Boone and Snowden, the response process to issues in the complicated context is “sense-
analyze-respond.”39 
As in the obvious/simple context, however, entrained thinking can be a problem in 
the complicated context. In the complicated context, experts consulted for a solution to the 
problem may ignore the suggestions of non-experts in the field. Experts may ignore the 
recommendations of non-experts because they are most invested in providing a resolution 
of their making, causing them to be less tolerant of ideas from others.40 Another potential 
problem in the complicated context is “analysis paralysis,” where entrained thinking (or 
ego) prevents experts from agreeing on a solution, causing delays and inaction. Analysis 
takes time, Boone and Snowden say, and leaders must choose between tolerating potential 
delays in finding the “right” answer or finally committing to action. 
The third context is the complex.41 Cause-and-effect relationships exist in this 
context, but the number of variables precludes their prediction. Issues occur in this context 
when unpredictability precipitates a major change or crisis, during which a solution 
emerges. Experts’ opinions based on their prior experiences are not as valuable as they are 
in the complicated context. There is at least one right answer to resolve an issue in this 
domain, but it is not immediately apparent. Leaders managing issues in the complex 
context must demonstrate patience and allow the solution to reveal itself. In this domain, 
the response process is “probe-sense-respond,” enabling the emergence of a viable path 
forward out of unpredictability and flux. “Unknown unknowns” dominate the complex 
context, so only in retrospect is there an understanding of why things happened. However, 
 
39 Snowden and Boone, “A Leader’s Framework,” 71. 
40 Snowden and Boone, 72. 
41 Snowden and Boone, “A Leader’s Framework,” 74; Kurtz and Snowden, “The New Dynamics of 
Strategy,” 469. 
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Snowden and Boone believe these unstable conditions foster innovation more than in 
contexts of increased stability.42 
A problem likely to occur in the complex context is the temptation to revert to a 
traditional command-and-control structure rather than foster the innovation that may 
emerge.43 When results are not quickly apparent and consistent with their expectations, 
leaders may become impatient with the process and seize absolute control, risking failure. 
Conversely, leaders who foster creativity, innovation, and the exploration of new 
techniques are more likely to resolve issues in the complex context than those who attempt 
to impose strict order. 
Chaotic is the fourth context and requires immediate action to restore normalcy, 
resulting in a response process of “act-sense-respond.”44 This context represents the realm 
of the unknowable, with relationships between cause and effect impossible to decipher. 
Boone and Snowden describe the chaotic context as one of turbulence, where a leader’s 
first responsibility is to “stop the bleeding” rather than determine whether identifiable 
patterns exist.45 The first order of business is the restoration of order and a sense of 
stability. Strong leadership must dominate in the chaotic context, as there is no time to 
request the opinions of others. Given the instability of this context, Snowden and Boone 
argue that innovation flourishes in this domain. Leaders will be more receptive to 
innovative actions that support a return to stability. This context allows leaders an 
opportunity to advance thinking if they seize upon it and possess the courage to act. When 
represented visually, as in Figure 1, the chaotic context is situated next to and below the 
obvious/simple context, which occupies a higher “plateau.” Snowden and Kurtz represent 
the framework this way to illustrate their belief that the improper application of best 
practices in the obvious/simple domain may cause a leader to “fall” into the chaotic context. 
 
42 Snowden and Boone, “A Leader’s Framework,” 74. 
43 Snowden and Boone, 74. 
44 Snowden and Boone, “A Leader’s Framework,” 74; Kurtz and Snowden, “The New Dynamics of 
Strategy,” 469. 
45 Snowden and Boone, “A Leader’s Framework,” 74. 
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However, a problem in the chaotic context is the tendency of leaders in this domain 
to develop an inflated sense of image and capability.46 Their successes may gain them a 
cult-like following, feeding into their self-image and clouding their vision to changing 
contexts. Those successful at the dominant leadership style required in the chaotic context, 
Snowden and Boone note, may stumble in others if they insist on maintaining that posture. 
The final context of the Cynefin framework is disorder, at the center of the 
illustrative model, which Kurtz and Snowden call a state of “uncertainty about 
uncertainty.”47 Snowden and Boone say that disorder occurs when leadership stakeholders 
disagree on which Cynefin context a current issue occupies.48 In disorder, they continue, 
“multiple perspectives jostle for prominence, factional leaders argue with one another, and 
cacophony rules.”49 Exiting disorder, they say, requires either agreeing unanimously about 
which of the other contexts an issue exists in entirely, or dividing the issue into its 
constituent parts so that each is handled in one of the other four contexts. Kurtz and 
Snowden say consensus among decision-makers reduces the size of the disorder “space” 
and is a step toward finding an agreed-upon solution.50 Disorder is an unhappy place, 
Snowden warns in a Cynefin lesson, as things in this domain are likely to get worse.51 
The Cynefin framework was widely distributed outside of academic channels when 
an article outlining its core concepts was published in Harvard Business Review in 2007. 
While the magazine’s readership is primarily professionals in the private sector, Snowden 
and Boone introduced an example of the framework’s application to a crisis using a 
decidedly non-business case: the 1993 Brown’s Chicken Massacre in Palatine, Illinois.52 
On January 8, 1993, two men murdered seven people inside a Brown’s Chicken fast-food 
 
46 Snowden and Boone, 75. 
47 Kurtz and Snowden, “The New Dynamics of Strategy,” 480. 
48 Snowden and Boone, “A Leader’s Framework,” 70. 
49 Snowden and Boone, 72. 
50 Kurtz and Snowden, “The New Dynamics of Strategy,” 470. 
51 Cognitive Edge, “Cynefin Framework.” 
52 Snowden and Boone, “A Leader’s Framework,” 69. 
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restaurant during a robbery.53 The crime occurred in Palatine, a suburb outside of Chicago, 
and is one of the most infamous crimes in that city’s area. The men responsible were 
convicted in 2009 and sentenced to life imprisonment for their crimes.54 
In the magazine, Snowden and Boone used the crime as the backdrop against which 
they evaluated the actions of Deputy Chief Walter Gasior of the Palatine Police 
Department. During the murder investigation, he was an administrative executive and 
spokesperson for his department. Using the Cynefin framework, they observed that Chief 
Gasior faced multiple contexts at once during his response to his department’s crisis 
event.55 Issues challenged Chief Gasior from the chaotic, complex, and obvious/simple 
contexts. Snowden and Boone described how his responses to each issue followed the 
recommended response processes the framework identified, allowing him to navigate a 
significant crisis successfully. In a 2011 blog post, Snowden again featured the Cynefin 
framework’s application to evaluate police policy. In that post, he featured analysis and 
application of Cynefin sense-making to the police response during an Oklahoma hostage 
situation.56 Snowden and Boone’s decision to use a police emergency as the narrative 
device to introduce their framework in 2007, and Snowden’s reference of the framework’s 
application to policing again in 2011, supports using it as an analytical tool in this thesis. 
This research intends to reveal which context each agency’s legitimization efforts 
and policies were in before the selected civilian death, and the context in which they existed 
in response to the event. By categorizing these policy implementation efforts, this thesis 
identifies the specific Cynefin contexts likely to maintain or restore legitimacy when police 
agencies confront the challenge of a police-related civilian death. Further, categorizing the 
 
53 “Robbery Hinted in Slayings in Chicago Suburb,” New York Times, January 15, 1993, https://www.
nytimes.com/1993/01/15/us/robbery-hinted-in-slayings-in-chicago-suburb.html. 
54 Megan Crepeau, “Judge Tosses Bid for New Hearing in Brown’s Chicken Massacre,” Chicago 
Tribune, January 11, 2018, https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-met-browns-chicken-
massacre-court-20180111-story.html. 
55 Snowden and Boone, “A Leader’s Framework,” 76. 
56 Dave Snowden, “Sense-Making in a Hostage Situation,” Cognitive Edge, October 30, 2011, 
https://www.cognitive-edge.com/blog/sense-making-in-a-hostage-situation/. 
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contexts of less-successful efforts and policies can inform police agencies on areas needing 
revision to withstand a future legitimacy challenge successfully. 
This project does not produce a list of guidelines, best practices in legitimation 
efforts, or tactics to follow. Each agency serves a unique community with unique needs. 
Instead, the objective is to provide recommendations that allow police to determine the 
context their legitimation efforts currently operate in and compare that to the contexts that 
have shown efficacy when challenged by a fatal force event. It will be a method to evaluate 
policies from within and provide a way for police departments to prepare for future 
legitimacy challenges. 
This thesis is organized into eight chapters. Chapter II, the literature review, begins 
by examining legitimacy theory as applied to institutions broadly and the police 
specifically; then, the policies that policing sovereigns recommend to promote legitimacy 
are discussed. Chapters III through VII detail the five police agencies whose officers had 
interactions that resulted in a civilian death, prompting a legitimacy challenge to the agency 
involved and either retaliatory violence against police or large civil unrest. These chapters 
and agencies are as follows: 
• Chapter III: New York City Police Department 
• Chapter IV: Ferguson Police Department 
• Chapter V: Baltimore Police Department 
• Chapter VI: Baton Rouge Police Department 
• Chapter VII: Saint Anthony Police Department 
Each chapter also shows how (or if) the studied agency applied the aforementioned 
legitimacy-promoting policy dimensions, using the Cynefin framework to compare the 
context/domain each agency operated in before and in response to the fatal force event. In 
doing so, the aim is to discover whether there is a context/domain that better promoted or 
retained legitimacy in the wake of a crisis. In conclusion, Chapter VIII presents the findings 
of this analysis and provides police leaders with recommendations for future legitimacy 
policy application. 
15 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter provides an analysis of the academic discussions of legitimacy theory, 
legitimacy vis-à-vis policing, and police policies that contribute to legitimacy. This 
literature review is divided into two sections. First, the general function of legitimacy in 
institutions is discussed; then, this discussion examines how legitimacy positively affects 
policing and promotes its good operation within the community. Next, the chapter 
discusses legitimacy-developing recommendations from several prominent professional 
organizations and government agencies that guide police agencies in policy formulation. 
These organizations and agencies assert that police agencies must possess legitimacy if 
they intend to be successful. The goal of each recommendation is to enhance the public’s 
sense of police legitimacy. The sequence of this literature review is designed to help answer 
the research questions—defining legitimacy and its significance to policing and detailing 
prevailing police policies that develop legitimacy. 
A. THE FUNCTION OF LEGITIMACY IN INSTITUTIONS AND POLICING 
The focus of the literature on institutional legitimacy ranges widely, with 
competing theories explaining how it originates. Legitimacy is an essential quality that 
supports an institution’s survival and a necessary component for police organizations to 
fulfill the core tenets of their societal mission: preventing crime, maintaining order, 
preserving life, and protecting property.57 When a police organization faces a legitimacy 
challenge, obstacles to accomplishing their mission emerge. These obstacles may include 
people not complying with police directions, disobeying the law, and, at the extreme, 
directing violence toward the police. This section reviews the significant literature 
regarding legitimacy theory; the challenges of building, maintaining, and repairing 
legitimacy; the reasons police organizations need legitimacy; and the antecedents of police 
legitimacy. 
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German sociologist Max Weber’s seminal work, The Theory of Social and 
Economic Organization, forms the foundation of modern institutional legitimacy theory.58 
In his book, Weber describes an “imperative control” or “imperative coordination,” the 
process wherein people usually comply with a specific order given by an authoritative 
source.59 Compliance with direction represents the critical element of “legitimate 
authority,” of which he argues three forms exist.60 First, as Weber posits, rational (legal) 
authority consists of obeying authority based on the belief in the validity of commands 
given by those in elevated positions of power. Next, traditional authority supports the 
acceptance of established traditions and the authority of those exercising and practicing 
those traditions. Finally, charismatic authority rises from allegiance to an extraordinary 
person and the customs and behaviors he or she determines and directs.61 Weber’s work 
fits into the broader framework of his theories on society and state bureaucracies, which 
remain especially influential in the context of legitimacy studies. 
Although Weber says that the sources of institutional legitimacy have at their core 
either a rational, traditional, or charismatic authority, American sociologists Paul J. 
DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell suggest an alternate method for developing legitimacy.62 
They argue against the notion of Weber’s rational authority, which requires obedience to 
those in elevated positions, thereby conferring legitimacy to such authority.63 DiMaggio 
and Powell do so by asking how “confused and contentious bumblers”—their words for 
those failing to meet Weber’s standard of “elevated persons” who wield legitimated 
authority—continue to survive in their institutions.64 They argue that people lacking talent 
or skill not only occupy but can also thrive in elevated positions of authority. They disagree 
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with Weber’s argument, doubting that those with lesser abilities would inspire compliance 
only because of their higher status. Rather, DiMaggio and Powell suggest that as 
institutions and organizations grow and mature, pressure grows for similarity in form and 
function.65 Legitimacy, they argue, results from “institutional isomorphism,” grounded in 
the likeness of structure, output, and culture of like institutions.66 Their model proposes 
that as institutions progress, they exchange legitimacy as a result of shifts toward identical 
form. In other words, one institution seeks legitimacy by modeling another’s qualities. 
DiMaggio and Powell further suggest three mechanisms that contribute to 
institutional isomorphic change. The first is coercive isomorphism, which derives from 
political influence, government mandates, and the pressures from organizations that rely 
on and interact with each other.67 Next, mimetic isomorphism is a process of imitation, 
such as searching for organizations with similar problems to model after, locating solutions 
to challenges at little cost.68 Last is normative isomorphism, which DiMaggio and Powell 
argue relates to professionalization, professional organizations, and the efforts of those in 
the field to define their conditions and work methods.69 Notably, they suggest that even in 
the absence of evidence of improved organizational efficiency, the forces of institutional 
isomorphism—the drive toward similarity—continue to confer legitimacy. Much like 
Weber, DiMaggio and Powell’s work has been influential in the field. They have continued 
legitimacy studies and compelled other researchers to reconcile the different perspectives. 
For example, American sociologist Mark C. Suchman’s research incorporates 
Weber’s and DiMaggio and Powell’s studies on legitimacy.70 He argues that like an 
“anchor-point,” institutional legitimacy binds the various cognitive and normative forces 
that define, build, and allow an institution authority.71 In synthesizing his predecessors’ 
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work, Suchman suggests that legitimacy research is not a homogeneous, single-solution 
field. He argues that legitimacy research separates into two tracks. The first track represents 
a strategic tradition of legitimacy studies, which explores the managerial perspectives that 
employ manipulation to garner societal support.72 The other track constitutes the 
institutional tradition of legitimacy, which examines how pressures from sector-wide 
structure dynamics affect an organization or field. The strategic tradition corresponds with 
Weber’s legitimacy theories while DiMaggio and Powell’s concepts on isomorphism fit 
into the institutional tradition. Suchman’s separation allows Weber’s and DiMaggio and 
Powell’s models to co-exist even if they are sometimes incompatible.73 
Although he notes the difficulty of defining legitimacy, Suchman’s work 
nonetheless provides a definition.74 Legitimacy, he claims, describes “a generalized 
perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate 
within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.”75 
Accordingly, he argues there are three types of legitimacy. Pragmatic legitimacy lies 
within the self-interest and expected value a group attaches to an action; moral legitimacy 
depends on an audience’s judgment that institutional activity is the proper course of action; 
and cognitive legitimacy recognizes an organization’s inevitability and accepts its 
necessity.76 
Suchman argues that legitimate institutions are more meaningful, predictable, and 
trustworthy.77 Legitimacy enhances the stability and comprehensibility of an 
organization’s activities, meaning these traits augment each other. In other words, when 
people understand an organization’s actions, they voice challenges less often, and public 
acceptance improves the organization’s stability. Possessing legitimacy leads an institution 
to appear proper, desirable, and appropriate. Suchman argues that these qualities increase 
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the likelihood that institutions will obtain finite resources (such as funding) that ensure 
their survival.78 
Legitimacy can suffer challenges, however. Suchman believes the challenge of 
legitimacy lies in gaining, maintaining, and repairing it. His work provides techniques to 
achieve each end.79 He argues that legitimate institutions survive while institutions that 
lose legitimacy risk their continued existence and must undertake significant efforts to 
restore it.80 Weber, DiMaggio and Powell, and Suchman’s work demonstrates differing 
theories on the origins of institutional legitimacy, the methods and reasons organizations 
seek to build it, and the benefits and challenges of an institution’s quest for legitimacy. As 
such, studies of police legitimacy incorporate several of these thematic elements. 
The literature firmly establishes the value of legitimacy to institutions. Therefore, 
police organizations, as institutions of government, similarly benefit from establishing 
legitimacy. Tom R. Tyler, Yale professor of psychology and law, has heavily influenced 
research into police legitimacy.81 Tyler proposes that legitimacy represents an essential 
component of successful police organizations and survival in their settings. Scholars in the 
field describe his research and model of the antecedents to legitimacy as a “conceptual 
touchstone,” and his arguments are widely accepted.82 Tyler posits that “procedural 
justice,” the public’s perception that the police treat people fairly and act impartially, 
positively correlates to their judgments of police legitimacy.83 Inversely, when perceptions 
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of procedural injustice are high, opinions of police legitimacy are low.84 Thus, legitimacy 
is an important component of successful policing. 
Tyler’s work challenges older models of building legitimacy. Tyler argues that 
receiving cooperation from the public indicates and results from police legitimacy, which 
suggests the instrumental model’s flawed nature. He argues that the instrumental model of 
legitimacy, whereby public perceptions of police performance (e.g., crime control, criminal 
deterrence, and fear of arrest) form its basis, has a low correlation with gaining public 
cooperation.85 The instrumental model of police legitimacy has its roots in the early 20th 
century, during a period of professionalizing the occupation. Quantifiable indicators, such 
as arrests, calls for service, and rapid response times, became the measures police 
employed to demonstrate their value and establish legitimacy.86 However, Tyler disputes 
this claim, contending that the public’s sense of police legitimacy is unrelated to 
performance evaluations, arguing that these instrumental metrics inadequately measure its 
development.87 For example, his research indicates that the public does not legitimate 
police organizations based on parameters such as arrest numbers or response time. He 
argues that procedural justice leads to legitimacy and inspires a strong belief in the value 
of following the law and voluntarily complying with the police.88 
According to Tyler, the elements of procedural justice include people’s having a 
sense of participation during their interactions with the police and feeling heard; believing 
that the police act equitably and neutrally; being treated with respect and dignity; and 
feeling that the police work in a fair and trustworthy manner.89 Procedural justice is the 
basis for police legitimacy in Tyler’s widely accepted model. Other criminal justice 
researchers have supported Tyler’s model of procedural justice. 
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For example, Tal Jonathan-Zamir and David Weisburd tested the strength of 
Tyler’s argument that procedural justice leads to police legitimacy.90 Their hypothesis 
acknowledged procedural justice as the precursor to police legitimacy but predicted that 
the importance of police legitimacy would decrease when a population felt “under threat.” 
They tested this hypothesis by surveying the opinions of the residents of Sderot, a city in 
Israel that frequently experiences missile attacks due to its proximity to Gaza.91 Jonathan-
Zamir and Weisburd believed that the threat of attack would decrease the respondents’ 
correlation between procedural justice and police legitimacy. They hypothesized that the 
dangerous circumstances would lower expectations of the police who continued to 
demonstrate just behavior. Jonathan-Zamir and Weisburd, however, found the opposite.92 
According to their research, even as Sderot’s residents were fearful of an attack, the level 
of value they attached to procedural justice remained constant; instead, they found a sense 
of stability in valuing fair policing processes.93 The social value of procedural justice in 
their police institution remained high regardless of the threat. 
However, other research exposes some weaknesses in Tyler’s model of police 
legitimacy. Some argue that when police use confrontational enforcement tactics and focus 
on minor violations, they can negatively affect perceptions of legitimacy, even in the 
presence of procedural justice. For example, Jacinta M. Gau, a professor of criminal justice 
from the University of Central Florida, and Rod K. Brunson, a professor of criminology at 
Northeastern University, suggest that “order-maintenance” policing is at odds with 
building a sense of procedural justice in people, negatively affecting their perceptions of 
legitimacy.94 They argue that the tactics of order-maintenance policing, such as aggressive 
enforcement of low-level criminal activity and zero tolerance for any transgression, harm 
procedural justice perceptions. Respondents in Gau and Brunson’s research questioned the 
need for heavy-handed policing tactics, such as stop-and-frisk and car stops, believing that 
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the officers applied them unfairly.95 Gau and Brunson agree with Tyler that policing with 
procedural justice leads to a sense of legitimacy in the organization but insist that intensive 
policing tactics weaken this feeling.96 
While Gau and Brunson find weaknesses in Tyler’s assertions about police 
legitimacy, other researchers disagree entirely with his procedural justice model. For 
example, in their book Mirage of Police Reform, Robert E. Worden and Sarah J. McLean 
agree with the prevailing literature that legitimacy has positive consequences for police 
organizations.97 They concur that people are more likely to accept decisions and comply 
with requests from legitimate police organizations.98 However, they argue that police 
departments weakly apply procedural justice efforts and measure them minimally, 
reducing their impact on legitimacy. 
Worden and McLean counter Tyler’s claim that procedural justice is the primary 
antecedent to police legitimacy on two fronts. First, they claim police agencies poorly 
implement procedural justice, the fairness with which the police treat the public, and tend 
not to have adequate measurement standards.99 They argue that while police agencies may 
intend for their members to practice fair policy, the independent nature of policing (the 
frequent absence of direct supervision) precludes ensuring procedural justice in each public 
interaction. Second, based on their surveys of members of the public who had police 
interactions, coupled with observations of police BWC footage capturing that interaction, 
Worden and McLean determined that procedural justice is weakly linked to the public’s 
perception of police legitimacy.100 Worden and McLean’s research concluded that 
whether or not the police acted with procedural justice made little impact on people’s 
perceptions of their legitimacy. Instead, they found that people’s interaction with police, 
regardless of the sense of fairness, significantly influenced their perceptions of police 
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legitimacy. Those with more police contact had a lesser opinion of police legitimacy; those 
with less police contact had a more favorable impression.101 
Worden and McLean’s work is particularly relevant when compared with Tyler’s 
research design. Tyler conducted his research via surveys of residents of particular 
localities. His survey generated self-reported data reflecting the respondents’ opinions on 
whether they believed the police had treated them in a procedurally just manner.102 Tyler 
did not pursue independent confirmation of such treatment. Conversely, Worden and 
McLean surveyed those who had interactions with police while also observing the officers’ 
relevant body-worn and in-car camera footage.103 This method allowed an objective 
determination of whether the person had been treated with procedural justice and measured 
the impact this treatment had on perceptions of police legitimacy. Their findings indicated 
that it was not how police conducted public interactions but whether they interacted with a 
person at all that most affected perceptions of police legitimacy.104 
This review of the prevalent literature on institutional legitimacy theory and police 
legitimacy touches on a deep and wide-ranging body of literature. Police legitimacy studies 
focus on the antecedents of legitimacy and how to build and sustain police organizations’ 
legitimacy. The next section examines the literature on police organizational practices and 
policies that promote legitimacy. 
B. POLICE POLICIES THAT PROMOTE LEGITIMACY 
Some professional organizations and government agencies provide policy 
guidelines and recommendations for police agencies and, in doing so, confer legitimacy on 
those agencies that comply with their direction. Cooper describes this process as “sovereign 
isomorphism,” wherein entities define institutional and professional standards to be 
followed, conferring legitimacy on agencies that conform to these standards.105 Worden 
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and McLean describe sovereigns as “audiences with standing,” such as legislators, courts, 
and professional organizations, that confer legitimacy to organizations that follow their 
guidance.106 Consistent with this process, police agencies seek counsel and 
recommendations from sovereign organizations to help build legitimacy. 
Some of these sovereigns include the International Association of Chiefs of Police 
(IACP), the Department of Justice (DOJ) and its Office of Community Oriented Policing 
Services (COPS), the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), President Obama’s Task 
Force on 21st Century Policing (the Task Force), and the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. 
These groups’ documents, directions, and guidelines are recognized by police executives 
nationwide as sources of recommendations and validation of their policing policies.107 As 
described below, concern about the public’s perception of police legitimacy forms the 
cornerstone of many of their policy proposals. 
Building and maintaining legitimacy is the primary declared objective of many 
sovereign policy proposals and recommendations. President Obama’s Task Force on 21st 
Century Policing was established by executive order in December 2014, in the wake of the 
deaths of Eric Garner in New York and Michael Brown in Ferguson earlier that year.108 
The first section of the report states, “Building trust and nurturing legitimacy on both sides 
of the police–citizen divide is not only the first pillar of this task force’s report but also the 
foundational principle underlying this inquiry into the nature of relations between law 
enforcement and the communities they serve.”109 The Task Force highlights Tyler’s 
findings on the effect of procedural justice on legitimacy. It agrees with his assessment that 
when people have a sense of fair treatment, they are more likely to comply with the law 
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and police direction, thus conferring legitimacy to the police.110 Further, the report 
recommends that procedural justice be the center around which all police training is 
focused instead of existing on the fringes.111 
Echoing the Task Force’s emphasis on the importance of legitimacy in policing, the 
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights recommends that police need to alleviate the perception 
or concerns a community may have about being treated unfairly or unequally, which 
negatively affects legitimacy.112 The commission further agrees that citizens are more 
likely to cooperate if they believe law enforcement performs its duty in an equitable and 
impartial manner.113 However, the finding most relevant to this thesis is the “overarching 
need” to build legitimacy between police and the community, as this is one of the central 
matters of contention after a fatal police shooting.114 These events can have an immense 
and immediate detrimental impact on police and community relations. 
The DOJ’s Community Relations Service has warned that a controversial use of 
police force can rapidly deteriorate (or destroy) the police and community’s relationship 
and threaten a department’s internal stability.115 Further, Nathan James et al. authored a 
report finding that the tension created by high-profile police incidents can negatively affect 
the perception people have about police even beyond the local community involved.116 
For example, after the controversial deaths of Eric Garner in Staten Island, New York, and 
Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, in the summer of 2014, policing was subject to 
national and international attention and scrutiny.117 Such controversial force incidents 
expose fractures in the relationship between the police and community and affect the 
 
110 Community Oriented Policing Services, 10. 
111 Community Oriented Policing Services, 52. 
112 Commission on Civil Rights, Police Use of Force, 1. 
113 Commission on Civil Rights, 2. 
114 Commission on Civil Rights, 131. 
115 Department of Justice, “Community Relations Services Toolkit,” 1. 
116 James et al., Public Trust, 1. 
117 Department of Justice, “Community Relations Services Toolkit,” 1. 
26 
perception of police acting in an impartial manner, which negatively impacts the public’s 
sense of police legitimacy.118 
Legitimacy is vital in gaining the public’s cooperation with the police and the law. 
Use-of-force events may hurt this relationship, so professional organizations and 
government agencies that guide police agencies have identified several policy dimensions 
that may positively impact the public’s sense of police legitimacy. Enhancements to police 
oversight, changes to department leadership, increases in community engagement efforts, 
modification of training, and incorporation of technology are some of the 
legitimacy-building policies these guiding organizations have proposed. A discussion of 
these policies follows. This thesis applies these policies to analyze how the five police 
agencies responded to the incidents identified, which in turn provides the information 
needed to answer the research questions. 
Suchman has suggested that the creation of monitors and watchdogs allows an 
organization to “post a bond” on its reputation.119 In other words, the addition of a police 
oversight function may aid in the public’s perception that a guarantor will ensure fair police 
processes, thus enhancing perceived legitimacy. In line with his position, the Task Force 
recommends creating civilian oversight police boards or commissions, whose purpose is 
to review serious uses of force and controversial incidents.120 The board’s mission would 
be to identify lapses in administrative, policy, tactical, training, and supervisory 
capacities.121 In findings similar to the Task Force’s, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 
recommends that civilian review boards be genuinely independent and separate from law 
enforcement, even suggesting that they have subpoena powers to complete their 
mandates.122 The commission also recommends that these boards oversee routine police 
disciplinary matters, in addition to the more serious incidents mentioned by the Task Force, 
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which it believes can further improve community faith in the police.123 However, 
according to James E. Copple and Nicola L. Erb in a policy document written for COPS, 
these boards and commissions need training and exposure to the daily reality of 
policing.124 By comparing police boards to medical review boards (where trained members 
of the medical profession evaluate other members), Copple and Erb recommend that 
oversight boards provide their members training on police policy and process. They argue 
that doing so will equip board members to better understand policing issues while also 
encouraging police officers to believe the process is fair. 
Improving or replacing agency leadership is another dimension recommended by 
research conducted by police policy sovereigns. The Task Force recommends establishing 
enhancement programs and higher standards of conduct at every leadership level, finding 
that good leadership is likely to lead to line officers behaving in accordance with 
department policies.125 The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights finds that organizational 
transformations support community partnerships when management and structures align to 
set improved performance as a goal, which may increase faith and legitimacy in the 
police.126 However, in some cases, seeking improvement from agency leadership is 
insufficient, and more drastic change is necessary. Suchman describes this process as 
“disassociation,” whereby structural changes to leadership create a space between an 
incident of poor performance and the organization as a whole, indicating an agency’s desire 
to move beyond a controversy.127 American criminologist Lawrence W. Sherman concurs 
with Suchman, noting that removing the police executive (chief or commissioner) provides 
a symbolic change from an agency’s prior unfavorable actions. He believes doing so 
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separates the agency from improper conduct of the past, with these reforms re-creating it 
as a “new” agency.128 
The recent firings of two police executives following controversial incidents serve 
as examples of this symbolic change and disassociation process. For instance, Chief Rick 
Maglione of the Fort Lauderdale Police Department was relieved of his command in June 
2020 after BWC footage revealed his officers’ questionable use of force and unprofessional 
conduct during a demonstration.129 Another instance of this disassociation process is 
manifest in the firing of Louisville Metro Police Department Chief Steve Conrad that same 
month due to his officers’ failures to activate their BWCs during a fatal shooting 
incident.130 In the latter incident, Louisville Mayor Greg Fischer stated, “This type of 
institutional failure will not be tolerated,” and Kentucky Governor Andy Beshear agreed, 
declaring the chief’s firing “had to happen.”131 These pronouncements created a wedge 
between the “old” department under Conrad’s command and a “new” department from that 
moment forward. The changing of an agency’s executive is a considerable commitment to 
transformation. Still, as crime policy researcher Wesley Skogan and the National Research 
Council found, the police chief is the central component in determining his or her officers’ 
behavior.132 As demonstrated, improvement or change in leadership is a recognized 
method for enhancing police legitimacy. 
Beyond enriching (or replacing) agency leadership, adopting community-oriented 
policing is endorsed by sovereign professional organizations and government agencies. 
The IACP suggests that community-oriented policing is an effective, valuable way for a 
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department to engage and empower the community.133 It argues that successful 
community-oriented policing embraces the philosophy of community service as the central 
goal of the agency, internalizing an institutional commitment to the strategy. This model 
empowers citizens, the IACP suggests, to partner with police and solve the local crime and 
social problems of their community. The DOJ’s Community Relations Service concurs 
with the IACP, advising that good police and community relations validate the public’s 
sense of police legitimacy, making them more inclined to cooperate with the police.134 
Conversely, when this relationship is weak, the public’s inclination to cooperate weakens. 
Further, James et al. find that community policing—the police and the public’s engagement 
as established policy—can be an avenue to repair existing fissures in that relationship.135 
According to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, an effective community-
oriented policing policy consists of three critical components: a “collaborative relationship 
between law enforcement agencies and the public”; “organizational transformations that 
provide alignment of management structure, personnel, and information systems to support 
community partnerships” at the institutional rather than programmatic level; and the 
development of “problem-solving strategies which pertain to a process of active 
examination of identified problems . . . to develop . . . effective responses.”136 Copple and 
Erb further note that routine-yet-negative police contacts, such as traffic enforcement, can 
complicate the police’s relationship with the community.137 They recommend that 
agencies structure their patrol function to increase direct positive contacts with the 
community. Expanding on their view, the Task Force report recommends that police 
enforcement measures, such as ticket writing, be used solely as a corrective measure to 
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enhance public safety rather than a revenue stream.138 The Task Force finds community-
oriented policing requires that positive relationships be built actively. The strategy must 
not be relegated to a specialized unit’s duties but rather be the way the entire department 
operates.139 
Besides incorporating community-oriented policing into a police department’s 
organizational structure, enhancing community engagement is an essential policy 
consideration recommended by police policy sovereigns. Distinct from community-
oriented policing, which describes the institutionalization of that policy and philosophy 
within a police department agency-wide, community engagement defines the methods of 
interacting and communicating with the community. The Task Force report proposes, for 
instance, that police departments engage in positive community contacts (such as youth 
outreach) in areas they frequently find themselves responding to for negative reasons (such 
as responding to crime reports).140 The rationale for such action is to balance negative 
interactions with contacts benefiting the community. Positive connections can weaken the 
perception that police only appear in these areas to enforce the law, thus increasing a sense 
of fairness and legitimacy. Additionally, the IACP notes that positive community contacts 
may take the form of social events, such as forming neighborhood watches, enrolling 
people in citizen police academies, or attending “coffee with a cop” events.141 These 
“trust-building endeavors,” as described in the Task Force report, may help foster 
relationships between police and the public by increasing non-enforcement contacts 
between them.142 Social events, such as annual National Night Out events, should be part 
of an ongoing and persistent dialogue between police and the community they serve, the 
IACP finds; the effort to meet the community cannot wait until a high-profile or 
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controversial incident occurs.143 Copple and Erb agree with these findings, suggesting that 
the police forge “anchor” relationships within the community at gatherings outside the 
scope of traditional policing, such as barbeques, visits to senior centers, and sporting 
events.144 Community-oriented policing and community engagement go hand-in-glove, 
requiring a commitment to mutual familiarization and relationship building. Beyond 
community interaction, however, police agencies are also advised by sovereign 
organizations on force and tactical equipment policy considerations, which may positively 
or negatively impact legitimacy. 
Police policy sovereigns heavily emphasize de-escalation, the preservation of life 
in use-of-force guidelines, and less-lethal technologies. The Task Force report, for 
example, advises police agencies to formulate de-escalation and alternatives to summonses 
or arrests into policy, in keeping with the idea that overly aggressive law enforcement 
strategies damage the police–community relationship.145 The report further details that the 
use of force against “vulnerable populations—including children, elderly persons, pregnant 
women, people with physical and mental disabilities, limited English proficiency, and 
others—can undermine public trust and should be used as a last resort,” as such action can 
adversely impact public perceptions of legitimacy.146 The report further suggests that 
departments conduct research to establish whether their use-of-force and equipment 
policies, while effective, may be perceived as unfairly applied and cause collateral damage 
to legitimacy.147 Holding an opinion similar to the one held by the Task Force, the DOJ’s 
Community Relations Service suggests that officers should de-escalate encounters 
whenever possible, recognizing that “a controversial use of force by a police officer can 
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jeopardize the stability of a police department and its relationships with the community 
overnight.”148 
To enhance use-of-force accountability, PERF’s Guiding Principles on Use of 
Force advises that police agencies document all force incidents, be they purely physical 
force events or the use of authorized equipment.149 The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 
concurs and endeavors to collect this data to determine whether the police apply force to 
different groups unfairly, which would harm perceptions of legitimacy.150 As the Task 
Force states, “Crime reduction is not self-justifying,” meaning the community is unlikely 
to accept behaviors they deem to be outside of the fairness and equity they expect, lest the 
police lose legitimacy.151 
Less-lethal technologies, which are unlikely to cause death when appropriately 
deployed, are suggested by the Task Force report as possibly decreasing fatal police 
interventions.152 For example, the use of conducted electrical devices (CEDs) reduces 
officer injuries by 70 percent and suspect injuries by 40 percent in cities that use CEDs 
compared to those that do not.153 PERF’s Guiding Principles on Use of Force supports the 
Task Forces’ recommendation, advocating that use-of-force policies nationwide 
incorporate CEDs and that policies do not rely on lethal force to address ineffective CED 
deployment.154 PERF suggests that in response to an ineffective CED deployment, officers 
use a “critical decision-making model” rather than escalating force, which requires 
re-assessing the threat and responding with proportional action instead of automatically 
resorting to a firearm.155 Continuing with a commitment to de-escalation, PERF 
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recommends discontinuing concepts it finds outdated, such as officers’ “drawing a line in 
the sand” during contentious confrontations or trying to resolve all situations quickly, 
which can lead to controversial uses of force.156 PERF also recommends that police 
agencies provide officers with tools such as personal protective shields, which allow them 
to deflect incoming threats and assess de-escalation tactics.157 Copple and Erb add to 
PERF’s guidance on these devices, noting that there must be nuance in their deployment 
so as not to send a message of aggression.158 As incidents of force and equipment 
deployment are subject to interpretation by a public typically uninformed of specific police 
policy, the messaging between an agency and an interested public is essential. 
In Building Trust between the Police and the Citizens They Serve, the IACP and 
COPS say a well-structured media strategy and publicly directed statements are an 
effective means to positively influence the public’s perception of a police agency and its 
actions.159 An agency’s use of a designated spokesperson, the guide suggests, can cultivate 
contacts in the media and help devise a proactive messaging strategy that highlights 
department successes and positive stories. Copple and Erb concur with the IACP and 
COPS, arguing that police agencies should use the media to promote their positive stories 
and create a narrative of their own with the public.160 However, more important than 
proactive, positive messaging is communication with the media and public during critical 
police incidents, such as officer-involved shootings or allegations of misconduct. The 
IACP finds police executives who are transparent with their community members and 
include public messaging in their response to critical incidents obtain and sustain the 
confidence of their citizens, thereby increasing legitimacy.161 The Task Force similarly 
notes that agencies need to communicate with media and the public quickly, openly, and 
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impartially, especially in response to allegations of misconduct or improper use of force.162 
Specifically, for officer-involved shootings, the IACP explains, there should be a 
systematic response capability built to address community inquiries and concerns.163 
To discourage speculation or uninformed commentary on noteworthy police 
incidents, the IACP recommends providing basic information to the press and public as 
quickly as possible, which can quash speculation and rumor.164 During such events, police 
agencies can also benefit from providing procedures and protocols, giving actions context 
in public and media messaging.165 The IACP suggests that this messaging be an ongoing 
police–community communication program that does not wait for a crisis incident. PERF 
advocates regular information releases even when information is preliminary and events 
are still unfolding.166 
Beyond the mere facts of an incident and applicable policies, transparency on 
procedural processes is an essential aspect of communication with the media and the 
public: a clear, concise, and open discussion of the internal mechanisms that dictate an 
agency’s response to a critical event.167 In these discussions, the U.S. Commission on Civil 
Rights encourages increased police accountability and transparency with the public.168 
The commission finds that the lack of transparency about practice and policy negatively 
impacts the public’s perception of police legitimacy.169 Mary-Jo Robinson and 
Christopher Smith, writing for COPS-sponsored Rank and File, find that the communities 
police agencies serve have come to expect the “what, when, where, and how” of critical 
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police events, policies, and processes that are important to them, and demand prompt 
explanations.170 
With these public expectations declared, the use of BWCs has become the primary 
way police agencies demonstrate their commitment to transparency.171 To explore this 
approach, police technology-policy researchers Lindsey Miller and Jessica Toliver 
co-authored a PERF-sponsored guide on BWCs.172 In it, they report that officers’ use of 
BWCs supports a community’s sense that they are receiving procedurally just policing 
while creating public records of events for subsequent review, each of which enhances 
perceptions of legitimacy. BWCs provide the community with transparency on issues 
concerning police conduct, they continue, providing the ability to review evidence of 
questionable encounters and answer any inquiries.173 Further, Miller and Toliver say that 
BWCs act as a deterrent to improper police behaviors, as evidenced by fewer complaints 
against police officers using them versus those who do not, and provide a managerial tool 
to identify and correct poor performance. The Task Force report concurs, stating that 
BWCs create a sense of self-awareness in officers and the public that their actions are being 
recorded, leading to better behavior by both parties.174 The U.S. Commission on Civil 
Rights describes this as a “civilizing effect on both officer and civilian behavior.”175 
Further, the Task Force cites a 12-month study that found officers using BWCs had 59 
percent fewer complaints and 87.5 percent fewer use-of-force incidents than officers not 
using cameras.176 
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The research cited in the previous paragraph shows that police officers using BWCs 
are likely to improve police–community relations and increase public perceptions of 
procedural justice and, by effect, create greater police legitimacy. It is important to note, 
however, that police agencies using BWCs must do more than purchase and distribute 
them, policy sovereigns say. Copple and Erb’s COPS guide notes that police agencies 
should not “just buy the cameras and slap them on the officer’s chest” but must also ensure 
that sound policy dictates their use.177 For example, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 
recommends that officers turn their cameras on at the beginning of a public interaction 
rather than once it is in progress.178 Turning the BWC on midway, says the commission, 
can be seen by the public as a provocative action and negate the civilizing effect described 
above. 
A report by James et al. lists other BWC policy concerns, including the costs 
associated with maintaining the equipment and videos; concerns relative to citizen privacy 
rights (particularly during medical assistance assignments); the detrimental effect 
recording may have on witness cooperation; and the outcome wearing BWCs may have on 
proactive police enforcement, such as traffic stops.179 While BWCs can promote 
legitimacy and fair policing, they are not a cure-all; their use must be considered within the 
context of improving the relationship between police and the community and promoting a 
sense of legitimacy. 
Accordingly, releasing BWC footage containing uses of force or publicly 
questioned events is the policy widely suggested for adoption by police agencies by the 
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Toliver and Miller, Copple and Erb, PERF, COPS, and 
other policy sovereigns.180 This release should be within each state’s public disclosure 
laws, they say. Still, they generally recommend the widest distribution possible to 
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demonstrate the agency’s commitment to openness, accountability, and transparency, 
which aid in building a perception of neutrality and legitimacy.181 The legitimacy-
developing benefits of a police agency’s BWC program demonstrate how embracing 
modern technology can bridge understanding between the police and community. 
Similarly, another technology that can create a bridge of understanding with the 
community is social media. When recommending that police departments use social media 
platforms, such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, extensively, the Task Force observes 
that doing so promotes community engagement and increases the community’s sense of 
access to the police.182 Police can use social media in a few ways to engage with the public 
positively. Primarily, as Copple and Erb suggest, police agencies can easily promote the 
good work they do, rapidly creating and communicating a narrative of constructive 
interactions with the people they serve.183 Robinson and Smith believe this communication 
humanizes police to the community and demonstrates how officers participate helpfully in 
the public’s lives, such as through youth outreach.184 Secondarily, police departments can 
leverage social media during critical or controversial incidents as a method to disseminate 
information quickly, but the information must be current and factual. As the IACP 
indicates, misleading or false statements, particularly surrounding use-of-force events, can 
be very damaging.185 Successful communication via social media can open two-way 
communication lines between police and the community, Robinson and Smith suggest, 
reinforcing the principles of transparency.186 
Finally, many of the legitimacy-building policy recommendations listed above, 
such as modifications to the use of force and less-lethal force alternatives, community 
engagement, using BWCs, and leveraging social media, lean on a police agency’s ability 
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to teach its membership the value and importance of these courses of action. As such, police 
policy sovereigns recommend enhancing training as a way to unite these various 
legitimacy-building actions. The IACP and DOJ argue that training is an ongoing process 
from hiring until retirement, focusing on integrity, discretion, and ethics for building 
character and forming good habits.187 The Task Force expands on this idea, suggesting 
that training must impart the concept that officers should be responsive to the needs, 
character, and ideals of the community served.188 PERF advocates for value-based training 
to connect with the community, suggesting that the training culture reflect the skills, values, 
and attributes police agencies want their members to display when interacting with the 
public.189 The ethos of training, these sovereigns believe, should primarily emphasize 
connections and responsiveness in all policing aspects with the community. Currently, as 
Robinson and Smith note, there is an imbalance in training.190 For example, they find 
police recruit training consists of an average of 58 hours on firearms training and 49 hours 
on defensive tactics, but only about 8 hours on crisis intervention, CEDs, and de-escalation 
techniques. They advise that proper training is the backbone of comprehensive community 
policing, thus requiring the correction of this imbalance. 
As a part of improving the training commitment to community values and needs, 
policy sovereigns most heavily emphasize reductions in the use of force, the 
implementation of less-lethal technologies, and de-escalation techniques in their 
recommendations. The Task Force suggests that, at a minimum, firearms training be 
conducted annually, with a focus on “shoot/don’t shoot” scenarios, seeking to train officers 
away from leaning on their firearm as the primary force option. Less-lethal force options, 
they believe, should be incorporated into this annual training.191 The IACP’s 
recommendations align with the Task Force’s, arguing that training improvements can 
teach officers to choose the appropriate response level rather than automatically select a 
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higher force option.192 Officers trained this way, the IACP suggests, are better prepared to 
explore options other than force and can leverage de-escalation techniques that preserve 
the lives and safety of all parties. The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights also emphasizes 
that police training benefits from de-escalation tactics, including strategies to create 
distance, time, and space between an officer and a threat, intending to reduce the need to 
use force.193 As of November 2018, the commission notes that de-escalation training is 
not required in 34 states, finding that current police instruction overemphasizes officer 
safety and firearms proficiency skills.194 Alternatively, the commission suggests teaching 
officers to avoid situations where using physical force or a firearm is their sole option.195 
A vital part of the training shift toward de-escalation and using less force is 
revamping the style of training. The Task Force suggests abandoning the prevalent 
disciplinarian, paramilitary “boot camp” models of instruction for an adult-style learning 
and scenario-based model.196 James et al. say the current military-style training models 
are stress-based approaches to police training, which prepare police for “combat” and 
crime-fighting rather than community service and problem solving.197 Their report found 
that police agencies should implement scenario-based training, role-playing exercises that 
teach officers ways to respond to various incidents they may encounter.198 These sessions, 
they say, are more impactful than lecture-based sessions that lack realistic interactions. 
James et al. suggest that this training model is more effective at teaching officers de-
escalation and crisis intervention skills, thus decreasing the likelihood of needing to use 
force. 
The introduction of implicit bias awareness is an emerging area in the efforts to 
enhance police training. The Task Force advises that achieving legitimacy requires the 
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mitigation of implicit biases, defined as those which people are unaware they have, and 
incorporating this concept into all aspects of training.199 Implicit biases may distort the 
perception police have about members of certain groups and affect their decision-making 
process, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights finds.200 Correcting this type of bias, the 
Task Force advises, requires that police agencies move away from tactics and policies that 
unintentionally lead to excessive action against minority groups, such as African-
Americans, Latinos, Muslims, LGBTQ members, and others.201 The DOJ Community 
Relations Service suggests that a partnership with the community can help police agencies 
develop “cultural competency” courses to foster an understanding of each community’s 
uniqueness.202 Incorporating implicit bias awareness into the overall culture of enhanced 
police training, as evidenced above, can strengthen the bond between the police and the 
community, fostering a sense of fairness and impartiality that is critical in building the 
perception of police legitimacy. 
Many of the recommendations to increase the public’s perception of legitimacy 
have become more prevalent in U.S. police departments since George Floyd’s death on 
May 25, 2020. As this thesis was conceived before his death, it seems appropriate to briefly 
discuss how his case relates to the subject of this research topic, even as it remains active. 
Floyd died in police custody while being restrained by Minneapolis Police Department 
(MPD) Officer Derek Chauvin.203 Civilian witnesses captured the incident on video, 
showing Officer Chauvin kneeling on Floyd’s neck until he became unconscious and then 
unresponsive, and later died at the scene.204 Media reporting of the incident included this 
video on a continuous loop, which sparked worldwide outrage at police. In addition to the 
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numerous protests in the United States, which still occur as of this writing, widespread 
anti-police protests inspired by Floyd’s death have occurred in countries such as England, 
Switzerland, Brazil, Italy, Spain, Scotland, and China, among others.205 
Writing about Floyd’s death and the massive public outrage that ensued, Rick Muir, 
director of the Police Foundation in the United Kingdom, argues in favor of enhancing 
procedural justice as a way to improve public confidence in the police. Muir contends that 
“police legitimacy has to be renewed constantly, every hour of every day, in the practice 
of police officers and in the way they relate to members of the public.”206 The IACP, 
echoing Muir, condemned the actions of the officers involved in Floyd’s death while 
emphasizing the need for police to increase transparency, enhance procedural justice 
through policy changes, and reduce the use of force.207 Chuck Wexler, the executive 
director of PERF, referenced the 30 Guiding Principles on the Use of Force when 
commenting critically on Chauvin’s actions and advocating adherence to de-escalation: 
“Ultimately, this . . . is about the sanctity of all human life.”208 
Several police agencies pivoted in response to the challenge Floyd’s death posed to 
police legitimacy. Many of the legitimacy-increasing policy recommendations suggested 
above by police sovereigns have been a part of that response. For example, some heads of 
nationwide police agencies condemned the Minneapolis officers’ actions in strategically 
planned media conferences and publicly directed statements regarding the Floyd 
incident.209 The MPD publicly released the BWC footage of his arrest after public and 
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media demands.210 In keeping with transparency on procedural processes, MPD Police 
Chief Medaria Arradondo quickly announced the firing of four officers involved in the 
incident the day after Floyd’s death.211 
Separate from Minneapolis, other cities also implemented sovereign 
recommendations to maintain and support their legitimacy in response to Floyd’s death. A 
ban on chokeholds, for example, is among changes to use-of-force policies occurring in 
over 20 cities across the country post-Floyd, including New York City, Los Angeles, 
Denver, Houston, and Washington, DC.212 Floyd’s death prompted citizens in Fort Worth 
to demand civilian oversight boards (the city opted instead for a police monitor).213 In 
Atlanta, Chief of Police Erika Shields resigned two days after a fatal shooting of a black 
man by a member of her agency, an act consistent with efforts to improve or replace agency 
leadership after a controversial use of force.214 While Shields insists she left voluntarily, 
the immediacy of her resignation after the shooting suggests otherwise. The death of 
George Floyd is having a continued impact on police legitimacy that has yet to be 
measured. The aftermath of the events of May 25, 2020, is ongoing. In the wake of Floyd, 
police agencies nationwide are grappling with the legitimacy challenge and are following 
the suggestions of police policy sovereign organizations to recover in the public’s eyes. 
This literature review examined legitimacy theory as applied to institutions broadly 
and the police specifically, as well as policies that policing sovereigns recommend to 
promote legitimacy. The first section informed how legitimacy affects an institution’s 
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ability to survive and how police agencies need the public perception of legitimacy to gain 
and maintain support. The second section detailed 12 policy dimensions that police policy 
sovereigns found enhance a sense of legitimacy when implemented as directed. A brief 
review of some policing responses to George Floyd’s death provided evidence that police 
leaders adhered to those policy prescriptions following a police-related civilian fatality. 
These two areas of legitimacy theory and police policy form the core logic of this thesis 
and are the guiding principles for the analysis that follows in Chapters III through VII. 
The next chapters detail the five selected police interactions that resulted in a 
civilian’s death and precipitated a crisis of legitimacy for the agency involved. Each fatality 
was caused either by police directly using force (by shooting or applying physical force) 
or while the person was under the care and custody of the police. These deaths resulted in 
a substantial legitimacy challenge to the agencies involved, drastically damaged their 
relationship with the community, and generated intense public attention and media 
coverage. More critically, the aftermath of each fatality included either deadly violence 
targeting the police or large-scale civil disorder and riots, extreme representations of lost 
legitimacy. 
These deaths, between 2014 and 2016, ignited intense and persisting scrutiny of the 
use of force by police and law enforcement’s relationship with the community.215 These 
chapters follow in chronological order of occurrence. First, the facts, legal processes, and 
outcomes are described (the action), followed by a review of the retaliation against police 
or widespread destruction of property (the aftermath).216 Then, the Cynefin framework is 
applied to each agency’s implementation of the expert-recommended legitimacy-
developing policies before and in response to the crisis. Finally, Chapter VIII provides the 
results of this analysis and answers the research questions. 
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III. NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT: 
ERIC GARNER—JULY 17, 2014 
On Thursday, July 17, 2014, two plainclothes members of the New York City 
Police Department (NYPD) approached Eric Garner on a street corner in the Tompkinsville 
section of Staten Island, New York, suspecting him of selling loose cigarettes.217 Garner 
was 43 years old, stood over six feet tall, and weighed close to 400 pounds; he suffered 
from sleep apnea, diabetes, and severe asthma.218 A bystander captured the events that 
followed on video, which the New York Daily News website published the following day. 
In the footage, the officers speak to Garner, explaining why he was being arrested, with 
Garner protesting his innocence and asking to be left alone.219 The video shows Officer 
Daniel Pantaleo approaching Garner from behind to take him into custody, wrapping one 
arm under Garner’s armpit and the other around his neck; a struggle ensues. Garner and 
several more intervening officers then fall to the ground, and they handcuff him. While on 
the ground with officers on top of him, Garner repeats “I can’t breathe” 11 times before he 
loses unconsciousness.220 He died a short time later at Richmond University Hospital on 
Staten Island.221 
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The response to Garner’s death was swift condemnation from the public and 
community leaders such as Al Sharpton.222 Sharpton and Garner’s wife met with New 
York City Mayor Bill de Blasio and then-NYPD Police Commissioner William J. Bratton, 
expressing their demands for an impartial investigation. Later, other political figures, 
including New York City Federation of Teachers President Michael Mulgrew and former 
New York State Governor David Patterson, joined in criticizing the NYPD.223 Thousands 
marched in protests nationwide, expressing anger at Garner’s death through the summer of 
2014. The demonstrations became particularly fierce in August 2014 when the New York 
City medical examiner ruled Garner’s death a homicide. The medical examiner found that 
Garner died from Pantaleo’s placing him in a chokehold and compressing his chest, with 
his poor health aggravating both actions.224 
Staten Island District Attorney Daniel M. Donovan Jr. convened a grand jury in 
September 2014 to determine whether criminal charges were warranted, based on evidence 
including the medical examiner’s findings.225 On Wednesday, December 3, 2014, the 
grand jury returned its decision, declining to indict Pantaleo while determining that no 
criminality was manifest in Garner’s death.226 Later that same day, then-Attorney General 
Eric Holder announced the start of a DOJ-led federal civil rights investigation into Garner’s 
death.227 Holder noted that his office had allowed the Staten Island district attorney’s local 
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investigation to commence before his own while the DOJ monitored the proceedings from 
their start. On Tuesday, July 16, 2019—nearly five years after Holder announced the 
investigation—the U.S. attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Richard Donoghue, 
declared insufficient evidence existed to prove that officers violated any federal civil rights 
statutes during Garner’s arrest. That decision ended the search for criminality in this 
incident.228 
In May 2019, two months before the cessation of federal proceedings against 
Pantaleo, his NYPD department trial began.229 Separate from a criminal proceeding, an 
NYPD department trial is an internal disciplinary process to determine whether an officer 
violated policy or procedures and recommend a penalty to the police commissioner for 
final approval. On Friday, August 2, 2019, an administrative judge overseeing the trial 
found Pantaleo guilty of violating an NYPD policy that banned chokeholds, and 
recommended his firing.230 A few weeks later, then-NYPD Police Commissioner James 
P. O’Neill announced his agreement with the decision to terminate Pantaleo’s employment 
with the NYPD. Pantaleo is currently appealing the police commissioner’s decision, 
requesting his reinstatement.231 Civilly, New York City settled the Garner family’s 
wrongful-death claim one year after his death in 2015, agreeing to pay $5.9 million to 
Garner’s survivors.232 
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A. AFTERMATH: TWO NEW YORK OFFICERS KILLED 
Eric Garner’s death sparked a crisis of legitimacy for the NYPD and damaged its 
relationship with the community.233 The protests that began immediately after his death, 
and reignited each time state and federal authorities announced they would not be filing 
charges, spread beyond New York to cities such as Boston, Chicago, Pittsburgh, and 
Washington.234 In New York City, police arrested hundreds during these protests, during 
which some protesters carried coffins over the Brooklyn Bridge with the names of those 
shot by police. “No justice, no peace, no racist police” was a common refrain during these 
demonstrations. After the state-level grand jury declined to return an indictment in 
December 2014, demonstrators in Washington and Boston timed their marches to coincide 
with local Christmas tree lightings, snarling traffic and pedestrian access. Anger at the lack 
of a criminal indictment, demands to change the regulations that guide police use of force, 
and increased police accountability were sentiments expressed by those marching. These 
actions were an expression of rage at the perception of a broken criminal justice system.235 
The expressions of anger indicated a loss of legitimacy—the perception that the police 
were unjustified in their actions. The protesters demanded that their voices be heard and 
systemic changes be made. However, others would take violent action against the police, 
deviating from the ongoing protests and demonstrations, which were legal and anticipated 
avenues of change and police accountability. In December 2014, violence targeting NYPD 
officers would demonstrate an extreme example of lost police legitimacy. 
Just before 3:00 p.m. on Saturday, December 20, 2014, just weeks after the Staten 
Island grand jury’s decision not to indict Daniel Pantaleo, NYPD Officers Wenjian Liu and 
Rafael Ramos were shot and killed by Ismaaiyl Brinsley while they sat in their police car 
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in the Bedford-Stuyvesant section of Brooklyn.236 Brinsley, a resident of Baltimore, 
Maryland, then fled on foot, committing suicide on a subway platform a short distance 
away as pursuing officers closed in on him. 
Brinsley had an extensive criminal history, having been arrested nearly 20 times in 
his lifetime.237 Brinsley was on a violent spree the day of the police murders, having shot 
an ex-girlfriend that morning in the abdomen after an argument in Baltimore. He then 
traveled to New York City by bus, posting anti-police comments on his Instagram social 
media account. During the trip, he posted a photograph of a handgun with the caption “I’m 
Putting Wings On Pigs Today. They Take 1 of Ours. . . . Let’s Take 2 of Theirs 
#ShootThePolice #RIPErivGardner #RIPMikeBrown This may be my final post. . . . I’m 
Putting Pigs In A Blanket” (original emphasis).238 Brinsley’s references to “wings on pigs” 
and “pigs in a blanket” were expressions of his desire to kill police officers (“pig” is vulgar 
slang for a police officer).239 He also referenced Eric Garner and Michael Brown—a man 
killed by police in Ferguson, Missouri, during the summer of 2014—further declaring his 
motivations for killing Liu and Ramos.240 
There is no evidence that Brinsley harbored deep-seated, long-standing resentment 
or anger toward police.241 His life was marked with petty crimes, an unstable childhood, 
and the struggles of a youth in a poor urban environment. However, his final words to the 
world on social media and his actions that day in December 2014 indicate a person whose 
anger, rage, and actions were directed at police. In his final post, the specific mentioning 
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of Garner and Brown voiced his intent to retaliate against the police for what he believed 
were actions lacking legitimacy. Chapter II demonstrated that people are more likely to 
comply and cooperate with the police when they possess legitimacy; the retaliatory murder 
of police is the ultimate evidence of a perceived loss of legitimacy. 
B. CIVILIAN BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS 
1. Before 
The original NYPD police misconduct board was founded in 1955 as a 
police-staffed sub-unit within the department, created to address “police misconduct in 
their relations with Puerto Ricans and Negros specifically.”242 The board’s review process 
excluded outside civilian input until 1987, when New York City Council legislation 
mandated the inclusion of civilian investigators. These investigators, however, worked 
alongside other officers and under the supervision of police department officials. 
Full civilianization of the board came a few years later, due mainly to a 
well-publicized and notorious “police riot” in Tompkins Square Park. On Saturday, August 
6, 1988, police and fair-housing protesters engaged in violent clashes in the park, during 
which 31 civilians and 13 police officers suffered injuries of varying severity. Reporters 
described the event as “the most violent conflict between police and a crowd in years.”243 
Civilian videos of the riot revealed that some officers had hid or obscured their badges, 
reducing the ability to identify them, and at times wildly hit protesters with batons.244 In 
1993, then-Mayor David Dinkins and the City Council agreed to remove the board from 
NYPD control, creating an entirely independent civilian agency.245 Thus, the New York 
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City Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB) was established, empowered with 
subpoena authority for its investigations and the ability to recommend discipline in 
substantiated misconduct cases to the police commissioner. 
In 2012, the CCRB’s authority expanded.246 Before then, when CCRB 
substantiated an allegation of serious police misconduct, an NYPD “department advocate,” 
an officer with the department trained in the law, would “prosecute” an officer during an 
administrative NYPD trial.247 Critics of this model called the system a “toothless tiger,” 
suggesting that the NYPD was inept at the process.248 Under a memorandum of agreement 
reached by the NYPD and CCRB that year, civilian employees of the CCRB assumed the 
prosecutorial role during the administrative hearings. Department officials remained judges 
during these proceedings, with the police commissioner the final arbiter of discipline. 
However, if the commissioner deviates from the discipline recommendation of the CCRB 
when an officer is found guilty, he or she must provide the board with a written explanation. 
The board can appeal the commissioner’s decision if it chooses. 
2. In Response 
The CCRB remained unchanged procedurally after Eric Garner’s death, but some 
leadership changes coincided with the incident. On the day of Garner’s death, Mayor Bill 
de Blasio appointed Richard Emery as the new chair of the CCRB, a position vacant since 
December 2013; his appointment was previously planned, though, and unrelated to the 
events on Staten Island.249 Emery was a prominent civil rights lawyer, having previously 
criticized the CCRB as ineffective. Upon assuming the role, his objective was to increase 
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public confidence in the board while still treating officers fairly.250 After taking control of 
the board in the wake of Garner’s death, Emery effected several personnel changes. He 
ousted his executive director and several board members in September 2014 as part of 
revamping the agency.251 Additionally, in October 2014, de Blasio and Police 
Commissioner William J. Bratton announced they both intended to impanel two new board 
members supportive of Emery’s vision.252 However, his tenure was short-lived as Emery 
resigned in 2016 after making comments deemed disparaging to women and police 
officers.253 
Currently, the CCRB maintains 13 executive board members.254 The mayor and 
City Council are each allowed to pick five board members while the police commissioner 
chooses three. No members may have prior police experience except for those appointed 
by the police commissioner. Recently, however, public discussions about changing the 
process of selecting board members have emerged.255 Some activists advocate amending 
the city charter to convert CCRB board members to publicly elected officials rather than 
political appointees. They argue that the change would increase the board’s public 
accountability. 
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3. Cynefin Analysis 
Personnel changes aside, there was little difference in the CCRB’s policy and 
procedures before and in response to Garner’s death. The board was fully civilianized by 
1993, and the CCRB assumed control of the prosecutorial process in 2012, well before his 
death. As such, the NYPD was operating in the complicated domain before and after 
Garner’s death, maintaining the expert-recommended “good practice” of civilian boards’ 
having oversight of police misconduct issues.256 
C. IMPROVING OR REPLACING LEADERSHIP 
1. Before 
Police Commissioner Bratton and Chief Philip Banks III were the top officials in 
charge of NYPD when Garner died. In December 2013, newly elected Mayor de Blasio 
announced Bratton’s appointment to commissioner, assuming the role Raymond Kelly had 
held since 2002.257 This was Bratton’s second term as commissioner, his first being in 
1994 under then-Mayor Rudolph Giuliani. When Bratton assumed command in January 
2014, he maintained Banks as chief of the NYPD, the position he had occupied since March 
2013 under Kelly.258 At the local community level at the time of Garner’s death, Assistant 
Chief Edward Delatorre headed the Patrol Borough Staten Island command while Deputy 
Inspector Joseph Veneziano led the 120th Precinct, serving as Officer Pantaleo’s 
commanding officer.259 
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2. In Response 
There were no changes to any of the NYPD leadership roles described above as a 
result of Garner’s death. Instead, Mayor de Blasio pulled Bratton closer, expressing faith 
that his new commissioner would conduct a thorough investigation of the incident.260 For 
example, at a roundtable discussion with community leaders, de Blasio kept Bratton by his 
side as both faced questions from angry citizens.261 
While both Bratton and Banks would later separate from the NYPD, there is no 
evidence that Garner’s death was the causative factor. Banks retired in November 2014 
rather than assuming the role of Bratton’s first deputy commissioner, a promotion from 
chief of department but, in his opinion, one less relevant to everyday police operations.262 
Bratton remained police commissioner until September 2016, leaving the department to 
work for a policy advising firm over two years after Garner’s death.263 Both Delatorre and 
Veneziano also remained in their respective commands for several years post-Garner and 
have since been promoted to higher positions of authority. 
3. Cynefin Analysis 
There were no NYPD leadership changes in response to Garner’s death. Mayor de 
Blasio openly expressed confidence that his new police commissioner would identify and 
correct the agency’s issues and its relationship with the community. Thus, the NYPD was 
in the complicated domain before and after Garner’s death, requiring Bratton’s expert 
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professional guidance and fact-based management to determine the best course of action 
post-Garner, which are each identified features of this domain.264 
D. ADOPTING COMMUNITY-ORIENTED POLICING 
1. Before 
As noted above, Officer Pantaleo’s confrontation with Garner happened in July 
2014, seven months into the new tenures of Mayor de Blasio and Commissioner Bratton. 
Many of the prior administration’s policies were still in effect. As such, the department 
maintained a programmatic, rather than an institutional, model of community-oriented 
policing based on a plan formulated by former Police Commissioner Lee P. Brown in 
1991.265 Under this model, officers assigned to the NYPD’s Community Affairs Bureau 
were exclusively responsible for fostering goodwill and outreach with the public, 
community leaders, and civic organizations.266 This model relegated these tasks to the 
small number of officers in the bureau, relying little on the participation of outside officers. 
The assignments of Community Affairs officers lacked consistency, and they were 
deployed to routine policing duties when needed, reducing their impact in the community-
oriented policing program.267 The programmatic nature of the NYPD’s approach 
minimized the results obtained under its style of community-oriented policing. 
2. In Response 
Garner’s death motivated a change in the NYPD’s community-oriented policing 
model. In May 2015, the NYPD introduced the neighborhood policing model.268 Touted 
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by the agency as a new patrol paradigm, the program systemically changed how police 
officers perform their duties.269 By implementing neighborhood policing, the agency 
intended to “increase connectivity and engagement with the community without 
diminishing, and, in fact, improving the NYPD’s crime-fighting capabilities.”270 The 
program was introduced in phases, first in the Patrol Services Bureau, before being 
expanded to the Transit and Housing Bureaus, and the department adjusted as issues and 
problems arose. 
Each precinct was divided into five “sectors,” unique geographical zones that 
correspond as much as possible to established neighborhoods. Officers are assigned the 
same sector every day, encouraging ownership of each area’s issues and providing the 
public with the opportunity to interact with the same officers consistently. The officers 
assigned to sector duties must remain within the boundaries of their assignment, absent 
emergencies. Further, two additional officers are designated to each sector as neighborhood 
coordination officers (NCOs)—liaisons between the police and community members who 
also help detectives with investigative work, developing leads, and collecting evidence. 
NCOs gather information and coordinate their efforts with sector officers to jointly address 
the community’s needs and concerns. The commitment to an agency-wide community-
policing philosophy differs significantly from the old model, which was programmatic and 
narrowly realized. 
3. Cynefin Analysis 
The NYPD’s formulaic and simplistic method of programmatically implementing 
community-oriented policing before Garner’s death indicates operating in the obvious/
simple domain. The program lacked the institution-wide commitment to collaborative 
relationships and organizational changes recommended by policy sovereigns due to 
entrained thinking, instead relying on established practices from the past, a weakness of 
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the obvious/simple domain.271 However, after Garner’s death, the department’s expansion 
of the NCO program better aligned with a full conversion to community-oriented policing. 
The gradual implementation of the policy indicated the agency was in the complex domain, 
following the “probe-sense-respond” cycle.272 The shift toward community-oriented 
policing was probed in a small number of precincts, allowing for the emergence of a fully 
realized model. 
E. ENHANCING COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT 
1. Before 
The NYPD weakly implemented community engagement efforts in the years before 
Garner’s death, engaging in practices that alienated the public and committing scant 
resources to community outreach. Of particular controversy was the department’s 
aggressive reliance on “stop, question, and frisk” (SQF) as a crime-reduction tool from 
2002 to 2013.273 Under former Mayor Michael Bloomberg and Police Commissioner 
Raymond Kelly’s leadership during that period, SQFs increased from 97,296 in 2003 to 
685,724 in 2011.274 Critics charged that while the department’s SQF policy was intended 
to enhance safety and reduce crime, it instead undermined the NYPD’s relationship and 
engagement with the community.275 
The NYPD’s SQF practices resulted in several plaintiffs filing lawsuits against the 
agency and New York City. On August 12, 2013, federal judge Shira A. Scheindlin found 
in Floyd v. City of New York—a 2008 class action lawsuit alleging that police stopped the 
plaintiffs without cause—that the NYPD’s SQF practices were unconstitutional and 
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amounted to indirect racial profiling.276 As part of a remediation order mandating changes 
to the SQF program, Judge Scheindlin directed the department to pilot a body-worn camera 
program and appointed attorney Peter L. Zimroth as the monitor overseeing the reform 
process.277 
Under Commissioner Kelly, the agency’s commitment of resources to community 
outreach relied heavily on its Community Affairs Bureau. However, as mentioned above, 
these efforts were programmatically rather than institutionally implemented. In other 
words, community outreach was a task designated to few officers rather than an agency-
wide philosophy. Local-level community engagement was inadequate.278 At the precinct 
level, the NYPD operated community councils, advisory groups that met monthly. The 
purpose of these groups was to link the community and the commanding officer, aiming to 
establish a working partnership to improve public safety and quality of life. On the other 
hand, a criticism of these councils was that goals were set “top-down” by the NYPD, being 
agency-driven rather than responsive to community members’ needs.279 
2. In Response 
In January 2014, Mayor de Blasio settled the Bloomberg administration’s appeal of 
Judge Scheindlin’s ruling.280 Agreeing to her reforms was part of the city’s and 
department’s efforts at ameliorating SQF’s harmful impact on community engagement. As 
a result, stops decreased from an all-time high of nearly 700,000 in 2011 to 45,787 by the 
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end of 2014.281 That number was further reduced to 22,565 in 2015, and then again to 
12,404 in 2016. 
Besides eliminating stop-and-frisk as a central component of its crime-reduction 
strategy, the NYPD experimented with novel community engagement methods after 
Garner’s death. For example, NYPD officers participated in Coffee with a Cop meetings, 
which focused on opening channels of communication with the public in an informal 
setting; some of these coffee sessions had over 60 attendees.282 The NYPD did not restrict 
its outreach efforts to the surface level; it went underground as well. NYPD subway officers 
organized Meet Your Police initiatives in the transit system, with members of the local 
police station establishing information hubs on busy platforms to increase engagement with 
commuters.283 
Notably, while the mission of the neighborhood policing model requires all officers 
to embrace community policing and engagement as a mandate, the department recently 
created a specialized “Rapid Response Team” to help distressed citizens in their utmost 
time of need.284 Two recent cases of the team’s work demonstrate the NYPD’s enhanced 
commitment to community outreach.285 In early July 2020, Rapid Response Team 
members helped a 10-year-old girl celebrate her birthday after she and her family were left 
homeless in a fire. Later in the month, they bought groceries to help feed the family of a 
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shooting victim. These focused interventions were unheard of in the NYPD’s old model of 
community outreach. 
3. Cynefin Analysis 
Much like its efforts at community-oriented policing before Garner’s death, the 
NYPD’s community outreach approaches resided in the obvious/simple domain. By 
prioritizing a tool for crime reduction at the sacrifice of community outreach, the NYPD’s 
use of “established practices” alienated it from some community members and exposed it 
to legal oversight from outside the agency. In response to Garner’s death (and Judge 
Scheindlin’s findings), the NYPD has pivoted into the complex domain. The NYPD probed 
for an emergent solution to community outreach, reducing its reliance on SQF and adopting 
new ways of presenting itself to the community. 
F. EMPHASIZING DE-ESCALATION, PRESERVATION OF LIFE, AND 
ADOPTING LESS-LETHAL TECHNOLOGIES 
1. Before 
The NYPD began collecting data on firearms discharges in 1971, analyzing the 
circumstances of its officers’ use of deadly force. The agency annually releases an 
aggregated report of the data from the prior year for public review. The 2013 Annual 
Firearms Discharge Report, compiling data from the year before Garner’s death, stated 
that “the Department has made restrain the norm.”286 The report says that evidence of 
officer restraint was manifest in the reduction of lethal police shootings from 93 in 1971 to 
8 in 2013, which also saw the smallest number of total police firearms discharges, 81, since 
the department began tracking them.287 The NYPD’s ultimate objective, the report says, 
is to ensure that officers fire their weapons only when there is absolutely no other option. 
The report further notes the department’s pledge to preserve life, including those of 
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subjects threatening the life of an officer or another person.288 Additionally, the report 
emphasizes the department mandates its officers use lethal force to stop a subject’s actions, 
not kill the subject. Lacking in the report, however, is any mention of de-escalation; instead, 
it frames the discussion of lethal force in terms of restraint.289 
In February 2014, however, the NYPD announced the introduction of Seven Steps 
to Positive Community Interactions, a training program teaching officers de-escalation 
skills. “The idea is to begin to formulate new language for all our officers that might help 
diffuse a situation rather than escalate it,” said Commissioner Bratton when introducing 
the program.290 Mayor de Blasio said the plan was part of his administration’s efforts to 
repair community relationships damaged by the city’s history with SQF and encourage 
officers to be respectful during encounters with the public.291 
At the time of Garner’s death, the less-lethal force options available to NYPD patrol 
officers were limited to batons and oleoresin capsicum (OC) spray. A 2008 RAND 
Corporation study by Rostker et al. found that officers rarely used the OC spray and 
recommended the NYPD supply its officers with additional less-lethal technology 
options.292 The study suggested the NYPD had equipped officers with CEDs and impact 
munitions, soft non-penetrating projectiles—fired from launchers—that induce compliance 
by blunt-force pain.293 “If the NYPD employed a more robust standoff weapon,” Rostker 
et al. found, “it might not only prevent some incidents from escalating to deadly force but 
might also reduce injuries to officers and citizens alike.”294 At the time of Garner’s death, 
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only patrol supervisors were equipped with CEDs, and impact munitions were exclusive to 
members of the Emergency Service Unit, the department’s tactical team.295 
2. In Response 
In September 2014, Commissioner Bratton testified before a New York City 
Council oversight hearing on the erosion of police and community relations since Garner’s 
death.296 At that hearing, Bratton announced the creation of a mandatory three-day 
retraining program that would instruct officers on ways of speaking with uncooperative 
subjects and gaining compliance, methods of subduing a person if they refused to comply, 
and cultural sensitivity. He intended for officers to attend this training regularly, as they 
did for firearms training. The program commenced in December 2014 and was the first 
department-wide de-escalation training effort resulting from Garner’s death.297 While 
combining classroom instruction with tactical scenarios in a gymnasium setting, instructors 
advised officers to forego ego- or adrenaline-driven responses and instead focus on 
protecting the lives of everyone involved in an altercation.298 The program has since 
evolved from its original form to a four-day Crisis Intervention Team Training Program 
conducted by the NYPD’s Specialized Training Section. The program teams up members 
from the criminal justice and mental health systems, teaching officers skills to de-escalate 
tense encounters.299 
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The introduction of de-escalation, first as a workshop and later as formal 
instruction, was a departure from the NYPD’s training curriculum that existed when Garner 
died. In October 2015, the New York City Inspector General’s Office highlighted this 
deficiency in a report critical of the NYPD’s efforts at teaching de-escalation skills before 
2014. The report, commissioned in response to Garner’s death, found “little to no 
substantive focus on de-escalation in NYPD’s training programs.”300 For example, only a 
portion of a four-and-a-half-hour police policy course focused on de-escalation skills 
during the entire 468-hour NYPD recruit training program.301 In addition to introducing 
the de-escalation training, the NYPD’s response to the report was to change its use-of-force 
reporting guidelines, requiring officers to document all instances of applying force.302 The 
motivation for the policy shift was to encourage officers to protect people and de-escalate 
encounters when possible, signaling an intentional and ongoing shift to preserve life in 
direct response to Garner’s death. “De-escalation,” said Mayor de Blasio in December 
2019 during a press conference, “is the dominant approach now.”303 
In addition to the post-Garner emphasis on de-escalation, the NYPD considered 
providing its officers with CEDs, as was recommended by the 2008 RAND Corporation 
study, immediately after Garner’s death. Within a week, department officials began 
internal discussions on allowing patrol officers to carry CEDs, recognizing that officers 
might need more tools to subdue resistant subjects.304 By December 2014, Bratton 
announced the pending distribution of 450 CEDs to field training officers; by July 2016, 
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the department had nearly 10,000 officers trained on the devices.305 By 2019, the 
department had trained 28,624 officers to use CEDs and distributed 6,954 devices on 
patrol.306 The department also increased the potency of the OC spray supplied to officers, 
from 0.21 to 0.67 percent concentration of the active ingredients.307 The older version, 
officers complained, was ineffective at subduing even dogs. 
3. Cynefin Analysis 
The NYPD was in the obvious/simple domain in the area of de-escalation, 
preservation of life, and adoption of less-lethal tools for its officers before Garner’s death. 
The agency relied on established practices, leading to an oversimplification in its force 
analysis and complacency in modernizing its officers’ technology options. For instance, 
the topic of de-escalation was absent from the agency’s reporting, which instead focused 
on restraint, the NYPD’s long-time evaluation metric. Further, the RAND study’s 
recommendation to provide officers with CEDs was ignored by Commissioner Kelly’s 
administration. After Garner’s death, the NYPD entered the complicated domain. 
Following the “sense-analyze-respond” process, these policy implementations applied the 
RAND report’s recommendations of introducing de-escalation training, emphasizing 
preservation of life, and providing officers with CEDs. 
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G. MEDIA STRATEGY AND PUBLICLY DIRECTED STATEMENTS 
1. Before 
The NYPD staffs the Office of the Deputy Commissioner for Public Information 
(DCPI), led by a civilian deputy commissioner, as its primary method of media 
communication. The DCPI establishes relationships with local, national, and international 
media outlets, seeking to foster “communication, reputational management, and [facilitate] 
citywide news coverage.”308 The office is staffed 24 hours a day, with members available 
for consultation when disseminating media-worthy police information. 
Under former Police Commissioner Kelly, the Office of the DCPI sometimes had 
a contentious relationship with the media. The office was managed by Paul J. Browne, who 
centralized media messaging; during many press conferences, Browne was the only person 
allowed to speak other than Kelly.309 Some media sources reported having difficulty 
obtaining press credentials, which would enable coveted access to secure areas during 
police events and inside public buildings.310 Others resorted to hiring lawyers and filing 
lawsuits to obtain credentials.311 Kelly announced an interim replacement for Browne 
when he retired in mid-2013, a few months before the end of Kelly’s tenure.312 Upon 
beginning his second term commanding the NYPD in January 2014, Commissioner Bratton 
appointed Stephen P. Davis as DCPI.313 
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2. In Response 
After Garner’s death, Commissioner Bratton broadened media access to the 
NYPD’s inner workings. Bratton allowed New Yorker writer Ken Auletta to accompany 
him for several days, while he outlined his strategic plan for the NYPD, for an article 
Auletta was preparing. Auletta joined him at a memorial for an officer killed in the line of 
duty, and later at dinner in Manhattan, while Bratton described how the department was 
planning to repair its relationship with the community. He also permitted the press to 
accompany officers while they patrolled New York City, giving them an inside perspective 
of the changes he was making to the patrol model.314 Bratton’s open approach with the 
media was a conscious effort at promoting channels of communication. 
Additionally, the NYPD decentralized press conferences after Garner’s death. No 
longer did the DCPI exclusively manage outgoing information to the media. For example, 
the DCPI authorized on-scene police officials to speak on the department’s behalf after 
consultation with them, even for major news events such as the Trump Tower climber in 
August 2016.315 At that press conference, officers having an active role in the rescue 
responded to media inquiries, allowing greater depth and detail in the answers provided. 
As another example, the NYPD allowed the head of the Force Investigation Division to 
conduct comprehensive briefings about police-involved shootings and provide media 
representatives follow-up information as needed.316 
3. Cynefin Analysis 
Before Garner’s death, the NYPD occupied the obvious/simple domain in its media 
policy. The agency categorized its relationship with the media and comments to the public 
based on established practices, limiting who was allowed to speak on its behalf. This policy 
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was unquestioned, not open to dispute or advancement of thinking, a known aspect of this 
domain.317 Assuming this posture strained media relations, as indicated above. After 
Garner’s death, the department pivoted to the complex domain, experimenting with closer, 
more open media relationships, probing different policy positions in a manner the agency 
had not done before the tragedy. These actions suggest the agency was following the 
“probe-sense-analyze” response cycle of the complex domain.318 
H. TRANSPARENCY ON PROCEDURAL PROCESSES 
1. Before 
Police Commissioner Bratton committed to improving the NYPD’s transparency in 
procedural processes early in his tenure. In a speech before the Citizen’s Crime 
Commission in February 2014, five months before Garner’s death, Bratton proclaimed, 
“There should be no secrets in the NYPD.”319 However, a reporter’s test of the 
department’s efforts at transparency indicated the agency was falling short of its goals. The 
same month Bratton made his speech, the department rejected reporter Shawn Musgrave’s 
request for its Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) policy, suggesting the agency’s 
document was protected by attorney–client privilege.320 The irony of the NYPD’s 
withholding its public information guidelines was not lost on Musgrave. The department 
then tried to charge Musgrave over $500 for photocopies of the NYPD’s Patrol Guide 
containing the FOIL policy.321 The agency later relented and provided him the documents 
free of charge—the same month that Garner died. 
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2. In Response 
After Garner’s death, the public availability of NYPD officers’ disciplinary action 
dispositions became the focal point of procedural transparency discussions. At that time, 
New York Civil Rights Law 50-a prohibited the agency from releasing police personnel 
data, including disciplinary dispositions. Some critics of the law claimed it prevented the 
public from learning the circumstances and outcomes of police discipline, protecting bad 
officers, but noted little political will to change the law, even after Eric Garner’s and 
Michael Brown’s deaths.322 A 2017 decision by the New York Supreme Court’s Appellate 
Division settled two lawsuits seeking information protected by 50-a, one of which sought 
Officer Pantaleo’s records, rejecting the plaintiffs’ requests. In its ruling, the court said, 
“The remedy must not come from this court, but from the legislature.”323 Thus, the existing 
privacy rules remained in place pending a legislative solution. 
In 2019, a report by an independent panel charged with reviewing the NYPD’s 
disciplinary policies and chaired by former U.S. Attorney Mary Jo White leveled criticisms 
at the agency’s confidentiality practices. The panel found the process contained a 
“fundamental and pervasive lack of transparency” and recommended the state legislature 
seek a policy that balanced officers’ privacy and the public’s right to information.324 
However, 50-a would remain unchanged until 2020. After George Floyd’s death, police 
reform legislation gained traction in the New York State Legislature, and it sent a repeal of 
50-a to Governor Andrew Cuomo’s desk.325 He signed the measure in June 2020, making 
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officers’ records subject to FOIL requests. There is currently a stay on the repeal due to the 
NYPD police union’s pending action before the U.S. Second Circuit Court of Appeals.326 
3. Cynefin Analysis 
The NYPD’s transparency in procedural processes was in the obvious/simple 
domain before Garner, lacking openness with the public. The agency maintained 
established practices even as they were contrary to leadership’s objectives, suggesting the 
entrainment of thinking found to be problematic in this domain.327 Further, state law 
limited the agency’s release of information, an embedded structural process that precluded 
change. However, the NYPD has experimented with alternative methods of transparency. 
In October 2020, the agency announced disciplinary action on Twitter while withholding 
the officer’s identity, operating within 50-a rules; in response to a viral video of the officer 
using a loudspeaker for political purposes, the NYPD tweeted news of the officer’s 
suspension and pending disciplinary action.328 This emergent “probe-sense-respond” 
cycle indicates a move into the complex domain pending a legislative solution that will 
ultimately determine what personnel information the agency can make public.329 
I. BWC USE 
1. Before 
As noted above, in August 2013, Judge Scheindlin in Floyd v. City of New York 
ordered the NYPD to develop a BWC pilot program. The department did not use the 
cameras at the time of her ruling, and Mayor Bloomberg expressed his resistance to her 
decision, calling the technology a “nightmare” that would overburden officers while doing 
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their job.330 In November 2013, he appealed Scheindlin’s ruling, endeavoring to overturn 
her decision before the end of his term the following month.331 However, his efforts only 
delayed the NYPD’s adoption of BWCs. Upon assuming office in January 2014, newly 
elected Mayor de Blasio announced his intention of settling Bloomberg’s appeal and 
implementing the pilot program.332 However, the program was not yet in operation at the 
time of Garner’s death. 
2. In Response 
The NYPD’s BWC pilot program began in September 2014, two months after 
Garner’s death.333 While Judge Sheindlin’s order directed the department to test the 
technology in only five designated precincts, those with the highest number of SQF reports, 
Mayor de Blasio announced in early December 2014 his intent to accelerate the program. 
Recognizing the rising tensions between the police and the community after the deaths of 
Eric Garner and Michael Brown, de Blasio said at a news conference, “When something 
happens, to have a video record of it, from the police officers’ perspective, is going to help 
in many, many ways. And God forbid, when something goes wrong, we are going to have 
a clearer sense of what happened.”334 The pilot program ended in March 2015, but 
finalizing policy and procuring the cameras needed to equip the NYPD delayed their 
deployment until 2017.335 
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The NYPD currently operates the most extensive police BWC program in the 
United States.336 The department equipped over 24,000 officers of all ranks with the 
cameras during a phased roll-out from April 2017 through December 2019. In addition to 
police officers on patrol, detectives, sergeants, and lieutenants wear BWCs, as do 
command-level members (captains and above) supervising these officers. 
3. Cynefin Analysis 
Since the NYPD did not use BWCs before Garner, the agency did not occupy a 
Cynefin domain before Garner’s death regarding their implementation. However, after 
Garner, the department entered the complicated context, guided by expert-recommended 
“good practices,” such as Judge Scheindlin’s directives; Mayor de Blasio’s expansion of 
the program; and the expertise of policy sovereigns. 
J. RELEASING BWC FOOTAGE 
1. Before 
NYPD officers did not use BWCs before Garner’s death. As such, there was no 
video release policy. 
2. In Response 
In the early stages of the NYPD’s BWC pilot program, the department was reluctant 
to release captured footage. In August 2015, a department official suggested that releasing 
unedited BWC videos would invade the privacy of people recorded in them.337 
Prohibitively, however, the NYPD placed the cost of an edited version available through a 
FOIL request at $36,000. By comparison, the Seattle Police Department provided edited 
BWC footage to requestors at no charge. 
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By 2017, the NYPD took a less restrictive approach in releasing BWC videos. That 
September, the department released a BWC video for the first time, consisting of 48 
minutes of footage captured from four officers involved in a fatal shooting.338 The 
department published the videos and a narrative of the circumstances on its website, 
allowing for public and media download.339 However, the policy of BWC video release 
outside of FOIL requests was still unclear and subjective. The guidelines regulating the 
release of BWC footage relied on the police commissioner’s finding a “public concern” or 
trying to “preserve peace.”340 Some critics accused the NYPD of selectively releasing 
videos beneficial to the agency’s image while suppressing videos containing questionable 
police conduct.341 
The NYPD announced formal policies for releasing BWC footage in June 2020, 
these being less subjective than the previous “public concern” and “preserve peace” 
guidelines.342 These guidelines are published on the department’s website for public 
review. In broad terms, within 30 days, the department releases BWC videos of critical 
incidents, which include officer firearm discharges, use-of-force incidents resulting in 
death or serious physical injury, and events that may create public attention and 
curiosity.343 Further, the NYPD now complies with FOIL requests for video recordings 
unless prohibited by law. Additionally, the department created a YouTube channel called 
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insideNYPD that compiles these videos for public review; the channel currently has over 
19,000 subscribers.344 
3. Cynefin Analysis 
There was no video release policy when Garner died as the NYPD did not use 
BWCs. However, early their adoption, the department entered the complex domain, testing 
different policies with various levels of community acceptance until it created the formal 
system discussed above. The agency has transitioned into the complicated context, 
whereby releasing BWC videos is guided by legitimate “good practices,” federal court 
mandates, and policy sovereign recommendations. 
K. USING SOCIAL MEDIA 
1. Before 
In January 2014, the NYPD began using Facebook and Twitter social media 
platforms strategically at the direction of Commissioner Bratton.345 Bratton’s goal was to 
reshape the public’s perception of police officers by presenting uplifting stories without 
relying on the media.346 However, the strategy stumbled early on. In April 2014, the 
department launched a campaign to increase public engagement, asking for pictures of 
people with police officers and applying the hashtag #myNYPD. Instead of tourist-type 
photos of people smiling while standing next to officers, the agency found its social media 
feeds flooded with uncomplimentary images, such as police using force and police dogs 
biting suspects. The effort was labeled a fiasco by some media insiders.347 Undeterred, 
Bratton pivoted, insisting that there is no bad publicity, and noted the department had 
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gained over 4,000 new followers.348 The department treated the misstep as a learning 
lesson, with a spokeswoman saying social media use would continue as a means of creating 
new ways to speak directly to the community.349 
2. In Response 
By December 2014, five months after Eric Garner’s death, the growing pains 
associated with the NYPD’s entry to social media were still evident. That month, the 
Mid-Town South Precinct’s official Twitter account posted a tweet of a still image from 
the movie A Few Good Men.350 The tweet included lines from a scene when Jack 
Nicholson’s character Colonel Nathan Jessup yells, “You can’t handle the truth!” while 
justifying the murder of a subordinate. The post fell flat with the public and critics alike 
and was quickly deleted. 
The NYPD formalized its social media policies regarding the technology’s use as 
a public communication tool as its audience expanded.351 The agency has amassed over 
one million followers across 119 Twitter feeds, with the platform being the central source 
for social media communication.352 The department now designates digital 
communications officers to manage authorized social media accounts under the 
supervision of their respective commanding officers.353 The position’s guidelines require 
that commanding officers approve all posts, focusing on community outreach and 
communication, distributing crime information, and advertising good police work. Further, 
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the NYPD posted a social media disclaimer on its website explaining the rules of public 
commentary on its posts, such as reserving the right to delete posts containing hate speech 
or incitement of violence.354 
3. Cynefin Analysis 
The department’s efforts at leveraging social media before Garner’s death resided 
in the complex domain, its “probe-sense-respond” cycle evidenced in the trial-and-error 
approach to using the technology to promote its mission.355 After Garner, social media 
policy evolved, leading to the agency’s existing formal policies. The NYPD maintains a 
robust presence on its social media platforms, following the policy experts’ 
recommendations and promoting its narrative to the public. Doing so causes the 
department’s social media strategy to reside in the obvious/simple context, following the 
“sense-categorize-respond” process in conjunction with established practice and policy.356 
L. ENHANCING TRAINING 
1. Before 
Through 2014, the agency required newly hired officers to complete a six-month 
training program at the Police Academy.357 The multi-disciplinary instruction program 
consisted of 53 courses separated into three tracks: police studies, humanities, and legal 
studies. Within these instruction courses, recruits attended a nine-hour use-of-force course 
and a four-and-a-half-hour class on policing professionally. It was in this latter course, as 
mentioned above, that de-escalation skills were briefly addressed. After completing the 
classroom portion of training, they attended firearms and tactics training, where they 
learned firearms proficiency, OC spray usage, and other tactical exercises.358 Recruits 
successful in each part of academy training were then eligible to become full-fledged police 
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officers. Scenario-based training, however, which replicated encounters recruits might 
have on patrol, was poorly implemented. During the entirety of recruit training, the Police 
Academy devoted only three sessions to scenario-based instruction.359 
The New York City Inspector General’s Office interviewed academy instructors 
and recruits as a part of the October 2015 report initiated after Garner’s death. That report 
centered on NYPD practices from the period of 2011 through 2014, just before Garner’s 
death. The report found both the instructors and recruits critical of the inadequate time 
spent on scenario-based and encounter-simulation training, expressing a desire that the 
program be lengthened to help them fully grasp the concepts taught.360 
These sentiments corroborated the assessment of Rostker et al. from their 2008 
RAND Corporation study. In that study, they found the NYPD’s model of scenario-based 
training poorly structured.361 During their survey, they observed that time constraints and 
insufficient instructors precluded recruits from practicing skills learned, an obstacle to 
reaching a minimal level of competency. Rostker et al. recommended that the NYPD 
increase the quality and number of scenario-based training modules provided to recruits.362 
As evidenced by statements collected by the inspector general, the NYPD had failed to 
follow the RAND study’s recommendations. 
2. In Response 
As discussed above, in the immediate aftermath of Garner’s death, teaching officers 
de-escalation skills became paramount. The course Commissioner Bratton announced 
before the City Council in September 2014 was the NYPD’s central training task for the 
remainder of that year.363 He ordered a full review of NYPD training, seeking to identify 
deficiencies, acknowledging the undertaking would likely require retraining every officer 
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and potentially take years to complete.364 In July 2015, the NYPD reported the results of 
its survey-based review titled “Training: Bringing the NYPD into the 21st Century.”365 
The report emphasized a commitment to revitalizing and modernizing Police Academy 
training and identified several areas for improvement. 
First, the report prominently critiqued the department’s lack of scenario-based 
training. The report found that officers felt Police Academy training was “overly formulaic 
and mechanical, relying on lectures rather than situational engagement.”366 The existing 
Police Academy facility was determined an ineffective training environment for scenario-
based training, limiting the teaching method’s incorporation. 
As a part of its modernization efforts, the NYPD built a new, sprawling Police 
Academy facility in Queens to replace its tight quarters in Manhattan.367 This new facility 
contained a “simulated tactical village,” replete with storefronts, bank windows, 
automobiles, and even a subway car, to hold scenario-based training sessions. Only 10 to 
20 officers may use the village at once, allowing better student–instructor ratios. In 
scenario-based training sessions, officers wear BWCs during their simulated encounters, 
whose recordings instructors review and evaluate with participants. 
Next, the report revealed that the recruit curriculum was over a decade old, lacking 
regular or systematic updates.368 To remedy this, the NYPD hired civilian curriculum 
specialists and educators to guide the design of an adult-learning-style program while 
specifically incorporating scenario-based training in all topic areas.369 The report detailed 
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the department’s desire to shift away from a one-size-fits-all approach toward an 
interactive learning process that strengthens officers individually.370 
Finally, the report found that many instructors lacked recent field experience and 
professional development.371 Instructor development, the report said, would ensure that 
training remained effective, interactive, and vibrant.372 Rather than teaching a single track, 
instructors are cross-trained in disciplines (an academic instructor sometimes teaches 
tactics, for example) and teach in teams, seeking consistency in strategy and messaging. 
Lastly, instructors are periodically assigned to fieldwork for several months, keeping their 
experience relevant and relatable. 
3. Cynefin Analysis 
Before Garner’s death, the NYPD’s training policy resided in the obvious/simple 
context, relying on standard operating procedures and the constraints of established 
practices, and suffered from two problems featured in that domain. First, the department’s 
neglect of the Police Academy recruit training program exposed an oversimplification of 
the education process. Second, this oversimplification was evidence of entrained thinking 
that precluded exploration of modern teaching methods. After Garner’s death, the NYPD 
entered the complex domain, using the “probe-sense-respond” cycle when exploring new 
techniques and approaches, such as introducing new workshops, which over time have 
evolved into full training courses.373 
M. IMPLICIT BIAS AWARENESS TRAINING 
1. Before 
The NYPD’s approach to managing implicit bias awareness and promoting cultural 
diversity instruction has taken many forms. The Police Academy introduced a course on 
 
370 New York City Police Department, 6. 
371 New York City Police Department, 1. 
372 New York City Police Department, 5. 
373 Kurtz and Snowden, “The New Dynamics of Strategy,” 73. 
79 
“cultural competence” beginning in 2000.374 Recruits watched and discussed films on 
racism, sexism, financial class issues, and discrimination against the transgender and gay 
communities. When observing the program, political commentator Heather Mac Donald 
found “the cultural competence curriculum assumes that recruits come into the department 
with deep-seated biases” that the course seeks to reduce.375 In 2007, the NYPD expanded 
its efforts at broadening its recruits’ skills in dealing with the diverse communities of New 
York City. During “multi-cultural immersion training,” members from CCRB, prominent 
community members, and police executives helped recruits understand the vast range of 
cultural, sexual, and religious perspectives within New York City.376 By 2013, the 
department provided officers with a portable manual entitled Policing a Multicultural 
Society, which sought to help officers deal with cultural and communication barriers that 
might arise with the community. 
2. In Response 
After Garner, the NYPD began an intentional effort to address implicit bias in July 
2015 as part of modernizing its curriculum, as discussed above. The process was first 
reported and continues to be overseen by Peter L. Zimroth, the monitor appointed under 
Judge Scheindlin’s Floyd ruling.377 The course, Policing Impartially, contained 
information on police history and the benefits of fair and unbiased policing. However, 
Zimroth found many of the course materials were from prior recruit classes and prepared 
internally by the NYPD. He noted that the NYPD would likely change the program as its 
training overhaul continued. 
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In 2018, the NYPD entered into a contract with Florida company Fair and Impartial 
Policing (FIP), a leader in the field of implicit bias awareness training.378 By contract 
agreement, no more than 40 officers attend at once with two trainers present. FIP frames 
implicit bias as a safety concern: instructors show officers that their biases of who is 
“dangerous” leave them vulnerable to unperceived threats. At the same time, over-
vigilance can lead to community tensions.379 However, implicit bias awareness training is 
different from addressing overt racism; officers may become defensive if they believe 
instructors are accusing them of the latter.380 Instead, FIP prepares officers to manage their 
biases first by identifying them and then providing officers with tools to conduct self-
checks on their decision-making processes while policing, examining whether implicit bias 
influenced their choices.381 
3. Cynefin Analysis 
While not labeled implicit bias awareness training, the NYPD had cultural 
competency curriculum, an established, dedicated module in Police Academy training that 
had been expanded in the years leading up to Garner’s death. While the department 
relabeled the program several times, it essentially remained stagnant. Thus, the department 
operated in the obvious/simple domain when Garner died, following “best practices” but 
lacking the advanced techniques policy experts would provide. After Garner, the 
department entered the complicated domain, using the “sense-analyze-respond” cycle 
when hiring adept professionals to teach the implicit bias awareness courses—a “good 
practice” recommended by policy sovereigns. 
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IV. FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT: 
MICHAEL BROWN—AUGUST 9, 2014 
On Saturday, August 9, 2014, just weeks after the death of Eric Garner in New 
York City, Ferguson Police Department (FPD) Officer Darren Wilson shot and killed 
Michael Brown, continuing the legitimacy challenges police faced that summer.382 Initial 
reporting suggested that Officer Wilson approached Brown, an unarmed 18-year-old man, 
for the sole reason that he and his friend were walking in the middle of the street.383 These 
reports stated that during a conversation between Wilson and Brown, a struggle ensued and 
that Brown was holding his hands above his head in a gesture of surrender when Wilson 
shot him unnecessarily.384 These claims were the genesis of the protest cry “hands up, 
don’t shoot!” 
The immediate aftermath of the shooting in Ferguson, a suburb to the north of St. 
Louis County, Missouri, drew quick condemnation from the community and political 
leaders. John Gaskin, a member of the St. Louis County chapter of the National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), said, “With the recent events of a young 
man killed by the police in New York City [Eric Garner] . . . this [shooting of Michael 
Brown] is a dire concern to the NAACP.”385 Within days, President Barack Obama called 
Brown’s death “heartbreaking” while encouraging the public to await full details.386 On 
August 11, 2014, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder said he would be monitoring and 
supplementing the local investigation into the shooting, saying, “aggressively pursuing 
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investigations such as this is critical for preserving trust between law enforcement and the 
communities they serve.”387 The Brown family’s attorney, Benjamin Crump, denied FPD 
information that Brown’s being a robbery suspect prompted Wilson to stop him: “It’s bad 
enough they assassinated him, and now they’re trying to assassinate his character.”388 
The investigation of Brown’s death was removed from the FPD and assigned to the 
St. Louis County Police Department (SLCPD) to avoid the appearance of a conflict of 
interest. When the shooting happened, an FPD captain led the multi-agency Major Case 
Squad in St. Louis County, the unit that would have typically investigated this incident but 
for the captain’s assignment.389 St. Louis County Prosecutor Robert P. McCulloch 
convened a grand jury beginning on August 20, 2014, to review the evidence and determine 
whether criminal charges against Wilson would be appropriate.390 The grand jury met for 
25 days over three months and listened to the testimony of over 60 witnesses. On November 
24, 2014, the grand jury declined to return an indictment against Wilson. McCulloch also 
announced publicly that the grand jury’s investigation discredited many of the earlier 
claims that Wilson had murdered Brown in cold blood, saying those claims were 
“completely refuted by the physical evidence.”391 
On March 4, 2015, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder released the federal 
investigation’s findings of Brown’s shooting, which indicated that the facts did not support 
a civil rights violations case against Wilson.392 The early reporting on Brown’s death 
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suggested Officer Wilson killed him while he was surrendering. However, the DOJ’s report 
into the shooting released after Holder’s announcement consolidated witness reports and 
evidence that discredited these claims and supported Wilson’s assertion that he fired in 
self-defense.393 
Wilson, citing threats to his life, resigned from the FPD after the grand jury’s 
finding in November 2014.394 The City of Ferguson settled the Brown family’s wrongful-
death lawsuit for $1.5 million in 2017.395 In July 2020, St. Louis Country prosecutor 
Wesley Bell announced reopening the Brown investigation based on suggestions that 
McCulloch’s grand jury investigation had been incomplete.396 Bell, however, who 
campaigned for his position on a social justice platform, found that criminal charges could 
not be supported by the facts of the case, thus ending the search for criminality in the 
shooting. 
A. AFTERMATH: LARGE-SCALE CIVIL DISORDER IN FERGUSON 
Michael Brown’s shooting death happened just weeks after Eric Garner’s 
confrontation with Officer Daniel Pantaleo in New York City. When Officer Wilson 
engaged with Brown in August 2014, New York City was already well into dealing with 
the wake of Garner’s death. His final words, “I can’t breathe,” were gaining popularity as 
a rallying cry among protesters in the streets, on social media, and on clothing worn by 
professional athletes.397 Indeed, “I can’t breathe” would become the most notable quote 
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of 2014.398 “Hands up, don’t shoot” followed soon after, becoming yet another mantra of 
protesters after Brown’s death. New York City managed the Garner protests occurring 
throughout the city with minimal violence or property destruction. For example, city 
officials successfully negotiated with protesters to avoid logistical and political concerns 
well into August 2014, in one case relocating a protest to avoid blocking traffic on the 
Verrazano Bridge.399 
However, the City of Ferguson was on a different path, toward two periods of 
violence: first in reaction to Brown’s death in August 2016 and later in November of the 
same year when the grand jury declined to indict Wilson. These riots, however, had a root 
cause: the loss of police legitimacy. Worden and McLean argue that riots are the public’s 
overt expression of diminished trust and absent police legitimacy, when a department’s 
operations (or an officer’s conduct) are held to be inappropriate or improper.400 Writing in 
The Week, writer Ryan Cooper concurs with Worden and McLean in his assessment of the 
post-Floyd riots in Minneapolis. In his piece, he argues that Floyd’s death caused “a 
profound collapse in the legitimacy of the Minneapolis criminal justice system,” 
concluding that “when the police have well earned the utter contempt of its citizenry, 
disorder tends to follow.”401 Thus, the riots in August and November 2014, described 
below, were the result of the FPD’s loss of legitimacy, caused by the death of Michael 
Brown. 
In the early hours of Sunday, August 10—the day after Brown’s death—the chant 
“kill the police” echoed through some parts of the Ferguson community as protesters 
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marched near police officers.402 A vigil community members held later that day was 
peaceful during daylight hours but became increasingly volatile as the evening hours 
approached. Rioters vandalized and looted over 30 businesses that night, including a 
convenience store, a check-cashing store, a boutique, and several other commercial 
establishments near the site of Brown’s death.403 9-1-1 dispatch received multiple calls for 
gunshots that night, and videos showed looters stealing tires and smashing car windows as 
disorder spread through parts of the city.404 That first night of violence would last until 
around 3:30 a.m. on Monday, August 11, 2014, during which police arrested over 30 people 
for theft, assault, or burglary; two police officers suffered injuries, one of which was hit 
with a brick; and rioters fired on a police helicopter and later burned a QuikTrip gas station 
to the ground.405 In response to the violence and rioting, nearby school districts canceled 
classes or delayed opening, and several restaurants announced temporary closings.406 
A cycle of daytime peaceful protests and demonstrations with nighttime 
lawlessness emerged in the days that followed. Civic leaders, politicians, and community 
leaders non-violently marched in protest during the daylight hours while shootings and 
looting became commonplace in the evening.407 Social activists such as Al Sharpton and 
Jesse Jackson traveled to Ferguson, pleading for an end to the disorder and violence.408 
The intensity of the evening disturbances would ebb and flow for 19 nights until the end 
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of August 2014. After several nights of calm, the police in Ferguson reduced their overt 
presence in the city.409 By the end of August 2014, more than 230 people had been arrested 
for charges including burglary and gun or drug possession; one person had been shot after 
pointing a gun at a police officer; 29 businesses had been burglarized during looting; rioters 
had set multiple fires, with one business burned entirely to the ground; and the city had 
incurred approximately $5 million in property damage.410 The lawlessness of August 2014 
subsided in the months leading to the fall season. On November 24, 2014, the grand jury 
empaneled to investigate Brown’s death returned its decision not to indict Wilson, and 
violence again erupted. 
The outrage and anger at the grand jury’s decision not to indict Officer Wilson was 
immediate and fierce, surpassing that of the summer. In a press conference held at 1:30 
a.m. the day after the grand jury’s decision, St. Louis County Police Chief Jon Belmar said 
of the unrest, “What I’ve seen tonight is probably much worse than the worst night we ever 
had in August.”411 Continuing, Belmar reported hearing over 150 shots fired that night, 
expressing his surprise he had not been hit. Large swaths of businesses were again set 
aflame, as were multiple cars at several automobile dealerships. During the violence, at 
least 20 buildings were entirely destroyed by fire.412 Looting was widespread, with some 
locations suffering riot damage in both August and November. So numerous were the 
shootings that the Federal Aviation Administration diverted 10 flights scheduled to land at 
Lambert–St. Louis Airport that night, until either the shootings subsided or the weather 
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allowed planes to land on a different runway.413 Rioters targeted police cars, stealing an 
AR-15 rifle from one and setting another two aflame with Molotov cocktails. 
Missouri Governor Jay Nixon ordered 3,400 National Guard members into 
Ferguson to quell the violence, which subsided as the week continued toward 
Thanksgiving. The damage, however, had been done. The riots signaled to the FPD, and 
those watching on television, lost legitimacy with the citizenry. Businesses were destroyed, 
injuries were sustained, and parts of Ferguson lay in ruin. Estimates of the damage from 
the August 2014 disturbances amounted to over $5 million, but by the second wave of riots 
in November 2014, the total financial impact increased to over $20 million.414 
It is worth remembering that while Eric Garner’s and Michael Brown’s deaths 
occurred within weeks of each other, they shared a connection beyond temporal proximity. 
While on his journey from Baltimore to Brooklyn to kill Officers Liu and Ramos, Ismaaiyl 
Brinsley invoked Brown’s name in social media posts declaring his intentions to harm 
police officers. Thus, the murders of Officers Liu and Ramos might be seen as at least 
partially attributable to Brown’s death. 
B. CIVILIAN BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS 
1. Before 
The FPD lacked civilian board oversight of police misconduct complaints when 
Michael Brown died; the agency’s Internal Affairs unit investigated citizen complaints at 
the time. However, the DOJ’s Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department report 
found that the system “[failed] to respond meaningfully to complaints of officer 
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misconduct.”415 The report found that the FPD discouraged both citizens from making 
complaints against officers and officers from accepting citizen complaints. Further, the 
report observed that there was little likelihood the FPD would investigate citizen 
complaints of police misconduct under this system.416 On the infrequent occasions the 
agency accepted a complaint, the FPD usually ruled in the officer’s favor, even when his 
version of events conflicted with objective evidence.417 Each of these failures to respond 
to civilian complaints directly opposed established FPD policies. In sum, the report found 
that FPD leadership sent its officers the message that they could disregard civilian 
complaint policy with little fear of punishment.418 
2. In Response 
In response to Brown’s death, Ferguson city officials met with the National 
Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement (NACOLE) in November 2014.419 
NACOLE is a non-profit professional network of nationwide police review boards, 
consulted by city officials to advise on creating civilian review panels. After the 
consultation, the city established a Civilian Review Task Force to include community input 
with formulating recommendations for a Ferguson Civilian Review Board (FCRB). The 
Task Force compiled its proposals in an October 2015 report, which listed the FCRB’s 
mission: “foster respect, trust, cooperation, and accountability between the Ferguson Police 
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Department and the greater Ferguson community.”420 In April 2016, the City of Ferguson 
and the FPD entered into a consent decree with the DOJ, resulting from an investigation 
that revealed illegal policing practices (discussed in detail below).421 A central stipulation 
of the consent decree was that the city and police department accept the Task Force 
recommendations and have the FCRB functional by March 2017.422 
The FCRB is currently operational, its bylaws describing both the board’s 
composition and mission.423 The board consists of nine members appointed by the City 
Council, each serving three-year terms. Two must be residents from each of the city’s three 
wards, and three are “at-large” members from Ferguson’s civic or business community. 
Ferguson’s elected officials and government employees (including police officers) are 
ineligible to become members. Police misconduct complaint investigations now include 
civilian oversight and input.424 Under the new system, the FPD retains responsibility for 
investigating civilian complaints. However, the FCRB reviews the agency’s findings and 
presents disciplinary recommendations to the FPD chief. The FCRB can request additional 
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information from the FPD as needed to help make its recommendations, but the chief 
remains the final authority on disciplinary penalties. 
However, a news report from the August 2019 board session revealed the FCRB 
was not currently operating at full capability.425 During the session, the board barely 
achieved quorum when only five of the nine members appeared on time. Those members 
present voted to dismiss a non-present member who had failed to attend the previous two 
meetings without an excusal. Further, public participation was low, with just one woman 
in the gallery watching the proceedings that day. The woman was a former member of the 
Civilian Review Task Force, the group that helped create the FCRB; she told a reporter she 
was usually the only person who attended. Before closing the meeting, FCRB members 
voiced persistent difficulty getting the police department to comply with consent decree 
rules, saying the agency was not forthcoming with documents and materials the board 
needed to investigate misconduct allegations. 
3. Cynefin Analysis 
While the FPD did not have civilian oversight of police misconduct investigations 
before Brown’s death, the internal investigation policy in place then allows for Cynefin 
analysis. Those internal mechanisms operated within the obvious/simple domain. In this 
domain, established policy and a repeatable standard operating procedure were supposed 
to guide misconduct complaint investigations.426 However, the lack of managerial 
oversight indicates oversimplification of the process, failing to ensure policy compliance 
or discover wanton officer disregard. After the shooting, the FPD entered the complicated 
domain, first when it sought the expertise of NACOLE to guide creating a civilian board, 
and then later when following consent decree mandates relevant to the board’s operation. 
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The FPD required an informed diagnosis, consulting with and getting guidance from 
experts in the field, and following the domain’s “sense-analyze-respond” cycle.427 
C. IMPROVING OR REPLACING LEADERSHIP 
1. Before 
Chief Thomas Jackson commanded the FPD when Brown died, having led the 
agency since 2010.428 As an experienced police executive, he had served in the SLCPD 
for 31 years before joining the FPD.429 He had held various roles in that larger agency, 
including SWAT supervisor, hostage negotiator, airplane and helicopter pilot, and 
undercover detective.430 Within 13 minutes of the shooting, officers at the scene informed 
Chief Jackson of the events unfolding.431 Shortly after, he asked the SLCPD to assume the 
shooting investigation, as discussed above. 
2. In Response 
Chief Jackson was heavily criticized for the FPD’s handling of Brown’s crime 
scene and the perception that the department had mismanaged protests. In September 2014, 
one month after the shooting, he responded to those criticisms with apologies in a video 
message directed to the Brown family and community.432 Responding to the video, some 
Ferguson residents found Chief Jackson’s words inadequate and demanded his resignation, 
which he refused.433 In November 2014, Jackson again brushed suggestions that he resign, 
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telling CNN during the civil upheavals in Ferguson that month “I intend to see this thing 
through.”434 
Chief Jackson’s tenure, however, would end on March 19, 2015. Chief Jackson and 
Ferguson city officials mutually decided on his separation after the DOJ’s “pattern-and-
practice” findings detailed his failures heading the FPD.435 The DOJ’s Investigation of the 
Ferguson Police Department revealed examples of his involvement in the FPD’s illegal 
practices; these acts directly resulted in the agency’s entering the consent decree in April 
2016. Some of the misconduct under his watch included abusively using law enforcement 
tools (like tickets) as revenue streams to fill city coffers; suggesting the city reach revenue 
goals by hiring additional officers; changing officers’ schedules to increase ticket-writing 
revenue; and arresting suspects with less-than-probable cause.436 Further, the DOJ found 
that Chief Jackson had poorly complied with other FPD regulations, including failing to 
monitor use-of-force reports; never reviewing other supervisors’ justifications for officers’ 
use of force; and keeping insufficient records of disciplinary actions.437 
3. Cynefin Analysis 
Chief Jackson’s FPD career ended when the DOJ report revealed his complicity in 
the department’s illegal practices and his failure to monitor internal department operations. 
His oversight of the agency was in a problematic state of the obvious/simple domain at the 
time of Brown’s shooting, as evident in his desire to make a complex problem (agency 
funding) seem simple (using officers to generate revenue)—this oversimplification of the 
process affected the police–community relationship (discussed below).438 His removal 
marked the FPD’s entering the complex domain, an attempt to emerge from the period of 
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unpredictability after Brown’s death.439 Since Jackson’s resignation, the FPD has changed 
leadership five times, indicating the agency’s use of the “probe-sense-respond” cycle while 
probing management options that best provide stability.440 
D. ADOPTING COMMUNITY-ORIENTED POLICING 
1. Before 
The FPD did not strategically embrace the community-oriented policing 
philosophy before Brown’s death. In January 2013, Chief Jackson authorized FPD General 
Order 220.00, which outlined the FPD’s Crime Prevention and Community Policing 
policy.441 The FPD executed its community-oriented policy programmatically, differing 
from the institutional implementation sovereigns suggest. The order designated a 
“community relations officer” who also serves as “crime prevention officer.” The position 
involved duties closer to those of a crime analyst, such as reviewing crime reports, rather 
than responsibilities that foster community partnerships. While the FPD directed patrol 
officers to participate in community policing, their duties were vague and non-mandatory. 
For example, the order required officers to “create an effective working partnership 
between the community and police” when “not on assignment” but failed to provide 
methods to do so.442 
The DOJ’s Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department found that before 
Brown’s death, the “FPD moved away from the modest community policing efforts it 
previously had implemented, reducing opportunities for positive police–community 
interactions, and losing the little familiarity it had with some African-American 
neighborhoods.”443 The FPD’s policy deficiencies were glaring, indicating little concern 
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for fostering an effective program. For example, the single FPD community policing 
officer, in addition to being the crime prevention officer, was also the public relations 
liaison. No other officers held substantial roles in the community-oriented policing 
initiative. As another example, the FPD did not maintain geographic consistency in officer 
assignments. This deployment style resulted in officers failing to become familiar with the 
people and communities they served. 
2. In Response 
In its investigation report, the DOJ recommended that the FPD implement a “robust 
system of true community policing” while providing several specific techniques.444 The 
report suggested that the FPD involve the entire community while developing the plan, 
departing from the department’s internally formulated policy. The suggestions included 
increasing opportunities for the FPD to interact with the public in informal and social 
contexts, including police athletic leagues. The DOJ also suggested the agency modify 
officer deployment, shortening the shift length and maintaining consistency in geographic 
assignments to foster community interaction. Finally, the report recommended the 
department teach its officers the mechanics of community policing and their role in 
implementing the program, and create a system to evaluate performance. U.S. Attorney 
General Eric Holder commented on the FPD, saying, “I think it’s pretty clear that the need 
for wholesale change in the department is appropriate.”445 He made the statement two 
months after Brown’s death, but changes to the FPD’s community-oriented policing 
program would not occur until it entered into the consent decree in April 2016. 
By August 2016, the FPD began the shift toward the new model of community-
oriented policing.446 Each of the policy modifications brought the department closer to 
compliance with the DOJ’s consent decree. The department required officers to get out of 
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their cars and meet community members even when not on assignment to build positive 
relationships. FPD leadership took steps to formally introduce its officers to the community 
at local meetings and gatherings, breaking down communication barriers. Then-Chief 
Delrish Moss, appointed a year after Chief Jackson’s resignation, described his philosophy 
of community-oriented policing as “[policing] at the pleasure of the community, not at the 
peril of the community.”447 Additionally, FPD officers assumed geographic consistency 
in their assignments.448 By June 2019, a progress report on the FPD’s compliance with the 
community-policing goals revealed the agency had taken significant steps toward 
complying with DOJ direction.449 
3. Cynefin Analysis 
The FPD operated in the obvious/simple domain in its approach to community-
oriented policing before Brown’s death. The agency codified its community-oriented 
policing program in written policy, which included some “best practices” in the order, but 
its oversimplification of implementation requirements led to the program’s failure. After 
Brown’s death, the agency pivoted to the complicated domain, using the “sense-analyze-
respond” cycle in relying on DOJ experts’ direction as it endeavored to comply with the 
terms of the consent decree. 
E. ENHANCING COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT 
1. Before 
FPD efforts at community engagement before Brown’s death were deficient, much 
as its community-oriented policing program was. General Order 220.00, the FPD’s 
community-oriented policing policy, lacked descriptive methods of outreach and 
relationship building. To illustrate, it listed suggestions unproductive at engaging the 
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community in a meaningful way, such as providing citizens with crime statistics or 
“establishing community groups wherever and whenever the need is identified.”450 
Further, the city’s reliance on law enforcement fees as a central revenue source, as 
described above, created a two-fold problem. Officers alienated the community with 
aggressive, revenue-motivated enforcement, and the feeling of constant pressure to 
produce revenue dissuaded them from exploring opportunities to engage the community in 
a significant way.451 The DOJ’s report offers an example of how the FPD failed to engage 
with the public: officers could not get out of their cars and play basketball with kids even 
if they wanted to because the FPD had removed all basketball hoops under city ordinance. 
In summarizing the FPD’s community engagement efforts, the DOJ’s Investigation of the 
Ferguson Police Department said, “Ferguson’s . . . efforts appear to have always been 
modest, but have dwindled to almost nothing in recent years. FPD has no . . . community 
engagement plan.”452 
2. In Response 
The DOJ’s report shed light on the FPD’s failure to take part in community 
engagement, and the consent decree detailed the steps required to correct its course.453 
Some of these directives included creating an FPD–community engagement plan, with 
input from a steering committee made up of Ferguson residents; hosting and participating 
in facilitated group dialogues between officers and community members, requiring each 
FPD officer to attend at least one series of three meetings; starting a police explorer 
program to teach young people police-related skills and help with outreach; and 
establishing athletic, art, and music programs to foster positive interactions. In February 
2020, Natashia Tidwell, the Ferguson federal monitor overseeing FPD’s compliance with 
the consent decree, reported that these efforts were “largely stagnant” due to budgetary 
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constraints.454 However, in June 2020, the group dialogues required to formulate an 
engagement plan were still ongoing.455 
3. Cynefin Analysis 
The FPD’s approach to community engagement operated within the disorder space 
before Brown’s shooting, the state Kurtz and Snowden describe as “uncertainty about 
uncertainty.”456 The agency’s community approach focused on revenue generation, and 
some officers engaged in abusive and illegal practices against the citizenry. The lack of 
consensus between stakeholders in public safety (e.g., FPD leadership, officers, and the 
community) led the agency to see the population as a revenue source, leaving officers split 
between leadership pressures and a desire to engage positively with the public. The agency 
entered the complicated domain when entering into the consent decree with the DOJ, with 
expert advisors providing analytical guidance on how to proceed, causing the agency to 
enter the domain’s “sense-analyze-respond” cycle.457 
F. EMPHASIZING DE-ESCALATION, PRESERVATION OF LIFE, AND 
ADOPTING LESS-LETHAL TECHNOLOGIES 
1. Before 
Before Brown’s death, the FPD’s use-of-force, de-escalation, preservation-of-life, 
and less-lethal technologies regulation conformed to many sovereign policy 
recommendations. FPD General Order 410.00 stated that the agency “recognize [d] and 
respect [ed] the value and integrity of each human life.”458 While not explicitly required 
by regulation or methods provided, de-escalation was the goal in the agency’s authorization 
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of several less-lethal technology options. In addition to expandable batons, agency policy 
allowed officers to use tear gas, OC spray, CEDs, and impact munitions. Officers were to 
use these devices in a manner that would “best de-escalate the incident and bring it under 
control in a safe manner.”459 In practice, however, FPD officers often operated in violation 
of those policies. 
Indeed, the DOJ investigation found that FPD officers routinely ignored 
use-of-force policies at the time of Brown’s death.460 They engaged in a pattern of 
excessive force and escalated confrontations with citizens they believed were 
non-compliant or resisting arrest.461 Further, FPD officers tended to use unnecessary force 
against vulnerable populations, such as juveniles and people with cognitive or mental 
health issues, actions that went against policy sovereigns’ recommendations. Officers also 
used CEDs outside of the agency’s guidelines, using the devices when less force would 
have been sufficient. For example, an FPD supervisor used a CED to elicit pain compliance 
from a woman refusing to remove a bracelet while being processed in the city jail, even as 
five other officers were present and she did not present a threat.462 
2. In Response 
The consent decree heralded many changes to the use-of-force, de-escalation, 
preservation-of-life, and less-lethal technology guidelines for the agency. The agreement 
directed the FPD to build policies and evaluative systems to ensure the agency maintained 
an “unwavering commitment to protecting human life, and to upholding the value and 
dignity of every person.”463 To that end, the agency committed to a use-of-force model 
that established clear policy, trained officers on that policy, and mandated that supervisors 
ensure officer compliance. The goal was to give officers the training and skills they needed 
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for optimal decision-making and to learn ways of resolving conflicts without force.464 
De-escalation is a recurring requirement in the consent decree, with multiple prompts 
directing that officers attempt to diffuse tense situations rather than automatically resorting 
to force.465 
Regarding less-lethal technologies, the consent decree limited their use to instances 
when a subject attacked another person and officers founds that less-intrusive measures 
were (or would be) ineffective at ending the attack.466 Further, the ruling codified several 
CED policy restrictions, such as prohibiting officers from using them for pain compliance, 
as occurred in the bracelet incident above.467 Additionally, the consent decree required 
that officers justify each instance of applying a less-lethal device on a subject, rather than 
merely justifying its use.468 In June 2019, the federal monitor reported that the FPD had 
thus far significantly complied with the consent decree’s requirements. 
3. Cynefin Analysis 
Before Brown’s death, the FPD was in the obvious/simple domain in the area of 
de-escalation, preservation of life, and adoption of less-lethal tools for its officers. While 
the department dictated established practices in its use-of-force guidelines, leadership did 
not inquire whether or how officers followed those guidelines, leading to abuses. When the 
consent decree enhanced FPD policy, the changes it dictated moved the agency into the 
complicated domain, causing a requisite switch from “best practice” to “good practice,” an 
identified feature of this domain.469 
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G. MEDIA STRATEGY AND PUBLICLY DIRECTED STATEMENTS 
1. Before 
Before Brown’s death, the FPD community relations officer was responsible for 
facilitating communication between the agency and the media.470 As discussed above, this 
officer filled multiple roles, having crime analysis duties while also being the FPD’s public 
relations liaison. This officer represented the FPD in relaying crime and investigation-
related information to the press.471 Additionally, the officer was responsible for providing 
the agency’s entire membership with guidance on press releases and interviews.472 The 
FPD allocated little resources, just one officer, to its media strategy, failing to utilize the 
press as an avenue to promote its good work positively. 
2. In Response 
In the immediate aftermath of Brown’s death, the intensity of interest in the 
shooting overwhelmed the FPD’s media strategy. The agency provided a brief media 
statement on the day of the shooting but offered little follow-up, at the direction of a public 
relations firm the city had hired.473 Meanwhile, the SLCPD, the agency responsible for the 
shooting investigation, did not hold a press conference until nearly 24 hours after Brown’s 
death; Chief Jackson did not speak at this briefing.474 These delays and lack of information 
led to rumors and social media commentary developing a false narrative of events. 
Complicating matters, officials were reactively releasing information in response to media 
inquiries rather than proactively messaging the public as is recommended by policy 
sovereigns.475 
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Chief Jackson held his next press conference nearly a week after Brown’s death, 
and the community was convinced the delay was meant to cover up police misconduct.476 
However, the briefing was poorly executed. During the press conference, Chief Jackson 
revealed that Officer Wilson’s reason for approaching Brown was to stop him as a suspect 
in a store robbery, and provided a security video of the alleged crime. Police commanders 
from outside agencies assisting the FPD with protests had urged Chief Jackson not to 
release this information, advising him that implying Brown was a criminal would inflame 
community sentiments. The commanders’ assessments were correct, as one said, “You 
could tell we [law enforcement] had taken a step back” from restoring calm in the 
community.477 
The FPD’s media strategy was so ineffective that in February 2015, the Illinois 
Association of Chiefs of Police offered a training session called “Media Relations Training: 
Don’t Be the Next Ferguson, Missouri!” Rick Rosenthal, the course’s instructor, 
commented, “The bottom line is there was an information vacuum from the Ferguson 
Police Department, and the Twitterverse filled that vacuum.”478 The After-Action 
Assessment of the Police Response in Ferguson, Missouri, found that the FPD’s limited 
public information offerings and reactive public communications set a negative tone after 
Brown’s death.479 However, evidence suggests there have not been improvements to the 
FPD’s media policy, even with leadership changes. 
As mentioned above, the City of Ferguson hired Delish Moss in 2016 to serve as 
chief after Chief Jackson’s resignation. Before his appointment, Moss was a major with 
the Miami Police Department, assigned to that department’s media relations unit for over 
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20 years.480 One of Moss’s priorities then was improving communication between the 
department and its citizens.481 Moss’s media relations experience was a critical factor in 
the decision to hire him.482 However, Moss left the FPD in 2018, and as of this writing, 
Chief Jackson’s 2010 press relations order remains in effect.483 
3. Cynefin Analysis 
Chief Jackson’s failure to leverage the media to communicate effectively with his 
community, and his reliance on established policies, indicated complacency and a slow 
reaction to the evolving events after Brown’s death, indicators of operating within the 
obvious/simple domain.484 Little has changed in policy and practice, even after the 
critiques noted in the After-Action Assessment of the Police Response in Ferguson, 
Missouri. The FPD appears to have remained in the obvious/simple context since Brown’s 
death, the same as before the shooting. 
H. TRANSPARENCY ON PROCEDURAL PROCESSES 
1. Before 
The FPD maintained little to no procedural transparency before Brown’s death. For 
example, the FPD declined to make its policies and procedures publicly available.485 In 
addition, some processes intended to promote transparency existed in policy but not in 
practice. For instance, FPD General Order 301.00, governing employee misconduct 
investigations, required the chief to forward information about civilian complaints 
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investigations to a “professional standards inspector” for inclusion in an annual report.486 
There is no evidence, however, that the agency followed this policy.487 It is unknown 
whether the report was generated or distributed. 
2. In Response 
The FPD has adjusted some of its practices to increase transparency since Brown’s 
death. The agency complied with the consent decree requirement to publish its policies and 
protocols online, making them available at www.fergusoncity.com/documentcenter. The 
site contains draft and final versions of police policy documents. Additionally, the consent 
decree requires the agency to generate several annual reports, such as updating law 
enforcement achievements and challenges, and posting them online. The agreement also 
requires yearly reporting of the department’s implementation and status of its efforts at 
complying with the consent decree terms, which are also available on the website. 
The FPD has also taken independent transparency-developing action separate from 
the terms of the consent decree. In 2017, the department began using a record-keeping 
software suite donated by LEFTA systems, a technology company operated by former 
police officers.488 The database stores information on new officer training regiments, 
in-service training records, use-of-force information, and the demographic information of 
people subjected to FPD enforcement actions. The data collection tool allows FPD officials 
to collect and analyze this data and respond to community inquires and questions more 
quickly and accurately, improving transparency. 
3. Cynefin Analysis 
The FPD’s transparency protocols operated in the obvious/simple domain before 
Brown died. While agency policy called for an annual reporting of civilian complaints—a 
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“best practice” transparency technique that experts recommend—it meagerly maintained 
the protocol. Complacent leadership allowed the process to fail, an anticipated problem in 
this domain, while giving the false appearance that operations conformed with policy. After 
Brown’s shooting, the FPD entered the complicated context, guided by the directions of 
the consent decree and DOJ expertise, following the “good practices” that policy experts 
recommend. 
I. BWC USE 
1. Before 
At the time of Brown’s death, the FPD did not use BWCs. The agency’s 54-officer 
department possessed only two BWCs and lacked the funds to have them installed and 
made operational.489 
2. In Response 
In the aftermath of Brown’s shooting and the rising protests, two technology 
companies donated nearly 50 BWCs to the FPD in August 2014, allowing each officer to 
wear one while on patrol.490 In the following month, problems emerged as officers used 
the cameras. These issues included storage shortages for digital images and unfinalized 
rules dictating when officers should activate the cameras.491 More than a year after the 
shooting, the FPD had not set policies guiding retention and public dissemination of 
captured video.492 
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The DOJ’s consent decree would resolve these issues.493 The agreement required 
that all FPD officers, supervisors, jail workers, and any personnel who regularly interacted 
with the public wear BWCs while on duty. The decree also required that the city meet with 
a vendor to resolve its video collection and storage issues and develop policies dictating 
BWC activation. The order also directed that the FPD make videos publicly available 
within Missouri law to promote transparency and increase accountability. 
Currently, the FPD’s BWC program operates under General Order 20–6.10, 
authorized by Chief Jason P. Armstrong in August 2020.494 This order guides when 
officers must wear cameras and how they are to wear them, and defines situations when 
they must (or must not) activate them. The policy also delineates the process to upload 
video recordings, defines the obligatory retention period (90 days), and the rules about who 
may watch the footage. The department’s BWC program is guided by a robust and detailed 
policy, consistent with police sovereign recommendations and the terms of the consent 
decree. 
3. Cynefin Analysis 
Since the FPD did not use BWCs before Brown’s death, the department’s actions 
could not be evaluated by applying a Cynefin domain in this area. After his death, the 
department entered the complicated domain, its BWC program informed by “good 
practices” that experts recommend and that align with the consent decree’s mandates. 
J. RELEASING BWC FOOTAGE 
1. Before 
FPD officers did not use BWCs before Brown’s death. As such, no video release 
policy existed. 
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2. In Response 
As noted above, the FPD began using BWCs when two companies donated cameras 
after Brown’s death. However, by June 2015, the agency had not formulated a video 
dissemination policy, as required by the consent decree. FPD finalized its video release 
policy in December 2018.495 The policy explains that Ferguson recognizes the rapid 
release of video recordings containing “serious incidents” facilitates transparency between 
the agency and the community. Qualifying incidents include officers’ use of force resulting 
in serious injuries, firearms discharge by officers, vehicle pursuits with severe injury or 
death, or a subject’s death in custody. The policy also defines the maximum time the FPD 
is allowed to decide on releasing videos, providing the chief seven days from a “serious 
incident” to determine whether the department will make the video public. Additionally, 
the order contains privacy provisions shielding the identity of minors, crime victims, 
witnesses, sexual assault survivors, and other protected parties. Finally, the policy allows 
citizens to request video online or in person, which the FPD may redact if required by law. 
3. Cynefin Analysis 
As the FPD did not use BWCs at the time of Brown’s death, it had no video release 
policy. Current FPD policy follows “good practices” established by police sovereigns and 
conforms to consent decree regulations, placing the FPD in the complicated domain for 
this policy dimension. 
K. USING SOCIAL MEDIA 
1. Before 
The FPD did not maintain a presence on any social media platforms before Brown’s 
death. The After-Action Assessment of the Police Response in Ferguson, Missouri, found 
that FPD officials “had no concept of the effect of social media until it was too late, and all 
they could do was play catch up with the massive amount of data being shared” about the 
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shooting.496 The FPD could not respond to the deluge of social media attention aimed in 
its direction. For instance, users shared posts with the hashtag #ferguson over 3.5 million 
times within five days of Brown’s death. 
2. In Response 
There is little evidence that the FPD has developed a social media strategy since 
Brown’s shooting. The only social media footprint the department maintains is a Twitter 
account, opened in September 2014, @FPD_PUBLIC_INFO. The page is inactive, 
consisting of only 30 tweets, the most recent of which were from November 2014.497 
Policy sovereigns suggest that police agencies use social media communications to create 
constructive narratives with the community. However, a review of the still-visible FPD 
Twitter page indicates the agency held an antagonistic tone, focusing on arrests and 
enforcement rather than community outreach. The following are some examples: 
“Chief Jackson tries to speak and walk with protestors who turn violent and 
disobedient. 2 officers injured. 7 arrests made.”498 
“13 people arrested last night for noise viol, resist arrest, fail to comply and 
2 for language to incite violence.”499 
“42 arrests made at Ferguson Police Dept. this morning for Peace 
Disturbance.”500 
In contrast with police sovereigns, a search of the FPD’s website and general orders did 
not identify a social media strategy policy. 
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3. Cynefin Analysis 
The FPD did not use social media before Brown’s death. Although the agency 
posted sporadically on Twitter for three months after the shooting, it has not maintained an 
online presence since then. As such, it did not meaningfully occupy a Cynefin context 
either before or after Brown’s shooting and cannot be categorized. 
L. ENHANCING TRAINING 
1. Before 
Missouri’s Peace Officer Standards and Training guidelines required that new 
police officers attend a minimum of 916 hours of basic instruction.501 The state also 
instructed officers to complete 48 hours of in-service training over three years, consisting 
of courses in legal studies, interpersonal perspectives, and racial profiling. Most FPD 
officers received introductory and active-duty training, but most did not attend additional 
sessions unless they began a specialized assignment, such as investigation duty. 
The DOJ’s report found the FPD’s officer training program, as it existed before 
Brown’s death, inadequate on several fronts. First, officers poorly understood the legalities 
surrounding their powers to stop a suspect with less-than-probable cause.502 Officers also 
lacked training on interacting with the mentally ill or those under the influence of drugs or 
alcohol, leading them to interpret a lack of compliance as resistance that necessitated the 
use of force.503 As mentioned above, de-escalation training was absent from FPD training. 
The report expressed criticism in finding that FPD “officers need a better knowledge of 
what law, policy, and integrity require, and concrete training on how to carry out their 
police responsibilities.”504 Finally, the FPD did not implement scenario-based or adult-
learning methods in its training program as is recommended by policy sovereigns. 
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2. In Response 
The FPD’s consent decree directed many of the agency’s training enhancements. 
First, the agreement required that the agency develop a committee responsible for creating 
basic and in-service training plans for approval by both the DOJ and federal monitor. Some 
procedural changes included increasing in-service training to 50 hours annually and 
implementing a training coordinator to monitor and track officers’ progress.505 The 
consent decree further required the FPD to train its officers in community policing, critical 
thinking, and problem solving; bias-free policing (discussed more below); stop, search, and 
arrest; First Amendment rights; use of force; crisis intervention; BWC use; supervisory 
skills; accountability policy; and officer wellness techniques.506 The courts further 
directed that the training structure consist of scenario-based training and adult-learning 
techniques in addition to traditional lectures.507 By May 2019, the FPD had complied with 
the terms of the consent decree’s training reform directions.508 
3. Cynefin Analysis 
The FPD maintained an obvious/simple approach in its training program before 
Brown’s death, entrenched in standard operating procedures and established processes. 
However, in this domain, several weaknesses were evident. For example, while officers 
were qualified within state standards, the agency failed to incorporate police sovereign 
recommendations, such as de-escalation training and scenario-based instruction. This 
failure indicates entrained thinking, which credited old successes (state-qualified officers) 
to established protocols, precluding the exploration of evolved training methods. The 
agency now operates within the complicated context, using the “sense-analyze-respond” 
cycle, as the expertise-driven consent decree requirements guide its training program. 
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M. IMPLICIT BIAS AWARENESS TRAINING 
1. Before 
General Order 401.00, promulgated in December 2012, stated that all FPD officers 
would receive “bias-based profiling” training, the department’s term for racial profiling, 
every year.509 Racial profiling is an explicit expression of bias whereas implicit bias affects 
people subconsciously. Thus, the FPD did not conduct training to minimize implicit bias 
before Brown’s death. The agency also failed to provide cultural awareness training before 
Brown’s death. Some officers reported in the After-Action Assessment that the agency had 
not held such sessions since 1995.510 
2. In Response 
On November 6 and 7, 2014, the DOJ’s Office of Community Oriented Policing 
Services hosted a “Fair and Impartial Policing” training session for command-level 
members of the FPD.511 Leadership from St. Louis County, St. Louis Metropolitan, and 
Missouri Highway Patrol police departments were also present, each having assisted the 
FPD in managing the protests and riots after Brown’s death. The session taught officers 
how implicit bias affects their behavior, and the detrimental impact of biased policing on 
their relationship with the community. The sessions were led by Dr. Lorie Fridell, an expert 
on racially biased policing, and Noble Wray, a retired police chief from the Madison, 
Wisconsin, Police Department. Fridell and Wray would later found Fair and Impartial 
Policing, the company contracted by the NYPD in 2018 for its implicit bias program. 
Under the terms of the consent decree, the FPD would provide its officers with 
annual training on implicit bias, cultural competency, cultural awareness, and the impact 
these topics have on police and community relations.512 The FPD’s fair and impartial 
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policing policy is in draft form as of October 2019 and is available for public review on 
the city’s website.513 Topics in the annual course include minimizing implicit bias, the 
effect of implicit bias on police legitimacy, cross-cultural communication and cultural 
competency, and the law and legal prohibitions against discriminatory policing. The FPD’s 
policy warns that officers are subject to discipline for failing to attend the training or for 
policing in a biased fashion. 
3. Cynefin Analysis 
An FPD implicit bias program did not exist before Brown’s death, and its racial 
profiling program was sparse—and by some accounts, non-existent. As such, it did not 
occupy a Cynefin context in a meaningful way before Brown’s death and cannot be 
categorized. After Brown, the FPD entered the complicated domain, implementing “good 
practices” at the consent decree’s direction and guided by DOJ expertise. 
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V. BALTIMORE POLICE DEPARTMENT: 
FREDDIE GRAY—APRIL 12, 2015 
At around 8:40 a.m. on Sunday, April 12, 2015, four Baltimore Police Department 
(BPD) bicycle patrol officers tried to stop 25-year-old Freddie Gray near the Gilmor Homes 
housing development in the Sandtown-Winchester section of the city.514 The officers 
suspected Gray of involvement with criminal activity because he fled without provocation 
upon seeing them.515 When police caught him, Gray had a switchblade knife clipped inside 
his pants, and they arrested him. Since the officers were on bicycles, they requested a 
department vehicle to transport Gray to the Western District BPD station. Two additional 
officers arrived at the arrest site in a van and assumed custody of a handcuffed Gray. Those 
officers then picked up another prisoner and delivered both to the station for processing. 
When Gray arrived at the station, he was unconscious and in severe medical 
distress. Due to his condition, city paramedics responded and removed him to the 
University of Maryland’s Shock Trauma unit.516 Gray remained comatose, never regaining 
consciousness. He underwent several surgeries for a neck injury while lingering in the 
hospital but never recovered. Gray died from resultant medical complications on Sunday, 
April 19, 2015, one week after his arrest. An autopsy report revealed that Gray suffered a 
“high energy injury [to his spine] most often caused by abrupt deceleration of a rotated 
head on a hyperflexed neck, such as seen in shallow water diving accidents.”517 The 
autopsy concluded the neck injury that eventuated Gray’s death was likely caused by his 
striking his head on the van’s interior while being handcuffed and in leg restraints but 
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lacking the security of a seatbelt. The medical examiner ruled his death a homicide (a death 
caused by another person), finding that Gray’s injury occurred while police transported 
him in a vulnerable position while in the van, violating established police safety policies. 
Namely, the BPD had distributed a policy memo to officers mandating seat belts be used 
during prisoner transports on April 3, 2015; it was effective on April 9, 2015, three days 
before Gray’s arrest and transport.518 
In the week after Gray’s death, the BPD suspended and publicly identified the four 
bicycle officers who initiated his arrest and the two officers who transported him to the 
police station.519 Near the end of April 2015, U.S. Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch 
announced that the DOJ’s Civil Rights Division and the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
would conduct an independent probe of Gray’s death to determine whether the officers 
committed any civil rights violations.520 On May 1, 2015, Marilyn Mosby, the state’s 
attorney for Baltimore City, announced criminal charges and the six officers’ arrests during 
a well-publicized press conference.521 The total charges against the officers included 
second-degree murder, manslaughter, involuntary manslaughter, second-degree assault, 
vehicular manslaughter, misconduct in office, and false imprisonment. 
Although facing substantial criminal charges, none of the officers were convicted. 
Officer William G. Porter was the first officer to stand trial, his case beginning in December 
2015. It ended with a hung jury in January 2016 when the jurors could not unanimously 
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decide on his guilt.522 Prosecutors conducted the next criminal trial against Officer Edward 
Nero, who faced up to 20 years in prison if convicted; his five-day bench trial (whereby a 
judge rather than a jury decided guilt) ended with his acquittal on May 23, 2016.523 Next, 
the state tried Officer Caesar R. Goodson Jr. in June 2016. Goodson drove the van wherein 
Gray suffered his injury and was charged with second-degree murder, the highest charge 
against any of the officers.524 The eight-day bench trial ended in acquittal on June 23, 
2016. The bench trial of Lieutenant Brian Rice, the highest-ranking person on scene during 
Gray’s arrest, ended on July 18, 2016, once again in an acquittal.525 Rice’s trial would be 
the last attempt by Mosby’s office seeking criminality in Gray’s death. In the week 
following the final acquittal, Mosby dropped the charges against the remaining officers 
(including those against Officer Porter, whose retrial was pending), saying she was no 
longer confident the remaining trials would ever result in a conviction, a decision she said 
was “agonizing.”526 
Federal officials would not bring charges against the officers either. In a statement 
released on September 12, 2017, the DOJ said no evidence supported federal civil rights 
charges against the officers.527 Calling Gray’s death “a tragic event,” the agency declared 
that “the evidence [was] insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [the six 
officers] willfully violated Gray’s civil rights,” ending any criminal cases against the 
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officers.528 Meanwhile, Baltimore had settled the wrongful-death civil suit brought by 
Gray’s family for $6.4 million in September 2015.529 
With the state and federal processes completed, the BPD presented administrative 
charges against five of the six officers for policy violations during Gray’s arrest.530 Two 
officers accepted minor discipline, administrative boards acquitted two officers, and the 
BPD later dropped charges against the remaining officer. By November 2017, all six were 
back to full duty. 
A. AFTERMATH: LARGE-SCALE CIVIL DISORDER IN BALTIMORE 
The protests against Gray’s arrest and the questionable circumstances of his 
hospitalization began in front of the Western District station on April 18, 2015, one day 
before his death.531 The protests continued for six days, causing Governor Larry Hogan to 
send members of the Maryland State Police to assist the BPD as the marches grew in size 
and intensity. However intense the protesters were, their initial displays of anger and 
dissatisfaction at Gray’s death remained peaceful. However, on Saturday, April 25, 2015, 
some of these peaceful demonstrations devolved into violence and disorder. 
On that day, over 1,000 people marched uneventfully through downtown 
Baltimore, the most massive protest yet.532 However, at around 6:30 p.m., a smaller 
contingent of protesters split from that group and erupted in violence. Similar to Ferguson 
during the Michael Brown unrest, the Baltimore protesters became increasingly 
confrontational and aggressive with police and civilians as the sun set.533 Rioters smashed 
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local retail storefront windows, used rocks and bottles to damage police cars, looted 
convenience stores, and attacked people having dinner in restaurants near the Camden 
Yards baseball stadium. For a brief period, police prohibited those inside the ballpark from 
exiting until they dispersed the crowd. Omar Newberns, a protester interviewed by the New 
York Times, captured the anger of the moment. Newberns told the newspaper, “This is a 
powder keg right now. . . . New York and Ferguson and all the other places are just 
preliminary to introduce it to the nation,” referencing the unrest and violent retaliation that 
developed in New York City and Ferguson after the deaths of Eric Garner and Michael 
Brown.534 Media images of rioters standing on damaged police cars and using traffic cones 
and garbage cans to bash their windows flooded the media.535 At an evening press 
conference hosted by Baltimore Mayor Stephanie Rawlings-Blake, Fredericka Gray—
Freddie’s twin sister—pleaded for an end to the violence, saying, “Can y’all please, please 
stop the violence? . . . Freddie Gray would not want this.” By the end of the riots that night, 
police had arrested at least 35 people, and six officers suffered minor injuries.536 
Gray’s wake was the following day, Sunday, April 26, 2015, with his funeral 
scheduled for Monday, April 27. Social justice activists like Jesse Jackson, some members 
of Eric Garner’s family, and three officials from the White House attended the wake, which 
featured comments from late–Baltimore Congressman Elijah Cummings, who demanded 
a full investigation of his death.537 After the wake, Mayor Rawlings-Blake voiced her 
support for the demonstrators but reiterated her demands for peaceful protests.538 While 
that Sunday evening was uneventful, her request would go unheeded after Gray’s funeral 
the next day. 
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On Monday, April 27, violence broke out in the northwest Baltimore neighborhood 
of Mondawmin immediately after Gray’s funeral. Roaming gangs of rioters tore across the 
city, looting and setting fire to businesses and property.539 Rioters threw rocks and bottles 
at police, and looters loaded their cars with stolen possessions. Reporters on the scene 
broadcast as rioters emptied a local CVS pharmacy and then burned it to the ground. They 
also captured video of a protester using a knife to cut a hose that firefighters were using to 
extinguish the flames.540 Baltimore descended into chaos and violence. Governor Hogan 
declared a state of emergency, activated the National Guard, and mobilized nearly 1,500 
state troopers and 5,000 officers from neighboring departments to help the BPD quell the 
riots.541 By Tuesday morning, protesters had set 144 cars and 15 structures ablaze, and 
police had arrested more than 200 people.542 Later Tuesday night, Rawlings-Blake 
imposed a 10:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m. curfew to remove those causing the violence from the 
streets; with the increased law enforcement presence, these measures prevented any further 
significant incidents. The curfew remained in effect from Tuesday, April 28, to Sunday, 
May 3. After several nights of calm, the Mayor rescinded the order and demobilized the 
National Guard and outside law enforcement agencies, returning Baltimore to normal. 
Mosby’s announcement of criminal charges and arrests on May 1 likely contributed to the 
cessation of violence.543 
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The final tabulation of the Baltimore riots of 2015 was nearly 500 people arrested 
and over 150 officers injured.544 Financially, the Small Business Administration’s initial 
estimate of costs associated with the riots totaled nearly $9 million in damage to 285 
businesses and $60,000 to two residential structures. The Baltimore Development 
Corporation, the agency responsible for the city’s economic development, calculated a 
higher number, reporting that 350 businesses had been damaged.545 Rioters using fire 
destroyed close to 150 vehicles and over 60 structures. Looters targeted three pharmacies 
during the riots, stealing nearly 315,000 doses of drugs, some of which were potent 
opioids.546 However, some commercial operators voiced longer-term concerns, including 
tourists’ and shoppers’ possible hesitance to visit the city; they feared the economic impact 
would linger for years.547 Their fears were founded, as six months after the riots, some 
businesses reported revenue being down 20 to 30 percent.548 
The riots after Gray’s death were an expression of the BPD’s lost legitimacy with 
the public. As researcher Mark S. Mellman writes, while referencing Tom Tyler’s work on 
police legitimacy, “Absent either legitimacy or severe repression, anarchy reigns,” further 
arguing that “without the legitimacy that fairness produces, it will be more difficult for 
police to do their jobs effectively, and we will see more Fergusons and Baltimores.”549 
The death of Freddie Gray in the custody of BPD officers indicated to some residents a 
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tremendous lack of procedural justice and fairness in his interaction with those officers, 
thus greatly impacting the perception of police legitimacy. 
B. CIVILIAN BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS 
1. Before 
The Baltimore Civilian Review Board (BCRB) was established well before Freddie 
Gray’s death but operated in a manner essentially described as “irrelevant.”550 The 
Maryland General Assembly founded the board in 2000 after several police shootings and 
a controversial incident where police handcuffed a state senator. In 2013, City Council 
President Bernard C. “Jack” Young described the board as a “paper tiger” because the 
police department usually rejected its disciplinary recommendations.551 Further, board 
member attendance was sporadic. Of nine “voting member” positions, four had not 
participated in years. Of the five active participants, four were beyond their three-year term 
limit and had voiced their desire to resign. In addition, the three “non-voting” advisory 
positions the BPD and police union were supposed to appoint were vacant. While the board 
had limited subpoena powers, allowing it to obtain items needed to probe police 
misconduct complaints, like the medical records of people alleging police abuse, it only 
had two investigators, limiting its ability to examine complaints thoroughly. Citizen 
complaints would often go months without status updates or resolution. 
Additionally, the DOJ’s Investigation of the Baltimore City Police Department was 
critical of the BPD/BCRB citizen complaint investigation process.552 When the DOJ 
examined the period from 2010 to 2015, it found that the BCRB had faced several obstacles 
accomplishing its mission. For example, the BPD withheld complaint information to which 
the board was entitled and often closed officer complaints before the BCRB conducted its 
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own investigation. A report in the Baltimore Sun supported this finding, revealing that the 
BPD withheld two-thirds of cases under the board’s purview from 2013 to 2015.553 
Furthermore, the DOJ report found that the BCRB lacked the authority to compel officers 
to participate in its investigations; under state law, only other sworn officers were allowed 
to question BPD members.554 Finally, the BPD did not have to abide by BCRB discipline 
recommendations, nor was it obligated to apprise the board of investigation results. 
Overall, the DOJ found the civilian oversight mechanisms “inadequate and ineffective,” 
suggesting that the “flaws damage [d] the Department’s legitimacy.”555 
2. In Response 
The BPD’s civilian oversight board remained mostly unchanged from Gray’s death 
in 2015 until the department entered into its consent decree with the DOJ in April 2017.556 
The court order mandated creating a Community Oversight Task Force (COTF) that would 
review the board’s functions, remove impediments to the complaint process, and increase 
public accountability.557 The consent decree also required that the BPD and BCRB 
streamline the complaint process and obligated the BPD to share case information with the 
board, among other changes.558 
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By the end of 2017, some media outlets claimed the consent decree had “breathed 
new life” into the BCRB.559 More recent developments, however, suggest those reports 
were overly optimistic. In 2018, the COTF recommended disbanding the BCRB, 
advocating for a new independent board with full investigatory and subpoena powers; 
however, that recommendation required state legislative changes unlikely to occur.560 
Further, the BCRB has the same staffing issues in the years after Gray’s death as existed 
before: its website shows only six active voting members, and as of this writing, the 
positions representing the Southern, Eastern, and Southeastern districts are vacant.561 
Additionally, BCRB members have reported the BPD is still unforthcoming with 
information they need to adjudicate misconduct cases, saying the process remains 
“ineffective” and “opaque.” Detractors say the Baltimore City Office of Equity and Civil 
Rights of the BCRB, rather than investigating civilian complaints, “blunts criticism [of 
police], muzzles opposition, and obfuscates abuse” to “insulate the city from liability for 
racist, oppressive, and unconstitutional policing.”562 
3. Cynefin Analysis 
The BPD remained in the obvious/simple domain before and after Gray’s death, 
with structured processes embedded into agency policy. The agency was compliant with 
the “best practice” of having civilian oversight of police misconduct investigations before 
Gray’s death, as policy sovereigns recommend. However, the board’s lack of impact on 
discipline recommendations in that period suggests complacency in operation, evident in 
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that no entity ensured that BPD practice followed policy, a problem that arises in the 
obvious/simple context.563 While the requirements of the consent decree suggest the BPD 
had entered the complicated domain after Gray’s death, the board’s persistent problems in 
achieving full staffing and police support in obtaining investigatory needs indicate little 
has changed, reflecting entrained thinking that prevents initiatives to improve performance. 
C. IMPROVING OR REPLACING LEADERSHIP 
1. Before 
Anthony W. Batts was the police commissioner for over two years when Gray died. 
Commissioner Batts was chosen by Mayor Stephanie Rawlings-Blake in September 2012 
and confirmed by the City Council the following month.564 Before going to Baltimore, 
Batts headed the Oakland Police Department from 2009 to 2011, and spent nearly 30 years 
before that with the Long Beach Police Department in California.565 Known as a 
well-educated reformer in his previous police leaderships roles, Batts intended the same 
for the BPD. In November 2013, he published his strategic vision in a lengthy planning 
report, stating his objectives were “over the next five years to reduce crime, improve 
service, increase efficiency, redouble community engagement, and provide for the highest 
standards of accountability and ethical integrity.”566 The improvement commitments his 
plan discussed included some of the sovereign recommendations described in Chapter II. 
2. In Response 
In July 2015, three months after Gray’s death, Commissioner Batts was fired by 
Mayor Rawlings-Blake. The mayor said she relieved Batts of his duties due to the rise in 
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crime in the wake of the April 2015 riots, appointing Ken Davis as commissioner; Davis 
was one of Batts’s deputy commissioners.567 Before his firing, Batts was also under fire 
from other critics. The City Council had been preparing to send the mayor a letter 
demanding Batts’s resignation for his failure to curb the spike in murders, which by July 
had risen to 155 for the year, up from 105 the year before.568 The police union had also 
planned to hold a no-confidence vote for Batts’s alleged leadership failures during the 
riots.569 The union claimed that Batts’s “hands-off” approach with rioters had allowed the 
violence to spread, leading to over 150 officers suffering injuries.570 
Interestingly, some criminal justice system observers suggest that Batts’s partiality 
to policy analysis and education may have contributed to his ineffectiveness in the BPD.571 
Batts was active among academic and strategy elites, often contracting sovereign 
organizations like PERF in policy recommendations. He holds a doctorate in public 
administration and has lectured at the Harvard Kennedy School. Batts’s academic 
credentials, however, appeared to leave BPD officers unimpressed, which turned to open 
hostility after some were injured during the riots. Rather than gaining the respect of the 
rank and file, he was viewed as an outsider, and his inclination toward academics caused 
some to label him an “egghead.”572 
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3. Cynefin Analysis 
Commissioner Batts’s leadership did not sustain the fallout of Gray’s death. His 
extensive police management experience combined with his educational background 
placed the BPD firmly in the complicated domain, where his expertise guided his intent to 
bring “good practices” to the department. However, Batts’s preference for policy 
evaluation and accusations of inaction during the riots suggest “analysis paralysis,” an 
identified problem of the complicated domain.573 Additionally, Batts’s diagnosis of the 
BPD’s problems in his strategy document suggest an overconfidence in his ability to 
correct them based on his past successes in other departments, an identified “danger signal” 
in the complicated domain.574 After Gray’s death, the agency entered the complex domain. 
Following the unrest and rise in crime, the mayor selected one of Batts’s subordinates to 
lead the agency. Doing so indicated her willingness to probe his ability to lead, allowing 
the possibility of a viable path out of instability and adopting the “probe-sense-respond” 
cycle featured in the complex domain.575 
D. ADOPTING COMMUNITY-ORIENTED POLICING 
1. Before 
The DOJ’s Investigation of the Baltimore City Police Department found that before 
Gray’s death, the BPD’s model of policing centered on antagonistic policing rather than 
methods to foster community relationships.576 The agency’s strategies focused on 
narcotics enforcement, gun arrests, and an aggressive tactic to move people off the streets, 
known as “clearing corners.” These tactics resulted in the DOJ’s observing a “significant 
divide” between the community and BPD officers, some of whom admitted that 
“community relations [were] BPD’s weakest attribute.”577 The DOJ also found that 
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officers maintained a prevalent “us-versus-them” mentality and thought of community 
policing as “pandering to the public.”578 Many BPD district commanders did not work 
with community groups to establish commons objectives, and rarely did they send officers 
to local meetings.579 
While BPD officers were dismissive of community policing, their attitude 
corresponded with the agency’s overall implementation of the concept. Structurally, the 
BPD maintained a Community Collaboration Division (CCD), charged with managing 
community-policing efforts citywide, but the unit was lightly staffed and lacked input from 
local commanders or systemic integration with other parts of the agency.580 At times, local 
police district initiatives collided with CCD efforts as there was little coordination between 
the two. 
2. In Response 
The BPD took several steps to improve its community-policing program after 
Gray’s death—notably, before the DOJ released its Investigation of the Baltimore City 
Police Department in August 2016 and before the mandates of the April 2017 consent 
decree.581 For example, Commissioner Davis hosted a series of lectures for his officers 
called the History of Baltimore Speaker Series. Commissioner Davis wanted his officers 
to learn more about the variety of people they served, suggesting the BPD would become 
a nationwide model for other police departments looking to improve their community-
policing programs. The department assigned a new head to the CCD and directed the unit 
to expand its efforts at increasing positive community contacts. The agency also revived a 
defunct chaplaincy program, training 150 chaplains with access to police officers to help 
them mend community relationships. The DOJ report lauded Davis’s proactive efforts, but 
said substantial obstacles remained that prevented the agency from creating a successful 
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community-policing program, such as officers’ documented reluctance to accept the 
philosophy.582 
The BPD published a formal Community Policing Plan in April 2020, a 
requirement of the consent decree. The plan describes that “every officer is a Community 
Policing Officer,” a declaration that all BPD members will systemically participate in the 
program.583 The BPD also “flattened” the organization, streamlining communications and 
accountability between field officers and leadership so that both are working toward 
building community solutions. Further, the BPD reorganized its patrol staffing plan, 
increasing the number of street-level officers to allow them to spend at least 40 percent of 
their time engaging in active community-policing efforts. Finally, all BPD officers must 
annually attend an eight-hour training session that reinforces the plan and its underlying 
principles.584 
3. Cynefin Analysis 
The BPD’s implementation of a community-policing program that poorly 
communicated with other department units and its emphasis on aggressive crime-reduction 
techniques indicate operating in the obvious/simple before Gray’s death. The agency 
claimed to engage in the “established practice” of community-oriented policing yet 
oversimplified its operation by restricting its efforts to a single unit and failing to 
implement the philosophy in a manner that would lead to officer acceptance. Importantly, 
however, the agency independently pivoted to the complex domain when Commissioner 
Davis used the “probe-sense-respond” cycle to experiment with different programs when 
he assumed command, taking steps to build the program in line with sovereign 
recommendations. The agency now operates in the complicated domain, having fully 
adopting the “good practice” of community policing as a department-wide strategy in 
alignment with policy sovereigns and the consent decree. 
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E. ENHANCING COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT 
1. Before 
Before Gray’s death, the BPD poorly engaged with the community. As mentioned 
above, the BPD’s policing model emphasized criminal enforcement over community 
engagement, which led to a relationship characterized as contentious and tense.585 The 
DOJ’s report found that many officers displayed rude, aggressive behavior with witnesses, 
suspects, and the general public. To illustrate, one officer is quoted in the report as saying, 
“You’ve got to be the baddest motherf***er out there.”586 Further, officers ignored some 
policies intended to promote positive engagement.587 For example, the BPD required a 
daily 30-minute foot patrol from every street officer, intending to provide a period when 
they could get to know the people they serve. However, many officers disregarded the 
directive, and supervisors failed to enforce compliance. 
2. In Response 
The BPD took proactive measures to enhance community engagement before DOJ 
or consent decree mandates, much as it did with its community-policing program.588 New 
officers began attending services at houses of worship to foster a greater understanding and 
connection to the community. The agency also created a Youth Advisory Board and 
Women in Law Enforcement Program, mentoring groups to help younger community 
residents with professional development and encouragement. Further, the BPD began a 
Reading Partners program, providing kids with one-on-one tutoring at local libraries. 
In its Community Policing Plan, the BPD further defines how it engages with the 
community, dividing the efforts into three methods.589 The plan describes “informal 
community engagement,” such as playing basketball with youths or having conversations 
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with business owners; “formal community engagement,” such as attending community 
meetings and organized events; and “daily problem-solving,” where officers help 
community members with issues and disputes that could escalate in the future. A vital 
component of the plan is that responsibility for community engagement, which the agency 
says is crucial to successful community policing, is decentralized from units within 
headquarters and bestowed on every officer.590 
3. Cynefin Analysis 
The BPD’s community engagement strategy operated within the obvious/simple 
domain before Gray’s death. The agency’s policy suggests it wanted officers to engage 
meaningfully with the community, a repeatable “best practice” recommended by policy 
sovereigns. However, officers did not abide by policy, and supervisors demonstrated 
complacency in not ensuring compliance, an identified problem in the obvious/simple 
context.591 The BPD did not foster an authentic community engagement program, which 
indicated an expectation of smooth operation within existing policy; that led to the officer 
sentiments listed above, whereby officers maintained an adversarial view of the public. 
Much like it did with its community-policing program, the BPD took proactive “probe-
sense-respond” steps to enhance community engagement after Gray’s death, entering the 
complex domain and then later the complicated domain when complying with the “good 
practices” dictated by the consent decree. 
F. EMPHASIZING DE-ESCALATION, PRESERVATION OF LIFE, AND 
ADOPTING LESS-LETHAL TECHNOLOGIES 
1. Before 
The DOJ’s Investigation of the Baltimore City Police Department report found 
significant evidence that BPD officers often failed to de-escalate encounters, using tactics 
that unnecessarily escalated encounters, leading to the use of force in situations that could 
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have been peacefully resolved.592 Further, the department did not incorporate de-
escalation techniques until 2015.593 Instead, BPD training until then focused on physical 
tactics to overcome resistance, bypassing the opportunity to provide officers with skills to 
find alternatives to the use of force. Force was the preferred alternative to de-escalation.594 
BPD officers’ use of less-lethal technology also reflected their disregard for 
de-escalation. CEDs were the less-lethal option available to patrol officers when Gray died. 
However, the DOJ reported that BPD policy and training on their use was inadequate and 
led to officers deploying them improperly.595 For example, the DOJ reported an incident 
of an officer’s using a CED to calm a woman down, which obviously was ineffective as it 
caused her extreme pain.596 When she refused to remain calm, the officer applied the CED 
two more times, an escalation of force against an unarmed person posing little threat. 
2. In Response 
In 2016, the BPD embarked on a full review of its use-of-force policies, which had 
not changed since 2003; notably, this review occurred before any external mandates.597 
The department also began revising policies on less-lethal technologies, including CEDs, 
OC spray, and impact munitions, and added de-escalation strategies to its training 
curriculum.598 By 2017, the consent decree required that the agency teach, and that officers 
use, de-escalation techniques to reduce the necessity for using force even in circumstances 
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where force would be legally justified.599 The ruling also formalized the requirement that 
the agency complete its ongoing revision of less-lethal technology rules.600 
Since Gray’s death, the BPD has made substantial progress in modernizing its 
de-escalation and force policies, formalizing and making them available online for public 
view on its active policies page.601 Currently, the BPD’s website notes its commitment to 
teaching its officers “de-escalation techniques and tactical maneuvers that minimize the 
chances a scenario will call for the use of deadly force.”602 The agency also affirms its 
commitment to preserving life, saying that officers are allowed to use lethal force only in 
the “most extreme circumstances when all lesser means of force have failed or could not 
be reasonably deployed.”603 The department’s de-escalation policy requires that officers 
value the sanctity of life, strive toward peaceful resolutions, and comply with department 
standards, which are stricter than the minimum legal requirements for the use of force.604 
Additionally, BPD regulations require that officers use CEDs only against people 
displaying active resistance, such as kicking, or those who demonstrate an “imminent threat 
of death of serious physical injury.”605 The agency now leverages electronic learning to 
supplement classroom learning on the use of force, with all of these measures bringing it 
in compliance with federal orders.606 
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3. Cynefin Analysis 
The BPD’s use-of-force policy operated in the obvious/simple domain before 
Gray’s death. The BPD’s emphasis on force-based solutions in its training, as opposed to 
de-escalation, and frequent improper CED use indicate a reluctance to pivot from “best 
practices” of the past to emerging options that support minimal use of force. Such a 
reluctance to evolve is a problem in the obvious/simple domain and is an example of 
overreliance on “best practices,” which Snowden and Boone say are “past practices,” and 
not forward-looking.607 After Gray’s death, the BPD’s independent use-of-force review 
brought the department into the complex domain, using the “probe-sense-respond” cycle 
when prompted by its legitimacy crisis to explore multiple paths to emerge from the 
instability, public rebukes, and riots that followed. The BPD’s current compliance with 
federal mandates and expert direction caused it later to operate in the complicated domain, 
following the “good practices” of their recommendations. 
G. MEDIA STRATEGY AND PUBLICLY DIRECTED STATEMENTS 
1. Before 
Before Gray’s death, the BPD’s dedicated Media Relations Section (MRS) 
responded to media inquiries on policies, procedures, and general information on 
newsworthy police events.608 When Commissioner Batts joined the agency in 2012, 
however, he found the department’s media strategy inadequate.609 The agency lacked a 
public communications plan to establish its strategic messaging goals, so it could not 
showcase its positive work in the community. Further, the office was not fully staffed, 
limiting the department’s ability to answer media inquiries 24 hours a day. 
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2. In Response 
Immediately after Gray’s death, the BPD took innovative steps to allow the media 
access to the investigation. For instance, the department embedded a Baltimore Sun 
reporter with the team investigating Gray’s death, but ordered that the reporter refrain from 
publishing the story until the results were revealed.610 While this was a move toward 
openness with the media, the overall BPD media strategy was failing. The department was 
fielding press inquiries at a rate of over 100 per hour, and the limited staff the agency 
assigned to the MRS were quickly overwhelmed. The department faced difficulties getting 
its messaging out, and worse, some in the public believed it was trying to hide information 
or spread disinformation. For example, the MRS released a statement suggesting there was 
an assassination plot targeting police officers after Gray’s death, which was later debunked 
but led to increased tension with the community.611 
After Batts’s separation from the BPD, Commissioner Davis hired T. J. Smith as 
the new MRS director in August 2015, saying there was a “cosmic shift in thinking” 
underway in modern policing following Gray’s death, necessitating that police departments 
recognize the importance of quality communication with the public.612 Smith was 
recruited from the Anne Arundel County Police Department and was known for using 
social media and live-streaming technology in innovative ways to keep the public informed 
on breaking police events.613 Smith remained MRS director until 2018 and, for nearly 
three years, oversaw the BPD’s communications strategy during the entirety of the Gray 
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officers’ trials and the federal oversight that followed.614 He held press conferences nearly 
daily, promoting changes the department was undertaking to restore its reputation and 
relationship with the community, and speaking out regularly against surges of violence.615 
The MRS remains the central media contact clearinghouse for BPD officers, but it allows 
officers of the rank of captain and above to speak to the media on the agency’s behalf.616 
3. Cynefin Analysis 
While the BPD maintained a media section before Gray’s death, the lack of an overall 
messaging plan suggests it was in the obvious/simple domain. The agency followed the “best 
practice” of maintaining a dedicated point of contact for media access but lacked a plan to 
incorporate the unit into the agency’s positive messaging goals. This failure revealed 
ignorance to new practices, a sign of complacency, which led to an inability to react to new 
challenges, a known problem in the obvious/simple domain.617 After Gray’s death, the BPD 
entered the complex domain, the “probe-sense-respond” cycle indicated by the agency’s new 
efforts to allow unprecedented media access to the investigation and hire an innovator savvy 
at using new media-messaging technologies. 
H. TRANSPARENCY ON PROCEDURAL PROCESSES 
1. Before 
Commissioner Batts’s 2013 strategic plan identified transparency in department 
policy and internal discipline structures as an area he sought to improve, recognizing that 
open processes promote collaboration between police and the community.618 His plan made 
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deputy commissioners accountable for ensuring police operations were as transparent as 
possible, directing that they allay public fear or concerns regarding the BPD.619 Reputation 
management was an important component of Batts’s plan, which tied transparency to his 
desire to enhance the BPD’s professional image. Under Batts’s tenure, the BPD made 
increased efforts to inform the public on policy and procedures, time frames of critical 
incidents, and the roles external entities maintained in investigations, even if privacy laws or 
investigatory status precluded the full release of information.620 Consistent with his 
education and reformist background, Batts’s perspective on transparency conformed with 
policy sovereign recommendations. 
2. In Response 
The BPD made substantial improvements in procedural transparency after Gray’s 
death at the suggestion of the DOJ’s report.621 The consent decree recognized the 
transparency measures that the BPD had taken before Gray’s death as productive, as it did 
the continuing efforts before the agency was under federal oversight, all of which aligned 
with policy sovereign recommendations.622 After Gray’s death and the riots that followed, 
some policy experts suggested the BPD provide readily accessible policies on its website.623 
The BPD followed this suggestion but went further in its efforts to promote greater 
transparency. In addition to routine police regulations, the agency also allows the public 
online access to many of its internally focused strategic documents. For example, the BPD 
includes on its website its retention plan, the agency’s strategy to encourage talented 
members to remain with the BPD rather than leave for another department.624 
The BPD has taken other measures to increase its transparency with the public. For 
example, it posts proposed changes to regulations and training materials on its website and 
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collects public feedback.625 The agency also began posting data on officer-involved 
shootings, providing the status of state attorney actions and the internal review board’s 
assessments.626 
3. Cynefin Analysis 
Guided by Commissioner Batts’s police management proficiency and advanced 
education, the BPD operated in the complicated domain before Gray’s death, the domain of 
“good practice” guided by expert methodology and opinion.627 In response to his death, the 
agency experimented with broadening ways to provide the public with internal process 
information, a “probe-sense-respond” cycle suggesting a transition to the complex domain. 
In its efforts to promote transparency, the BPD has increased levels of experimental 
communication and interaction, both of which support success in the complex domain.628 
I. BWC USE 
1. Before 
While the BPD did not use BWCs before Gray’s death, Commissioner Batts in 2013 
identified his intent to begin testing devices in a pilot program, exploring the associated costs, 
and searching for recommended policy guidance for the devices.629 His experience as the 
chief of the Oakland Police Department, where he introduced BWCs, helped inform his plans 
for the BPD. While Mayor Rawlings-Blake was initially resistant to the technology, in 
October 2014, she created a working group to evaluate how BPD officers would use 
BWCs.630 This group agreed with Batts’s assessment and, in early 2015, recommended a 
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pilot program to finalize protocols on how officers would use the cameras, with Rawlings-
Blake saying she intended to have BPD officers equipped by the end of 2015.631 
Nevertheless, none of the officers involved in Gray’s arrest had BWCs. 
2. In Response 
The BPD continued with its plans to equip its officers with BWCs after Gray’s death. 
In October 2015, 155 officers entered the pilot program, testing technology options from 
three different vendors.632 The protocols for the camera’s use, however, were still in draft 
form, and the BPD chose not to make them public at the time. The lack of transparency with 
the camera regulations disturbed some, including a member of Rawlings-Blake’s working 
group, who categorized the BPD’s decision “incomprehensible and utterly unacceptable.”633 
The pilot program was a success, and in May 2016, the BPD began a full roll-out; by 
2018, every officer had a BWC.634 The agency also transitioned to a more transparent 
posture regarding the cameras and their regulations. The BPD provides statistical information 
about the number of videos officers record and notes that officer misconduct discovered on 
footage is investigated by its Internal Affairs section for possible discipline. Members of the 
public can request copies of videos as is allowed under Maryland privacy laws, which the 
agency provides for a small fee. Additionally, the BPD publishes many of its internal 
documentation regulating the cameras online, furthering its transparency efforts. For 
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example, it publishes existing BWC policy, draft versions of potential policy changes, and 
internal officer training documents.635 
3. Cynefin Analysis 
While the BPD officers did not use BWCs before Gray’s death, Commissioner Batts 
and the mayor were consulting with panels of experts to design “good practice” regarding 
their use. Thus, the agency was operating in the complicated domain before Gray died. After 
Gray’s death, the agency aligned its policies to conform with sovereigns’ recommendations 
and the consent decree, using “good practices” regarding BWC protocols in a clear and direct 
way with its officers and the public, thus remaining in the complicated domain. 
J. RELEASING BWC FOOTAGE 
1. Before 
BPD officers did not use BWCs before Gray’s death. As such, there was no video 
release policy. 
2. In Response 
As discussed above, when the BPD began its BWC pilot program in October 2015, 
the agency refrained from providing the public with information on how to obtain video 
recordings, much to the consternation of some.636 The agency has pivoted since then and 
maintains a policy consistent with the recommendations of policy sovereigns. Currently, the 
BPD Document Compliance Unit fields public requests for videos, charging a fee of $50 per 
video file related to a requested incident.637 A department BWC coordinator collects the 
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footage and returns it to the unit for public release, redacting the footage as required by the 
Maryland Public Information Act, if necessary.638 
3. Cynefin Analysis 
As noted above, the BPD did not use BWCs before Gray’s death but was consulting 
with outside experts to provide guidance on formulating “good practice” protocols, thus 
placing this policy dimension in the complicated context. After Gray’s death, the agency 
finalized its BWC program under the consent decree’s expert guidance, which included a 
video release policy, retaining this policy dimension in the complicated domain. 
K. USING SOCIAL MEDIA 
1. Before 
In June 2014, the year before Gray died, the BPD celebrated amassing 50,000 Twitter 
followers with a three-minute video on YouTube of officers from various units singing and 
dancing to artist Pharrell William’s song “Happy.”639 The department’s YouTube account 
had been active since 2006, and its Twitter account since 2009, indicating the agency’s 
awareness of the messaging value social media provided.640 A review of the BPD’s 
YouTube site shows that its first video was uploaded the year it activated the account, and 
the department’s videos contain a mix of officer profiles, press conferences, crime-reduction 
strategies, and social events the agency hosted. Years before Gray’s death, the agency had 
been leveraging social media as a way to promote the agency’s good work, as suggested by 
policy sovereigns. 
 
638 Baltimore Police Department, Document Compliance Unit, Policy 603 (Baltimore: Baltimore 
Police Department, 2017), https://www.baltimorepolice.org/603-document-compliance-unit. 
639 Baltimore Police, “Baltimore Police 50,000 Twitter Followers!,” June 30, 2014, YouTube, video, 
3:03, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oFULxMdji20&feature=emb_logo. 
640 Baltimore Police (@BaltimorePolice), “Baltimore Police,” Twitter, accessed November 27, 2020, 
https://twitter.com/BaltimorePolice; “Baltimore Police,” YouTube, accessed November 27, 2020, 
https://www.youtube.com/user/BPDMEDIAUNIT/about. 
140 
2. In Response 
After Gray’s death, the BPD used social media extensively to give the public updates 
on demonstrations, respond to false statements and rumors, and promote as much 
transparency as possible.641 For example, the department uploaded news conferences on its 
YouTube page and used Twitter to communicate with the public; during this period, the 
BPD’s number of Twitter followers increased from 80,000 to 126,000.642 An after-action 
report by PERF commended the agency’s social media presence in the wake of Gray’s death, 
recommending the BPD continue its efforts. Currently, the BPD has over 295,000 Twitter 
followers, over 216,000 Facebook followers, and over 15,000 YouTube subscribers.643 The 
BPD’s website curates its tweets and promotes its social media outreach efforts as a way to 
strengthen the department’s relationship with the community.644 
3. Cynefin Analysis 
The BPD was leveraging social media to promote itself positively well before Gray’s 
death in many of the ways sovereigns recommend as “good practice,” indicating it existed in 
the complicated domain for this policy dimension. After Gray’s death, the agency used its 
established social media practices to keep the public informed on developments and provide 
counter-messaging against rumors. This was in keeping with the “best practices” that policy 
experts recommend, placing the BPD in the obvious/simple domain. 
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L. ENHANCING TRAINING 
1. Before 
Commissioner Batts identified the BPD’s training program as deficient in his 
2013 strategic plan and advocated for improvements, arguing that regular training keeps 
officers abreast of legal issues, standard procedures, and emerging topics in modern 
policing.645 His plan specifically noted that the BPD training protocol lacked scenario-
based training and was also inadequate in many other areas, including use-of-force 
policy; field training officer instruction; crowd-control techniques; car stop tactics and 
vehicle pursuit regulations; and police-involved shooting instruction.646 Batts also 
referenced that any future training model be an ongoing, continuous delivery rather than 
single long sessions. 
The DOJ’s report agreed with Batts’s critical assessment of the BPD’s training 
program, finding that before Gray’s death, training had not been prioritized at any agency 
level. Instead, the report found that the “lack of emphasis on training [had] a pervasive 
influence on the Department.”647 For instance, BPD supervisors viewed training as a 
fringe activity that prevented them from fully staffing patrol needs. Additionally, even 
officers assigned to the training unit found themselves pulled from those duties and 
assigned to street patrol, which delayed and extended different training programs. While 
Batts had expressed concern over the quality of the BPD’s training program in 2013, the 
DOJ’s review indicated the agency remained deficient in addressing his concerns prior 
to Gray’s death. 
2. In Response 
Substantive changes to the training issues that had plagued the BPD followed the 
DOJ’s report publication in August 2016, over a year after Gray’s death. The department 
hired a new training director, who was charged with modernizing the training curriculum 
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and ensuring that officers understood that just policing is the cornerstone of all police 
interactions.648 To that end, the agency began using scenario-based instruction in the 
areas of constitutional law; the characteristics of an armed person; and most 
importantly—in a 16-hour session—de-escalation and communication, crisis recognition 
and response, and critical decision-making. The goal of this latter segment was to teach 
officers how to obtain voluntary compliance from people with minimal use of force. 
Additionally, the BPD began training officers on community foot patrol, providing 
recruits a 40-hour course on how to engage with community members in a respectful and 
collaborative manner; tenured officers attended short sessions of the program. Many of 
the improvements to the BPD’s training strategy comported with recommendations made 
by police policy sovereigns. 
3. Cynefin Analysis 
While Commissioner Batts identified training as an area requiring improvement 
well before Gray’s death, the agency was largely lacking in undertaking the 
improvements he suggested. Many of his officers disregarded his training strategy, 
effectively rendering his suggestions moot. This disagreement between stakeholders 
placed the BPD in the disorder context prior to Gray’s death, with “multiple perspectives 
jostling for prominence.”649 After Gray, the BPD entered the complicated domain as the 
agency fulfilled the “good practice” training enhancements police sovereigns 
recommend. 
M. IMPLICIT BIAS AWARENESS TRAINING 
1. Before 
The BPD began sessions on implicit bias training in April 2014, approximately 
one year before Gray’s death.650 In late 2013, Commissioner Batts voluntarily 
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commenced a collaborative reform process with the DOJ in response to multiple 
misconduct lawsuits filed against officers, resulting in over $5.7 million in damages paid 
to complainants since 2011.651 As a part of the discussions between the two agencies, 
the DOJ recommended and funded Fair and Impartial Policing to provide BPD officers 
with lessons on minimizing implicit bias in their dealings with the community.652 By 
November 2014, about 200 officers, mostly recruits and new supervisors, had attended 
training sessions.653 
2. In Response 
When Gray died, the BPD was in the early stages of its agreement with the DOJ, 
a voluntary process aimed at helping police departments restore their relationship with 
the community.654 After his death and the public outrage and riots that followed, the DOJ 
began a formal pattern-or-practice investigation, which led to the subsequent findings in 
the Investigation of the Baltimore City Police Department in August 2016 and the consent 
decree in April 2017.655 As such, the agency had been conducting implicit bias training 
voluntarily before Gray died, but the consent decree later stipulated that every officer 
needed the instruction.656 As of November 2019, the BPD certified that nearly all eligible 
officers had completed the training program, and the department had woven implicit bias 
awareness into other aspects of training, including arrest and use-of-force training.657 
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3. Cynefin Analysis 
The BPD was in the complicated domain regarding implicit bias training before 
Gray died, having consulted with and being advised by an external panel of experts in 
the topic, and maintaining “good practices” in line with the recommendations of policy 
sovereigns. The agency remains in the complicated domain, as it is required to provide 
the instruction under the expert guidance of the consent decree. 
  
145 
VI. BATON ROUGE POLICE DEPARTMENT: 
ALTON STERLING—JULY 5, 2016 
On Tuesday, July 5, 2016, a homeless man reported to 9-1-1 that Alton Sterling had 
pointed a handgun at him after the man had asked Sterling for money several times.658 
Sterling, a 37-year-old, 327-pound man, was selling CDs from his car in front of the Triple 
S Food Mart in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. A police dispatcher relayed that information to 
Baton Rouge Police Department (BRPD) Officers Blane Salamoni and Howie Lake II, 
including information that a suspect with a red shirt might have a gun in his pocket.659 
About 35 minutes after midnight, the officers arrived at the convenience store at 2112 
North Foster Drive.660 The officers approached Sterling, who matched the caller’s 
description, including the red shirt. 
Two cellphone videos from civilian witnesses captured the interaction.661 In the 
video, Lake unsuccessfully deploys a CED against Sterling as he resists the officers’ efforts 
to detain him. Salamoni then tackles him, and all three fall to the ground. During the 
struggle to handcuff Sterling, Lake yells, “Gun! Gun!,” and seconds later, Salamoni fires 
six shots, fatally striking Sterling. As Sterling lies wounded, Lake removes a loaded .38 
caliber revolver from Sterling’s right front pocket. Salamoni later claimed that he could 
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see Sterling trying to remove the gun from his pocket during their struggle and shot him to 
stop the threat.662 
Different from the Garner, Brown, and Gray cases, wherein federal civil rights 
investigations followed a state criminal investigation, the DOJ assumed the lead role in the 
inquiry of Sterling’s death. In response to community leaders’ and the Sterling family’s 
requests for federal intervention, Louisiana Governor John Bel Edwards agreed and 
quickly announced that a federal civil rights investigation would precede the local state 
criminal investigation.663 Local District Attorney Hillar C. Moore III released a statement 
on July 6, 2016, supporting Edward’s decision to turn the case over to the DOJ and Federal 
Bureau of Investigation.664 Moore would later entirely recuse himself from the 
proceedings and ask the Louisiana State Attorney General’s Office to handle any potential 
state prosecutions. His prior professional relationships with Officer Salamoni’s parents, 
both veteran Baton Rouge police officials, prompted his decision. “This is in the interest 
of justice, for the community and all involved,” Moore said, adding that his recusal “is the 
only and proper decision to make.”665 That Moore’s and Salamoni’s parents past working 
relationship might affect the perception of impartiality in the Sterling case heavily 
influenced his decision.666 Louisiana State Attorney General Jeff Landry assumed 
responsibility for the state criminal proceedings expected to follow the federal 
investigation. 
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On May 3, 2017, the DOJ released the findings of its 10-month investigation, 
concluding there was insufficient evidence to charge Officers Salamoni and Lake with 
federal criminal charges and closing the case without prosecution.667 Federal officials also 
declared their intention to provide the Louisiana State Attorney General’s Office with their 
investigative file, which Landry’s office could use to examine whether the officers had 
violated state law. Eleven months later, however, Landry announced that he would not be 
filing charges against the officers.668 In a March 27, 2018, press conference, Landry 
detailed his office’s investigation and the facts supporting legal justification for Salamoni’s 
shooting Sterling.669 Among the evidence that supported legal justification for Salamoni’s 
use of lethal force, Landry’s investigation found that Sterling had pointed a gun at another 
person, refused to comply with the officers’ attempt to handcuff him, and reached toward 
the gun in his pocket. 
Three days after Landry publicized his decision, BRPD Chief Murphy Paul held a 
press conference announcing his firing of Salamoni for a “violation of command of 
temper,” finding that he had failed to follow the department’s guidelines on de-escalation 
procedures.670 Chief Paul issued a three-day suspension without pay to Lake, not for using 
the CED, which he deemed a proper de-escalation attempt, but for using rude and 
derogatory language captured on video after the shooting. 
After being fired, Salamoni announced he would appeal his termination to the 
Baton Rouge Municipal Fire & Police Civil Service Board. However, before his board 
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appearance, he reached a settlement in August 2019 with Chief Paul and the BRPD.671 
Under the terms of the agreement, Salamoni’s termination was re-categorized as a formal 
resignation, contingent on his agreeing to withdraw his appeal. Chief Paul agreed to the 
settlement as he was unwilling to risk a board finding in Salamoni’s favor, which could 
have obligated his restoration as a BRPD officer. Lake considered appealing his suspension 
to the civil service board but withdrew his petition to end the matter and resume his career 
with the BRPD.672 The civil suit brought by Sterling’s family against the East Baton Rouge 
Metro Council, which funds the BRPD, was set to begin in April 2020 but has been 
rescheduled until March 1, 2021, due to the COVID-19 pandemic.673 
A. AFTERMATH: THREE BATON ROUGE OFFICERS KILLED 
At around 8:40 a.m. on July 17, 2016, an anonymous caller reported to 9-1-1 that a 
suspicious person with a gun, identified later as Gavin Long, was behind the Hair Crown 
Beauty Supply on Airline Highway in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.674 BRPD Officers 
Montrell L. Jackson and Matthew Gerald responded to the call, with East Baton Rouge 
Parish Sherriff’s Deputy Brad Garafola arriving shortly thereafter.675 Armed with a rifle, 
Long immediately fired on the BRPD officers, killing one and wounding the other. The 
injured officer broadcasted a distress signal and asked for additional assistance. Deputy 
Garafola, having heard the shots and seeing the wounded officer crawling behind a 
dumpster to look for cover, ran to attempt a rescue. During his effort, Long shot and killed 
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Garafola. Noticing that the remaining BRPD officer was still alive, Long focused his rifle 
and fired twice more, killing him.676 Long shot three more BRPD officers while evading 
capture. BRPD SWAT arrived shortly after the initial call for assistance, and a police sniper 
killed Long at a range of over 100 yards.677 By 8:48 a.m., Long was dead; less than 10 
minutes had elapsed from his first shot until police killed him.678 
The investigation of Long’s murderous spree revealed his history, motivations, and 
desire to kill police officers. Long, who had turned 29 on the day of his attack, was a 
divorced, former Marine sergeant and resident of Kansas City, Missouri; those who knew 
him spoke unremarkably about him to reporters after his death.679 While Long did not 
appear outwardly unusual, his actions leading up to July 17 revealed a singular motive: to 
target police. Two days after the confrontation between Officers Salamoni and Lake and 
Alton Sterling in Baton Rouge, Long used his laptop to search for the officers’ personal 
information and home addresses.680 The day he searched for this information, July 7, was 
the same day that Micah Johnson killed five officers in Dallas in retaliation for Sterling’s 
shooting and the shooting of Philando Castile on July 6, 2016, which is discussed in 
Chapter VII.681 
Long headed to Dallas after Johnson’s murder of the five officers in that city, 
driving over 500 miles through the night. Once there, he posted a video to his YouTube 
page. In the video, he suggested that actions beyond protest were necessary to demonstrate 
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dissatisfaction with the police killings of Sterling and Castile, clearly referencing Johnson’s 
murders. In a video he posted on July 10, he says, “If y’all wanna keep protesting, do that, 
but for the serious ones, the real ones, the alpha ones, we know what it’s going to take: 
revenue and blood.”682 Long then traveled to Baton Rouge, arriving on July 12, five days 
before his rampage. 
On the day he killed the three officers, Long intentionally targeted BRPD officers; 
video captured two failed attempts before he was successful.683 He missed his first 
opportunity when a parked patrol car he stalked with his rifle was empty; the officer was 
inside a convenience store. Another officer washing his patrol car was Long’s next target, 
but the officer drove off before Long could approach him at the car wash. These two missed 
opportunities happened just before Long was confronted by his victims, Officers Jackson 
and Gerald and Deputy Garafola. 
Hillar C. Moore, East Baton Rouge Parish district attorney, released the suicide 
note found in Long’s rental auto after his death.684 His letter corroborates the motivations 
and intentions evident in his actions. Long’s writings speak directly to his motives and 
choice of violent retribution, and he calls on others to do the same: 
The way the current system is set up, it protects all cops whether good or 
bad, right or wrong, instead of punishing bad cops & holding them 
accountable for their actions. . . . I must bring the same destruction that bad 
cops continue to inflict upon my people, upon bad cops and as well as good 
cops. . . . Therefore, now if the bad cops, lawmakers, & justice system 
leaders care about the welfare, families, & well-being of their fellow good 
cops, then they (bad cops) will quit committing criminal acts against 
melanated people & people in general. If not, my people, & the people in 
general will continue to strike back against all cops until we see that bad 
cops are no longer protected & allowed to flourish.685 
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Rumors circulated through the BRPD that Long arrived in Baton Rouge seeking 
retribution specifically against Salamoni and Lake, given his computer searches and lack 
of an independent reason to travel to the city.686 The rumors remain unconfirmed, but 
Long’s suicide letter provides insight into his motive and supports the rumor. 
The 10 days encompassing the deaths of the five Dallas officers and the three Baton 
Rouge officers accounted for the greatest loss of life in the law enforcement community 
since 9/11.687 
B. CIVILIAN BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS 
1. Before 
The BRPD did not have a civilian oversight body for police misconduct complaints 
before Alton Sterling’s death.688 Those complaints were investigated by its Internal Affairs 
division, with the chief determining appropriate disciplinary penalties in substantiated 
cases.689 Disciplinary options available to the chief ranged from verbal reprimands at the 
minimum to employment termination at the maximum. However, the agency infrequently 
disciplined officers. For example, data from 2014—the most recently available when 
reviewed by the media in a 2016 report—found that 30 of 35 use-of-force complaints 
lodged against officers did not result in disciplinary action; the remaining five complaints 
remained open more than two years later.690 Civilian oversight of the BRPD was one of 
the more frequent requests from community members, but the measure had little political 
support and was vocally opposed by the police union.691 
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2. In Response 
The BRPD did not adopt a civilian oversight model after Sterling’s death. The 
department’s Internal Affairs division continues to be the repository and investigating 
entity for misconduct complaints, but the agency made changes in June 2020 to simplify 
the intake process.692 Namely, the agency now accepts civilian complaints against officers 
using an online data-entry portal, in addition to accepting them by phone and mail.693 
3. Cynefin Analysis 
The BRPD officer misconduct complaint investigation process remained mostly 
unchanged in response to Sterling’s death. However, as described with the Ferguson Police 
Department in Chapter IV, the agency’s internal investigation policy allows for Cynefin 
analysis. Before and after the shootings, the agency’s officer complaint process operated 
in the obvious/simple domain, which is characterized by standard operating procedures and 
straightforward processing and management.694 However, the agency has not responded 
to community desires for a civilian oversight board and has at times allowed its internal 
investigations to languish. Both of these facts indicate complacency in oversight functions 
and narrow thinking that preclude searching for enhanced methods, identified flaws in the 
obvious/simple domain. 
C. IMPROVING OR REPLACING LEADERSHIP 
1. Before 
Before Sterling’s death, Carl Dabadie had been BRPD’s chief, having assumed the 
position in January 2013 when the mayor fired his predecessor.695 Chief Dabadie, then a 
26-year member of the BRPD, had been a subordinate of the outgoing chief. Just days 
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before Sterling’s shooting, Dabadie was thought to be an uncontroversial person who 
steered clear of controversy with little tolerance for politics—unlike the prior chief.696 
2. In Response 
Within a day of the shooting, Chief Dabadie called Sterling’s death a “horrible 
tragedy” but denied suggestions that he was considering resigning or retiring as a result.697 
The days that followed thrust him into the national spotlight. After Sterling’s death on July 
5 and the killings of three officers in his jurisdiction 12 days later, Dabadie was at once 
responsible for steering his agency through the impending state and federal investigations 
while also providing leadership as he consoled his officers.698 
In the months that followed, he and his agency became political fodder for 
candidates, becoming the central campaign issue for the upcoming East Baton Rouge 
Parish mayoral election.699 Upon her election in December 2016, incoming 
Mayor-President Sharon Weston Broome declared her intent to remove Chief Dabadie to 
restore community trust, but he refused, and civil service protections prohibited his 
firing.700 Dabadie eventually relented and resigned in July 2017, suggesting it was best for 
him and the agency, ending the showdown with Broome. In December that year, the mayor 
selected Murphy J. Paul Jr. for the BRPD’s chief position. Once selected, Chief Paul 
immediately began an assessment of the agency, building a team to seek ways to improve 
its relationship with the community, specifically in the areas of community policing and 
use-of-force policy. He has been described as “experienced, progressive, and visionary,” 
 
696 Rebekah Allen, “‘A Delicate Line’: Baton Rouge Police Chief Thrust into Spotlight amid 
Shooting Tragedies, Scrutiny,” Advocate, August 6, 2016, https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/
news/baton_rouge_officer_shooting/article_7eb56422-5512-11e6-a655-a37897a8a088.html. 
697 Melissa Chan, “Baton Rouge Police Chief Says He Won’t Resign after Alton Sterling’s Death,” 
Time, July 6, 2016, https://time.com/4395056/alton-sterling-baton-rouge-police-chief/. 
698 Allen, “A Delicate Line.” 
699 Andrea Gallo, “Police Officer Killings, Alton Sterling Outcry Likely Themes in Baton Rouge 
Mayoral Race as Qualifying Begins,” Advocate, July 19, 2016, https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/
news/article_7ccea528-4e01-11e6-9987-77500b3f5bff.html. 
700 Bryn Stole, “Baton Rouge Police Chief Carl Dabadie Retires after 3 Decades with BRPD, Ending 
Showdown with Mayor,” Advocate, July 25, 2017, https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/crime_
police/article_bdcdba58-7080-11e7-b0aa-1fcfd370ae81.html. 
154 
with a strong commitment to transparency and integrity.701 Having come from the 
Louisiana State Police Department, Chief Paul was an outsider to the BRPD but committed 
to examining the agency with “a fresh set of eyes and a different perspective.”702 
3. Cynefin Analysis 
Chief Dabadie’s “no-nonsense,” fact-based management style and long-time 
experience with the BRPD indicates the agency’s operating in the obvious/simple context, 
relying on the “known knowns” of his command-and-control methods before Sterling’s 
death. The mayor’s selection of Chief Paul as Dabadie’s successor suggests the agency 
shifted into the complex domain, with Chief Paul using the “probe-sense-respond” cycle to 
create an environment that could generate ideas, promote innovative approaches, and allow 
new methods of policing to emerge. 
D. ADOPTING COMMUNITY-ORIENTED POLICING 
1. Before 
Chief Dabadie credited “community policing” with helping to reduce murders in 
Baton Rouge in 2016.703 However, the BRPD’s community-oriented policing program 
was small and programmatically implemented. There is little evidence that the BRPD 
placed any emphasis on a community-policing model as policy sovereigns advocate. 
Instead, the agency relied on a crime suppression model that focused on pedestrian-heavy 
commercial districts.704 Instead of deploying officers in a manner likely to build 
community partnerships, the agency at times had its officers remain standing outside 
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restaurants and bars until hours as late as 4:00 a.m., moving belligerent drunks on their 
way. 
By some accounts, as little as five officers comprised the BRPD’s Community 
Policing Unit.705 However, rather than foster relationships with the public, the group 
operated more as a crime prevention strategies unit. Some Baton Rouge residents lamented 
how the unit compared to the past, when officers patrolled on foot and familiarized 
themselves with the people. “They were there every day. It became part of the culture, and 
it meant a lot. And these people grew to love them [the officers],” said one resident 
speaking of the past BRPD community-policing efforts.706 Instead, the unit had moved 
toward actions like providing technical safety solutions at home association meetings, such 
as suggesting home security systems, rather than developing quality community 
relationships. 
2. In Response 
Louisiana State Representative Denise Marcelle leveled pointed criticism at the 
BRPD’s paltry community policing program in response to Sterling’s shooting. She said 
an officer familiar with Baton Rouge community members would have been aware of Alton 
Sterling. “He was the guy that everybody called the CD man,” she said, suggesting that 
officers would have approached him differently had they known he was a local community 
fixture.707 Chief Dabadie responded to these critiques by saying he believed in community 
policing but that “a lot of people don’t want to be friends with the police either. You can’t 
make somebody talk to you.”708 
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Since Sterling’s death, the BRPD has worked to improve its community-oriented 
policing program to comply more with sovereign recommendations. When Chief Paul 
assumed control of the BRPD in January 2018, he focused the agency’s strategy on drawing 
the public into community decision-making processes.709 During this transition to improve 
his department’s relationship with the public, Chief Paul adopted the motto “Keep Talking 
Baton Rouge, We Will Never Stop Listening.”710 To support his vision, BRPD officers 
attend “procedural justice policing” training, expanding their understanding of community 
policing’s benefits.711 Further, the BRPD has shifted from “zero tolerance” policing and 
blanketing officers haphazardly in communities to targeted enforcement on problematic 
individuals. While the BRPD has not implemented community-oriented policing 
systemically as recommended by policy sovereigns, the work it has done to improve 
relationships via community engagement since Sterling’s death is significant, as discussed 
in the following section. 
3. Cynefin Analysis 
Before Sterling’s death, the BRPD’s community-oriented policing program 
operated in the obvious/simple domain, as evidenced by the “sense-categorize-respond” 
cycle indicated in the example above of sending community policing officers to a 
community meeting. However, those officers were not fulfilling the community’s 
expectations and failed to achieve the relationship-building model suggested by policy 
sovereigns. Thus, an oversimplification of that process resulted, a known liability of the 
context. After Sterling’s death, the BRPD entered the complicated domain, with Chief Paul 
adopting many of the “good practices” recommended by policy experts. 
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E. ENHANCING COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT 
1. Before 
The BRPD nominally participated in community engagement events before 
Sterling’s death. As discussed above, BRPD leadership expressed opinions that people 
could not be made to like the police, as evidenced in a sparse record of outreach events.712 
For instance, the agency participated annually in National Night Out against crime events 
and once hosted a Halloween event for community children at its headquarters.713 
2. In Response 
After Sterling’s death, the BRPD shifted toward heavy engagement with the Baton 
Rouge community. For example, from 2018 to 2019, officers attended over 650 outreach 
events, such as cooking competitions, bicycle safety events, and organized park fence 
repairs.714 Further, the BRPD established a Chief’s Advisory Council, composed of local 
organizations and grassroots groups to provide input on community initiatives.715 Finally, 
the agency restored its Police Explorer program after a long period of inactivity, giving 
teens 14 to 18 years old the opportunity to gain an in-depth understanding of the challenges 
officers face and encouraging interest in community service.716 
3. Cynefin Analysis 
Mirroring its community-oriented policing program, the BRPD’s weak community 
engagement strategy operated in the obvious/simple domain before Sterling’s shooting. 
The agency operated in a near automated manner that delegated responsibilities to ensure 
attendance at community events, these being characteristics of the domain.717 After the 
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shooting, the agency transitioned into the complicated domain, following many of the 
expert-recommended outreach techniques in a “sense-analyze-respond” cycle. 
F. EMPHASIZING DE-ESCALATION, PRESERVATION OF LIFE, AND 
ADOPTING LESS-LETHAL TECHNOLOGIES 
1. Before 
The BRPD’s use-of-force policy before Sterling’s death stated that the preservation 
of life was the department’s first priority. However, the regulation was broadly structured 
and lacked detail on de-escalation or alternatives to force when dealing with 
confrontational people. The agency’s guidelines stated that officers could use “reasonable 
force” or “the amount of force necessary” and prohibited using “unnecessary force or 
violence” but failed to provide officers with alternatives.718 Further, the policy focused on 
ways to overcome a subject’s resistance by relying on a force “continuum” that required 
officers to employ progressive levels of force, including CEDs and OC spray, before 
resorting to lethal force. Absent from the policy were any instructions on critical decision-
making, ways to avoid the need to use force, or methods of defusing confrontational 
situations, as policy sovereigns recommend. Nevertheless, former Chief Dabadie claimed 
that the agency did teach de-escalation techniques before Sterling’s shooting but had not 
incorporated them into official policies.719 
2. In Response 
In February 2017, the BRPD announced enhancements to its use-of-force policy, 
several of which are sovereign recommended.720 Most significantly, the new policy 
requires officers to de-escalate situations before using force when possible. No longer was 
the agency’s force policy structured solely around overcoming resistance. Further, the 
policy gives officers specific options to avoid using force, such as disengaging, isolating 
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or containing resistant people, and requesting additional officers or specialized non-lethal 
equipment.721 Additional policy enhancements include prohibiting chokeholds, requiring 
officers to give verbal warnings before using force when possible, and expecting officers 
to intervene if they see colleagues using excessive force. The policy amendments were 
well-received by community members, with a local pastor commenting, “What if these 
kinds of policies were in place last July,” referencing Sterling’s death. “I believe Alton 
Sterling would still be alive,” he said.722 
3. Cynefin Analysis 
The BRPD’s force-related policies operated in the obvious/simple domain at the 
time of Sterling’s death, with agency directives setting force parameters but lacking several 
expert-recommended policy aspects, such as de-escalation. This policy posture suggests 
that the agency operated in the “known knowns” of the domain but suffered a lack of 
foresight on available policy advancements from experts, a weakness in the obvious/simple 
context.723 After Sterling, the agency advanced into the complicated domain, closely 
aligning its force policies with “good practice” strategies recommended by policy experts. 
G. MEDIA STRATEGY AND PUBLICLY DIRECTED STATEMENTS 
1. Before 
The BRPD’s media policy, revised about five months before Sterling’s death, 
centered on providing the community with information within the public domain, provided 
doing so would not interfere with privacy laws or investigations.724 The department’s 
Public Information Office was the central source of information to answer media inquiries. 
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The BRPD appeared not to have strategically leveraged its media section to positively 
promote its work in the community before the shooting. 
2. In Response 
The BRPD media policy remained unchanged after Sterling’s death. The 2016 
policy revision in effect at that time remains active on the agency’s public website.725 
Furthermore, neither the 2019 nor the 2020 BRPD Report to the Community discusses 
using media to influence the public’s perception of the agency.726 
3. Cynefin Analysis 
The BRPD did not leverage a media relationship in a strategic manner before or in 
response to Sterling’s death. The agency’s Public Information Section remains unchanged, 
and there is no evidence that it promotes the agency positively or provides anything other 
than routine crime information. As such, the BRPD did not occupy a Cynefin domain for 
this policy dimension either before or after Sterling’s death and cannot be categorized. 
H. TRANSPARENCY ON PROCEDURAL PROCESSES 
1. Before 
The BRPD considered several options in providing the public with transparent 
processes in the years before Sterling’s death. After the 2014 high-profile deaths of Eric 
Garner in New York and Michael Brown in Ferguson, East Baton Rouge Parish District 
Attorney Hillar Moore considered creating a multi-agency team to investigate 
police-related shootings.727 Moore suggested that due to the BRPD’s small size, about 700 
officers, investigators might show favoritism and bias toward fellow officers when 
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examining use-of-force cases. By May 2016, Moore’s plan was in place.728 Prosecutors 
were embedded during police shooting investigations and had to report the results to the 
public, as well as demonstrate the evidence supporting their conclusions. Adding a layer 
of separation could increase the perception of impartiality and transparency, he said. 
2. In Response 
After Sterling’s death, the BRPD took several sovereign-recommended measures 
to further enhance its public transparency. In his 2019 Report to the Community, Chief Paul 
listed transparency as an important component of his agency’s strategy since his 
appointment the year prior. As evidence, both his 2019 and 2020 reports provide 
information on the agency’s crime strategies, investigative methods, officer equipment, 
and statistics on use of force.729 Further, the BRPD allows public access to the status and 
outcomes of Internal Affairs investigations, which for 2019 indicated that 57 of 118 cases 
resulted in a “sustained” finding.730 Finally, the agency has published its entire list of 
general orders, BWC policy, press releases, and other community-relevant documents for 
the public online through its web portal.731 
3. Cynefin Analysis 
Before Sterling’s death, the BRPD occupied the complex domain, as the agency 
experimented with several techniques to enhance its community transparency in response 
to police-related civilian deaths in other states. The agency showed a willingness to try 
innovative approaches, unsure whether they would be effective, but following the context’s 
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“probe-sense-respond” process.732 After Sterling, the agency transitioned to the 
complicated domain, following many sovereign “good practices” in giving the public clear 
access to its internal mechanisms. 
I. BWC USE 
1. Before 
Initial discussions about BRPD officers using BWCs began in September 2014, two 
years before Sterling’s death.733 After securing funding, the agency began testing four 
different BWC technology options with select officers. The first trial phase began in 
October 2015 and ended February 2016; the second began in January 2016 and ended June 
2016. When BRPD officers approached Sterling in July 2016, the agency was about three 
weeks into its third trial phase.734 
2. In Response 
The third BWC phase continued until September 2016.735 The fourth and final 
phase ended in March 2017, and in August of that year, the BRPD finalized its camera 
choice and began providing the devices to all its officers. In 2019, the department launched 
an independent website, Baton Rouge Police Body Camera Program, which provides an 
overview of the implementation program, a timeline documenting the process to obtain the 
cameras, and technical details on the camera technology.736 The portal also provides 
statistical information, such as the reduction in the reported use of force by officers and the 
number of videos recorded. In 2019, the BRPD finalized its BWC policy, also available on 
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its online portal, delineating the instances when officers must activate the cameras, 
retention and storage requirements, and supervisory oversight responsibilities. 
3. Cynefin Analysis 
Before and after Sterling’s death, the BRPD operated in the complicated domain. 
Well before the shooting, the BRPD had been piloting different camera systems and 
formulating its policy, largely following “good practice” recommendations. The trial 
phases continued after the shooting, and once a camera platform was selected, the agency 
continued to follow expert recommendations, such as providing the public full access to 
the camera’s technical information and making relevant department policies available to 
the public. 
J. RELEASING BWC FOOTAGE 
1. Before 
During the four pilot programs, the BRPD had not implemented a policy regarding 
releasing videos to interested parties.737 
2. In Response 
After providing cameras to all BRPD officers in August 2017, standard policy until 
April 2018 was that the department withheld BWC footage related to an open investigation 
until the case was adjudicated. That April, the agency revised its video release policy, 
which facilitated the expeditious release of videos to interested parties within 12 days of 
critical incidents, such as police shootings. When announcing the policy, Chief Paul said, 
“Transparency is essential in policing today. The public’s expectations of law enforcement 
have evolved, and it is our duty to respond to their concerns.”738 In 2020, the agency again 
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updated its policy, requiring the chief to make a determination of whether to make a 
critical-incident video public within nine days of its occurrence.739 
3. Cynefin Analysis 
During the BWC trial phases before Sterling’s death, only select officers wore the 
cameras, and the agency had not promulgated a release policy; thus, it did not occupy a 
Cynefin context and cannot be categorized. After Sterling’s death, the agency entered the 
complicated domain, following sovereign “good practice” recommendations by making 
BWC videos widely available, within state privacy laws, to enhance accountability and 
transparency. 
K. USING SOCIAL MEDIA 
1. Before 
The BRPD maintained a presence on social media accounts for several years before 
Sterling’s death, including Twitter and Facebook.740 The agency’s first tweet was a 2009 
request for information about a homicide the agency was investigating.741 Crime-related 
information drove the BRPD’s Twitter feed for the rest of 2009, but over the years, the 
agency pivoted to more community-oriented outreach efforts. For example, days before 
Sterling’s death, the BRPD tweeted photos of Chief Dabadie receiving an award from a 
local media group.742 
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2. In Response 
The day after Sterling’s shooting, the BRPD tweeted a 28-minute press conference 
with Chief Dabadie and other local officials providing initial information and answering 
media questions about the incident.743 The agency’s Twitter feed remained silent until it 
requested information related to the murders of the three officers by Gavin Long on July 
17. In the days that followed, the agency thanked Baton Rouge residents for their 
outpouring of sympathy, leveraging the tragic events into an opportunity to connect with 
the community.744 Since then, the BRPD has continued an active community-engagement 
strategy, expanding to YouTube in 2017 and Instagram in 2020.745 For example, recent 
posts during the COVID-19 pandemic give tips on safe social distancing and local food 
drives. 
3. Cynefin Analysis 
Several years before Sterling’s death, the BRPD was present on social media 
platforms, using them as avenues of information distribution and collection and 
communicating with the community as policy experts recommend. These actions suggest 
the agency was operating in the complicated domain, following “good practices.” Since 
Sterling, the BRPD’s established social media platforms have helped the agency 
communicate with the public as a regular practice, thus transitioning into the obvious/
simple domain. 
 
743 Baton Rouge Police (@BRPD), “Live on #Periscope: Press Conference,” Twitter, July 6, 2016, 
12:10 p.m., https://twitter.com/BRPD/status/750723589788225536. 
744 Baton Rouge Police (@BRPD), “Always Thankful for Love and Support from Our #batonrouge 
Community,” Twitter, July 20, 2016, 7:31 p.m., https://twitter.com/BRPD/status/755908097634242560. 
745 Baton Rouge Police Department (@batonrougepolice), “Baton Rouge Police Department,” 
Instagram, accessed December 6, 2020, https://www.instagram.com/batonrougepolice/; “Baton Rouge City 
Police Department,” YouTube, accessed December 6, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/c/BatonRougeCity
PoliceDepartment/about. 
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L. ENHANCING TRAINING 
1. Before 
Before Sterling’s death, the BRPD’s new officer training program was 20 weeks 
long, averaging about 800 hours.746 However, some critics noted that this length of training 
was much less than for other professions, such as barbers, who the state requires to attend 
more than 1,500 hours of instruction.747 Scenario-based lessons, values-based instruction, 
and responsiveness to the community, all policy expert recommendations, were absent. 
2. In Response 
After Sterling’s death, the BRPD affirmed its commitment to enhancing its officers’ 
training regimen. Demonstrating that commitment, the agency delayed several incoming 
new officer classes, so BRPD training staff could attend procedural justice policing 
courses, which taught them the benefits of treating the public fairly and without bias.748 
The agency then incorporated the lessons learned into its own curriculum, promoting the 
program as a way to bolster a good relationship with the community and shape interactions 
with the public.749 
Other improvements include the additions to the agency’s new officer training 
program, such as 40 hours of crisis intervention training, aimed at helping officers reduce 
their need to use force with people in mental crisis; 8 hours of scenario-based use-of-force 
training; and 19 hours on professionalism in policing.750 The BRPD programming in these 
sovereign-recommended course topics goes beyond the minimum requirements mandated 
 
746 Ryan Broussard, “More Than a Police Uniform,” Advocate, March 23, 2013, https://www.
theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/article_addf93c4-6542-5d3c-9b18-efb931a32bec.html. 
747 Jonathan Bullington, “Louisiana Requires Less Training Hours to Become a Cop Than to Become 
a Barber, Website Reports,” Times-Picayune, March 12, 2015, https://www.nola.com/news/crime_police/
article_9dd5d48b-2152-5d24-a4a0-bc11128d0c0f.html. 
748 Lea Skene and Grace Toohey, “Baton Rouge Police Begin Basic Training for 32 Recruits: ‘You 
Are the Future,’” Advocate, March 18, 2019, https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/crime_
police/article_b7ce53a6-4987-11e9-83d4-5f5f18e8e53d.html. 
749 Baton Rouge Police Department, 2019 Report to the Community, 7. 




by Louisiana. In fact, the BRPD training program overall consists of 790 hours of 
instruction while the state minimum is only 496. 
3. Cynefin Analysis 
Before Sterling’s death, the BRPD operated in the obvious/simple domain, largely 
guided by state-mandated minimum training requirements and the constrains of established 
practices. However, as a shortcoming in this context, the agency lacked forward strategic 
vision to expand its program to include advanced training options. After the shooting, the 
BRPD added substantial aspects of the “good practices” policy experts recommend, 
placing the agency in the complicated context while using the “sense-analyze-respond” 
cycle. 
M. IMPLICIT BIAS AWARENESS TRAINING 
1. Before 
The BRPD did not provide its officers with implicit bias training before Sterling’s 
death.751 Instead, agency policy focused on forbidding explicit bias-based profiling, 
teaching cultural competency, and imparting interpersonal communication skills to 
maintain professionalism.752 
2. In Response 
After Sterling’s death, Chief Dabadie worked to bring implicit bias training to his 
department as part of his efforts to restore his agency’s relationship with the public, but he 
resigned before the program began.753 In August 2017, BRPD training staff attended a 
three-day “training-of-trainers” course provided by FIP, the same organization discussed 
in the previous NYPD, FPD, and BPD policy analyses. FIP certified 30 BRPD officers as 
 
751 Grace Toohey, “National ‘Fair and Impartial Policing’ Training Comes to Baton Rouge Police 
Department,” Advocate, August 22, 2017, https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/crime_police/
article_ba41038a-8788-11e7-bc1a-9f7d996c9c85.html. 
752 Baton Rouge Police Department, Bias Based Profiling, General Order No. 108 (Baton Rouge: 
Baton Rouge Police Department, 2018), https://www.brla.gov/DocumentCenter/View/9874/General-Order-
108-Bias-Based-Profiling-. 
753 Toohey, “‘Fair and Impartial Policing’ Training.” 
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implicit bias instructors, who were then tasked by the agency to create a program for 
incoming recruits and current officers. The BRPD has incorporated this instruction in its 
seven-hour “BIAS policing recognition” program, the agency’s delivery of implicit bias 
training.754 
3. Cynefin Analysis 
The BRPD’s anti-bias training focused on the explicit forms of bias before 
Sterling’s death, such as racially biased policing, which as discussed previously are distinct 
from implicit bias. Thus, the agency operated in the obvious/simple context, relying on 
established protocols and policies. After the shooting, Chief Dabadie’s decision to contract 
with the FIP placed it in the complicated domain, with expert-recommended “good 
practices” guiding its implicit bias program. 
 
754 Baton Rouge Police Department, “Academy Course Schedule,” 6. 
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VII. SAINT ANTHONY POLICE DEPARTMENT: 
PHILANDO CASTILE—JULY 6, 2016 
On the evening of Wednesday, July 6, 2016, Saint Anthony Police Department 
(SAPD) Officers Jeronimo Yanez and Joseph Kauser pulled over an Oldsmobile driven by 
32-year-old Philando Castile.755 Inside the car was Castile’s girlfriend, Diamond 
Reynolds, and her four-year-old daughter as they all traveled in the city of Falcon Heights, 
Minnesota.756 Falcon Heights does not have a police department and was in contract with 
the SAPD for police services at that time.757 Yanez later told investigators that his reasons 
for stopping Castile included a broken taillight and suspicion that the driver might have 
been a suspect from a past robbery.758 
Castile was a licensed pistol owner and in possession of his gun when Yanez pulled 
him over. Reynolds claimed that Castile told Yanez he had his gun and reached for his 
wallet to provide his permit.759 Yanez, whose version of events differed from Reynolds’s, 
claimed Castile was not making a motion for his wallet but instead reaching for the gun. 
Yanez then shot Castile, killing him. Immediately after the shooting, Reynolds used her 
cellphone to live stream the events to her Facebook social media account; by the next day, 
her video of Castile’s final moments struggling to breathe were viewed over four million 
times.760 
 
755 This incident occurred the day after the death of Alton Sterling on July 5, 2016, as described in 
Chapter VI. 
756 Julie Bosman, “After Poised Live-Streaming, Tears and Fury Find Diamond Reynolds,” New York 
Times, July 7, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/08/us/after-poised-live-streaming-tears-and-fury-
find-diamond-reynolds.html. 
757 “Falcon Heights Contract with St. Anthony Police Expires,” CBS Minnesota, January 1, 2018, 
https://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2018/01/01/falcon-heights-st-anthony-police-2/. 
758 Mark Berman, “Minnesota Officer Charged with Manslaughter for Shooting Philando Castile 
during Incident Streamed on Facebook,” Washington Post, November 16, 2016, https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/11/16/prosecutors-to-announce-update-on-investigation-
into-shooting-of-philando-castile/. 
759 Mitch Smith, “In Court, Diamond Reynolds Recounts Moments before a Police Shooting,” New 
York Times, June 6, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/06/us/castile-police-shooting-facebook-
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The Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension assumed the lead in the shooting 
investigation, with Ramsey County Attorney Joh Choi set to receive the results.761 On 
November 16, 2016, Choi announced manslaughter charges against Yanez, which included 
endangering charges for his shooting Castile while Reynolds and her daughter were also in 
the car. Choi criticized Yanez in the press conference announcing the charges, saying, “I 
cannot allow the death of a motorist who was lawfully carrying a firearm under these facts 
and circumstances to go unaccounted for.”762 
Yanez’s trial began May 30, 2017, during which he testified in his defense, 
claiming that he had shot Castile because he feared for his life as Castile made a motion 
toward the gun.763 On June 16, 2017, a jury acquitted Yanez of all charges.764 A month 
after the trial concluded, Yanez and the City of Saint Anthony Village reached an 
agreement on his voluntary separation from the SAPD, which allowed him to receive 
$48,500 for unused leave he had accumulated while in service.765 Later, Falcon Heights 
city officials decided not to renew their contract with the SAPD, and on January 1, 2018, 
the Ramsey County Sheriff’s Office assumed policing responsibilities in the city.766 
Castile’s family and Saint Anthony reached a $3 million civil settlement after Yanez’s 
acquittal.767 
 
761 David Chanen, “Jesse Jackson Visits Twin Cities as Castile Shooting Continues to Reverberate,” 
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Unlike the DOJ’s actions during the Garner, Brown, Gray, and Sterling cases, the 
agency did not commence an investigation into potential pattern-and-practice or civil rights 
violations in Castile’s death. However, the SAPD voluntarily joined the Collaborative 
Reform Initiative under the DOJ’s Office of Community Oriented Policing Services in 
December 2016.768 The program helps police departments with various consulting 
services to restore community trust, such as implementing community policing and 
improving hiring practices.769 SAPD Chief Jon Mangseth promised his constituents that 
he would abide by the DOJ’s recommendations resulting from the eight-month review, 
which began in February 2018 and ended in August that year.770 
A. AFTERMATH: FIVE DALLAS OFFICERS KILLED 
The first week of July 2016 was tumultuous for American policing. On Tuesday, 
July 5, 2016, Alton Sterling was shot and killed by a BRPD officer during an encounter 
outside a convenience store.771 The next day, motorist Philando Castile was fatally shot 
by an SAPD officer during a traffic stop in Falcon Heights, Minnesota. In reaction to these 
two shootings, protesters held a march on Thursday, July 7, in downtown Dallas, Texas. 
The group, organized under the banner of #blacklivesmatter, argued the shootings were 
examples of excessive police force against black men.772 
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The protest was organized and peaceful, with Dallas Police Department officers 
and politicians joining together in solidarity alongside the protesters.773 The group 
gathered in Belo Garden Park, peacefully voicing their dissatisfaction with the events in 
Baton Rouge and Falcon Heights.774 However, at 8:59 p.m., as the protesters marched on 
Commerce Street through downtown Dallas, officers reported hearing gunshots. What 
followed was a running gun-battle as an active shooter, identified later by police as Micah 
Johnson, engaged with the police officers. Multiple civilian videos recorded the chaos of 
the night, some capturing Johnson killing officers.775 By 9:40 p.m., Johnson had killed 
two officers. At 10:53 p.m., police reported 11 officers shot; by the end of Johnson’s 
shooting spree, a total of 11 officers and 2 civilians had suffered gunshot wounds.776 Five 
of the injured officers lost their lives that night: Lorne Ahrens, Michael Krol, Michael J. 
Smith, and Patrick Zamarripa of the Dallas Police Department (DPD), and Brent 
Thompson of the Dallas Area Rapid Transit Police.777 
By 11:10 p.m., police had tracked and contained Johnson in the parking garage of 
El Centro Community College in downtown Dallas.778 Johnson was a 25-year-old Army 
Reserve washout from Mesquite, Texas, having separated from the service after a female 
soldier accused him of sexual harassment.779 With Johnson contained in the garage, DPD 
negotiators spoke with him, trying to convince him to surrender. Commenting on Johnson’s 
conversation with negotiators, former DPD Chief David O. Brown said, “He was upset 
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about the recent police shootings. The suspect said he was upset at white people. The 
suspect stated he wanted to kill white people, especially white officers.”780 While speaking 
with police negotiators, Johnson proclaimed, “Y’all are gonna have to kill my ass, and I’m 
going to do my best to kill you. . . . I’m trying to kill as many white pigs as I can. How 
many did I get?”781 These statements led DPD officials to believe that Sterling and 
Castile’s deaths had prompted Johnson’s rage, causing him to target and kill police officers 
that evening in Dallas.782 
Negotiations continued for several hours without progress.783 During the stand-off, 
Johnson continued shooting at the negotiators, but no additional officers were hit. He 
refused to surrender, threatening to animate from his position while firing, hoping to kill 
more officers. With negotiations breaking down, and given Johnson’s proven deadly 
capabilities and threats of possessing explosives, Chief Brown authorized lethal 
measures.784 Just after 3:06 a.m. on Friday, July 8, 2016, a DPD bomb-disposal robot 
delivered and detonated a one-pound explosive device to Johnson’s location, killing 
him.785 Dallas County District Attorney Faith Johnson presented the DPD’s use of a robot 
to kill Johnson to a grand jury, as is customary in Dallas for cases of police use of force 
with death.786 In January 2018, a grand jury determined the DPD’s use of force was lawful. 
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The day after the shootings, U.S. Attorney General Loretta Lynch released a 
statement encompassing the events in Falcon Heights, Baton Rouge, and Dallas.787 “This 
has been a week of profound grief and heartbreaking loss,” she said, while also noting her 
department’s lead role investigating Sterling’s death and providing assistance to the SAPD 
after Castile’s death. Lynch distinguished between legitimate protesters and those engaging 
in violent retaliation or destruction of property, saying, “To those who seek to improve our 
country through peaceful protest and protected speech: I want you to know that your voice 
is important. Do not be discouraged by those who would use your lawful actions as a cover 
for heinous violence.”788 Lynch’s pronouncement of the investigations into Sterling’s and 
Castile’s deaths, while expressing sympathy for the dead officers in the same statement, 
denoted her understanding that police actions perceived as illegitimate could catalyze 
deadly violence against officers. The feelings of uncertainty, helplessness, and fear were 
understandable and justified, she said. Violent action, however, is never the answer, she 
argued. Instead, she urged “calm, peaceful, collaborative and determined action” to rebuild 
the relationship between the community and police.789 Her words, however, came only 10 
days before Gavin Long would kill three officers in Baton Rouge, also in retaliation for 
Sterling’s and Castile’s deaths, as described in Chapter VI.790 
B. CIVILIAN BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS 
1. Before 
The SAPD did not have civilian oversight of officer misconduct complaints at the 
time of Philando Castile’s death in 2016.791 In fact, state law from 2012 prohibited 
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Minnesota civilian review boards from issuing “findings of fact or determination regarding 
a complaint against an officer.”792 The legislation allowed existing civilian boards only to 
make non-binding recommendations to police chiefs, who some suggested were inclined 
to overlook officers’ transgressions to avoid documenting deficiencies that could be used 
against their agencies in future litigation. As such, police misconduct investigations were 
solely under the purview of the relevant police department. 
2. In Response 
After Castile’s shooting, some said that citizens wronged by Minnesota police 
officers “have little means of redress and that citizen oversight is one way to help balance 
the power of police.”793 However, little has changed in response to his death. Under SAPD 
policy, the chief retains final authority on misconduct allegations.794 The chief may accept 
or modify investigative findings, and as the arbiter of discipline, the chief can mete out 
anything from an oral reprimand to termination from the agency. In 2020, Minnesota 
approved several police reform measures after George Floyd’s death but failed to modify 
the restrictions on civilian boards.795 
3. Cynefin Analysis 
The state law prohibiting civilian oversight panels from influencing officer 
misconduct investigations remained unchanged in response to Castile’s death. As such, the 
SAPD maintains its process-driven, internally managed investigative practice without 
civilian input, suggesting operating in the obvious/simple domain before and after the 
shooting. However, the SAPD cannot be categorized as occupying a Cynefin domain. As 
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is demonstrated below, Chief Jon Mangseth instituted many changes to his department 
after the shooting that better align with policy sovereigns’ recommendations. Doing so 
denoted a willingness to consult expert opinions to enhance his agency. However, the state 
restrictions supersede the SAPD’s ability to meaningfully implement expert-recommended 
civilian oversight boards. Thus, it would be improper to categorize the agency’s context in 
a policy dimension it does not control. 
C. IMPROVING OR REPLACING LEADERSHIP 
1. Before 
Chief Mangseth was the SAPD’s interim police chief at the time of Castile’s death. 
He joined the SAPD in 1995 and by 2015 had risen to the rank of sergeant.796 That year, 
then-Sergeant Mangseth completed the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension’s 
Chief Law Enforcement Officer and Command Academy, a training course that readies 
officers to assume command staff positions.797 In early 2016, his predecessor John Ohl 
retired, and after 21 years with the department, Mangseth was selected to head the 
agency.798 
2. In Response 
Chief Mangseth commented that Castile’s shooting was the first he could remember 
in the department’s history, saying, “We haven’t had an officer-involved shooting in thirty 
years of more, I’d have to go back in the history books. It’s shocking.”799 He remained 
police chief after Castile’s death and, as mentioned above, in December 2016 volunteered 
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his agency for the DOJ’s Collaborative Reform Initiative.800 Unlike an official 
investigation, as the DOJ conducted for the FPD and BPD in seeking systemic civil rights 
violations, the Collaborative Reform Initiative is a voluntary program for police 
departments to receive technical assistance intended to raise them to the top of the field in 
best policing practices.801 Chief Mangseth embraced the outside perspective the process 
provided, saying that identifying the SAPD’s strengths and weaknesses would allow his 
officers to better serve the community.802 
3. Cynefin Analysis 
Chief Mangseth’s short tenure before Castile’s death does not allow for meaningful 
Cynefin categorization, as he headed the agency for mere months before the shooting. 
However, his rapid request to join the Collaborative Reform Initiative in response to the 
shooting firmly placed the SAPD in the complicated domain, with a “sense-analyze-
respond” cycle. Chief Mangseth welcomed the expert-driven diagnostic process to 
discover agency improvements to mitigate the crisis caused by Castile’s shooting. 
D. ADOPTING COMMUNITY-ORIENTED POLICING 
1. Before 
Before Castile’s death, the SAPD’s community-oriented policing program failed to 
incorporate methods as suggested by policy experts. For example, the city’s 2016 budget 
describes some of the department’s previous attempts to demonstrate its commitment to 
community policing, including checking liquor and tobacco compliance, establishing a 
neighborhood crime watch, and performing animal control functions.803 None of these 
efforts are suggested by policy sovereigns as contributing to collaborative relationships; 
instead, they suggest the SAPD had been labeling routine law enforcement practices 
“community-oriented policing.” 
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In addition, the agency’s strategic posture before the shooting reveals a simplistic 
and presumptive view of community-oriented policing. In a report reviewing the events of 
2015, Chief John Ohl (Chief Mangseth’s predecessor) stated, “We [the SAPD] know our 
community and the community knows us,” arguing that the community should not confuse 
his agency with other departments that had experienced the fallout from controversial 
use-of-force incidents that year. His statements suggest he believed his agency’s 
community relationship-building efforts were sufficient and not in need of enrichment. 
However, in the same report, he suggested that his officers had to at times deal with “the 
dregs of society,” language inconsistent with building community partnerships.804 Further, 
the SAPD’s patrol strategy centered on officers’ technical policing skills’ being useful in 
solving community issues, with little mention of cooperative, collaborative, or community-
centered behaviors.805 
2. In Response 
Chief Mangseth’s 2016 Annual Report reviewed agency events from that year; it 
was the first report after Castile’s death and also the first under his leadership. In the report, 
he maintained a vastly different approach from Chief Ohl when discussing community 
relationships, saying that the SAPD “look [s] forward to learning how we can enhance our 
police service in the community.”806 Whereas Chief Ohl presumptively suggested the 
police and community “knew” each other, Chief Mangseth voiced his willingness to 
partner with and empower citizens to solve problems in the community, a technique that 
policy experts recommend. The department understood, the report continued, that getting 
to know community members was an essential component of gaining their support and 
working together on solving local problems.807 
 
804 City of Saint Anthony Village, Annual Report 2015, 1. 
805 City of Saint Anthony Village, 9. 
806 City of Saint Anthony Village, Police Department Annual Report 2016 (Saint Anthony, MN: City 
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The SAPD’s strategic plan also highlights how the agency has refocused its 
commitment to community-oriented policing.808 While the agency’s small size, 
approximately 20 officers, precludes altering its deployment structures to include policy 
recommendations such as maintaining particular officers in the same patrol areas, it has 
created inclusive relationships with different community groups.809 Community-oriented 
policing, says Chief Mangseth, is “a lens through which all policing activities and strategies 
must pass.”810 
3. Cynefin Analysis 
The SAPD’s community-oriented policing program operated in the obvious/simple 
domain prior to Castile’s death. The agency had presumed there was a clear cause and 
effect in its policing strategy, suggesting that its law enforcement techniques built 
community relationships, but policy experts find such attempts ineffective. Further, Chief 
Ohl’s suggestion that his agency was in sync with the community suggests an 
over-simplification of the relationship-development process and a mental entrainment that 
precluded new ways of thinking, a weakness in this domain.811 After Castile’s shooting, 
the SAPD shifted into the complicated domain, implementing “good practice” relationship-
building strategies that experts advocate. 
E. ENHANCING COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT 
1. Before 
The SAPD community engagement efforts focused heavily on law enforcement and 
tactical-related activities before Castile’s death, rather than promoting positive 
non-enforcement connections intended to foster familiarization and relationship building. 
 
808 City of Saint Anthony Village, St. Anthony Police Department 2018 Strategic Plan (Saint 
Anthony, MN: City of Saint Anthony Village, 2018), 1, https://www.savmn.com/DocumentCenter/View/
1078/St-Anthony-Police-Department-2018-Strategic-Plan. 
809 “Police Department,” City of Saint Anthony Village, accessed December 13, 2020, https://www.
savmn.com/191/Police-Department. 
810 “Body Worn Cameras,” City of Saint Anthony Village, accessed December 13, 2020, 
https://www.savmn.com/391/Body-Worn-Cameras. 
811 Snowden and Boone, “A Leader’s Framework,” 70. 
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For example, the year before the shooting, a department event included a “Touch a Truck” 
event, where SWAT officers allowed kids to play in an armored vehicle.812 As another 
example, the SAPD hosted a “Cops versus Kids” basketball game but categorized it as a 
“crime prevention” event rather than one to foster community engagement.813 
Additionally, “police effectiveness,” how well it suppressed crime and promoted a sense 
of security, was a central SAPD objective in its community engagement plan.814 This 
strategy suggested that achieving safety for the community was more important to the 
agency than doing so with the community. 
2. In Response 
After Castile’s death, the SAPD transitioned to an active community engagement 
plan, embracing many expert recommendations. The agency has adopted a programmatic 
method of community engagement, creating a Community Engagement Unit (CEU) 
consisting of one sergeant and four officers; however, given the SAPD’s small size, 25 
percent of its staff have been assigned to the unit.815 Some of the agency’s early efforts at 
engaging the community included offering kids ice-skating lessons, teaching bicycle safety 
courses, and acting as “guest readers” at community centers.816 
In 2019, the SAPD introduced several more sovereign-recommended 
community-engagement strategies.817 These included restoring its Citizens Academy, 
which allows 10 community members to sample an officer’s duties; attending student-
driven conversations on race and policing at local high schools; hosting Coffee with the 
Cops events; and having officers visit community block parties to promote familiarization. 
Sergeant Mike Huddle, the SAPD’s CEU leader, described the agency’s community 
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engagement plan as demanding “constant self-examination, feedback from community 
members, training, growth, and commitment from each member of the organization.”818 
3. Cynefin Analysis 
The SAPD’s community engagement plan operated in the obvious/simple domain 
before Castile’s death, similar to its community-oriented policing program. The agency 
maintained a structurally linear approached to interacting with the community. Officers 
were present at some events and displayed the agency’s technical and procedural 
capabilities, claiming they engendered building relationships. However, these efforts failed 
to follow the recommendations of policy sovereigns, who suggest non-enforcement-related 
and informal methods of community outreach. After the shooting, the SAPD shifted into 
the complicated domain, implementing many of the sovereign-designated “good 
practices.” 
F. EMPHASIZING DE-ESCALATION, PRESERVATION OF LIFE, AND 
ADOPTING LESS-LETHAL TECHNOLOGIES 
1. Before 
According to the SAPD’s Annual Report published the year before Castile’s death, 
the agency claimed its officers participated in role-playing scenario training centered on 
de-escalation, use of force, and critical incident management.819 However, the report noted 
that officers found it odd being taught these topics by professionals outside of policing, 
implying that officers considered the non-department training inferior.820 As for force 
options at the time of Castile’s death, SAPD officers had several less-lethal tools available. 
When he pulled Castile’s car over, Officer Jeronimo Yanez was equipped with a CED, 
 
818 City of Saint Anthony Village, 29. 
819 City of Saint Anthony Village, Annual Report 2016, 20. 
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baton, and OC spray; SAPD patrol officers were not routinely issued other less-lethal 
technology options on patrol.821 
2. In Response 
In response to questions about the SAPD’s use-of-force policies after Castile’s 
death, the SAPD claimed it considered some of its officers “experts in de-escalating 
contentious situations” and noted some also trained officers from outside agencies.822 
However, an examination of records after the shooting revealed that in both 2012 and 2014, 
Officer Yanez attended two 20-hour “Bulletproof Warrior” training sessions.823 These 
sessions carried labels like “Officer Survival” and “Street Survival” and taught attendees 
that hesitation could lead to injury or death, the opposite objective of de-escalation. 
Notably, Officer Yanez’s training records documented that he received only one two-hour 
instruction block on de-escalation during his four years with the department. 
With the assistance of the Collaborative Reform Initiative, the SAPD codified its 
commitment to de-escalation, proper use of force, and less-lethal technologies.824 For 
example, policy now requires that officers should attempt to stabilize public encounters to 
reduce the immediacy of a threat and minimize the likelihood of needing to use force.825 
Further, regulations require officers to consider less-lethal tools when possible and avoid 
physical confrontations, unless immediately necessary.826 The agency also made impact 
munitions available to trained officers, recommending them as a tool for de-escalation and 
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reducing the need to use greater force.827 Unlike the Bulletproof Warrior instruction that 
advises against hesitation due to threat of injury, SAPD policy states that officers should 
consider whether “taking no action or passively monitoring” a situation is the most 
reasonable response to a confrontation, especially for those in mental crisis.828 The 
transition to an enhanced de-escalation and use-of-force policy brought the SAPD into 
greater conformity with experts’ policy recommendations. 
3. Cynefin Analysis 
The SAPD’s force and de-escalation related polices occupied the obvious/simple 
domain before Castile’s death, characterized by officers having a narrow perspective on 
accepting information from outside sources and straightforward thinking that relied on 
addressing threats to officers rather than learning skills to reduce the need to use force. The 
training imbalance described above goes specifically against sovereign recommendations, 
but the obvious/simple domain can result in “no challenge of received wisdom” and 
complacency in seeking policy advancements.829 After Castile’s death, the agency entered 
the complicated domain, working with the Collaborative Reform Initiative to create 
policies better supporting de-escalation and “good practices” recommended by 
use-of-force experts. 
G. MEDIA STRATEGY AND PUBLICLY DIRECTED STATEMENTS 
1. Before 
The SAPD did not maintain a dedicated public information section before Castile’s 
death. Instead, the department’s policy deferred all decisions related to media contact to 
the chief. However, an interview from May 2016 with former Chief John Ohl, who Chief 
Mangseth replaced, indicated the agency’s strategy did not involve leveraging the media 
for proactive community messaging, procedural transparency, or information gathering. 
Instead, the interview revealed his hostility toward the media. In it, Ohl claimed media bias 
 
827 Saint Anthony Police Department, 65. 
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was responsible for the public’s negative perceptions of police, particularly in light of how 
the media had covered police-related civilian deaths. Ohl continued his critique of the 
media in his interview, saying it “[chooses] to dig deep and find the worst possible scenario, 
and shine it like a light, and report on it every day,” blaming the media exclusively for 
opinions of the police profession being “in the toilet.”830 
2. In Response 
As discussed in Chapter II, policy sovereigns recommend that there should be a 
systematic response capability to address community inquiries and concerns after police-
involved shootings.831 After the shooting, the SAPD issued this press release after 
Castile’s death: 
On 07–06-2016 at approximately 2100 hours, a Saint Anthony Police 
Officer effected a traffic stop on Larpenteur and Fry in the City of Falcon 
Heights, Minnesota. During the stop, shots were fired. One adult male was 
taken to the hospital. We have been informed that this individual is 
deceased. No one else was injured and the BCA has been called in to 
investigate this officer involved shooting. A handgun was recovered from 
the scene.832 
While the SAPD issued a public statement immediately after the shooting, it was short and 
vague, lacking context and explanations of procedures and protocols as policy experts 
recommend. 
However, during his first public forum in December 2016, Chief Mangseth 
acknowledged that his small agency would need to learn how to respond to the increased 
scrutiny and questions from the community.833 At that press conference, he admitted that 
the shooting spurred him to move forward and improve his department, saying, “I take 
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[Castile’s death] seriously. I just want you to know that I am invested in doing what we 
need to do to provide the best service.”834 This was one of his early attempts to leverage 
media as a tool to amplify his message to the community. Chief Mangseth has since used 
the media to promote the policy changes his agency undertook since Castile’s shooting 
while in the collaborative reform process, but SAPD policy preserves him as the sole 
contact for media inquiries and communication.835 
3. Cynefin Analysis 
Before Castile’s shooting, the SAPD chief was also the agency’s media 
spokesperson and did not leverage the media in a strategic manner to promote itself 
positively. Thus, the agency did not occupy a Cynefin domain before the shooting and 
cannot be categorized. However, after Castile’s death, Chief Mangseth pivoted into the 
complex domain. While the chief remains the sole conduit for public information, he seized 
on emerging opportunities in a “probe-sense-respond” cycle to communicate publicly in a 
variety of interviews and public appearances. Further, he has committed to experimenting 
with new strategies to deliver information on policy advancements to the community. 
H. TRANSPARENCY ON PROCEDURAL PROCESSES 
1. Before 
Before Castile’s death, the SAPD’s annual reports operated as the agency’s way of 
being transparent with the community.836 Since 2014, the department has posted these 
reports online, providing crime statistics, a review of its patrol and investigatory branches, 
a crime prevention summary, and a list of past accomplishments and projected goals.837 
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However, a review of the reports before Castile’s death yields few details about the internal 
decisions that formed the agency’s policies or discussions that speak to police 
accountability, topics recommended by policy experts. 
2. In Response 
After Castile’s death, the SAPD adopted multiple sovereign-recommended 
transparency techniques to supplement its annual reports, which it continues to publish. 
The agency created a transparency and data-sharing page on its website, containing links 
to several subpages that address citizens’ concerns and questions on internal processes.838 
For example, the SAPD publishes alleged misconduct reports, which disclose the details 
and dispositions of officer misconduct investigations.839 In addition, the agency publishes 
an annual use-of-force analysis containing detailed narratives on each instance of an SAPD 
officer’s use of force.840 The report includes a determination of whether an officer’s 
actions were within policy regulations and the demographic information of the civilian 
subject involved. Further, the SAPD’s policy manual is available online, with an 
introduction from Chief Mangseth inviting the public to review the document and submit 
recommendations for improvements.841 Finally, the SAPD provides an update on its status 
in the Collaborative Reform Initiative, a quarterly report that catalogues the agency’s 
policy and procedural advancements under the plan.842 
3. Cynefin Analysis 
The SAPD’s method of transparency before Castile’s death existed in the obvious/
simple domain. While the agency provided the public with some insight into its operations, 
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the topics discussed were a communication in a single direction, excluding public input or 
commentary. That posture suggests the agency operated under the presumption that 
extensive interactive communication was not necessary, while also trying to resolve a 
complex issue (public transparency) by simple means (publishing a document). After the 
shooting, the SAPD entered the complicated domain, closely aligning its policies with 
expert-recommended “good practices.” 
I. BWC USE 
1. Before 
At the time of Castile’s death, the SAPD did not equip its officers with BWCs. 
2. In Response 
In January 2017, the SAPD created the Tri-City Body Camera Work Group.843 The 
group comprised residents and city council members from the three municipalities the 
agency served, discussing how best to bring the technology to the agency. By the end of 
2017, the agency finalized its technology selection and, beginning in January 2018, began 
providing its officers with BWCs.844 By November that year, every SAPD officer was 
equipped with a camera. 
Beyond merely providing his officers BWCs, Chief Mangseth established sound 
policies regulating their use, implementing several layers of oversight. Daily record checks 
ensure that officers are wearing the cameras as directed, and the agency requires monthly 
supervisory audits to verify that officers are using the cameras within policy. Chief 
Mangseth does not think of BWCs as an “end-all do-all fix,” however, admitting that the 
devices do not capture every aspect of a police–citizen encounter.845 Officers must act 
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with procedural justice and impartial policing, he says, if they expect the public to accept 
the limits on the perspective BWCs provide. 
3. Cynefin Analysis 
The SAPD did not use BWCs before Castile’s death, so the department did not 
occupy a Cynefin domain in this policy area and cannot be categorized. After his death, 
the department entered the complicated domain, creating a panel of experts to formulate 
its BWC program and incorporating “good practices” that policy experts recommend. 
J. RELEASING BWC FOOTAGE 
1. Before 
As the SAPD did not use BWCs until nearly two years after Castile’s death, there 
was no policy on releasing footage. 
2. In Response 
BWCs are a relatively new technology in Minnesota, and policies in the state are 
emerging and evolving as agencies introduce the devices. In Minnesota, most BWC data 
is “presumptively private,” unlike the “presumptively public” status of other government 
data.846 SAPD policy complies with state law.847 Under the law, BWCs are considered 
public in just two circumstances.848 First, videos containing footage of an officer causing 
a person substantial bodily harm, such as an officer-involved shooting, are publicly 
accessible. Second, a police agency can designate a video public if a person in the footage 
(even if only audibly) chooses to do so, if investigations utilizing the footage are 
completed, and if others in the video either agree to its release or request redactions. 
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3. Cynefin Analysis 
The SAPD did not use BWCs when Castile died, so the agency did not occupy a 
Cynefin domain for this policy dimension. Currently, the BWC video release policy is 
governed by state law and, in most cases, is presumed private and not available to the 
public. Since the SAPD cannot independently formulate its own release policy, it is 
improper to categorize the agency in a Cynefin context for this policy dimension. 
K. USING SOCIAL MEDIA 
1. Before 
The SAPD did not have a social media presence on any platforms before Castile’s 
death. 
2. In Response 
Chief Mangseth listed implementation of SAPD social media pages and applicable 
policy as a future objective his 2016 Annual Report.849 Following through on that goal, 
the agency created Facebook and Twitter accounts in March 2017, followed by an 
Instagram page in September that year.850 The SAPD’s official social media policy is 
contained within its department manual, incorporating the technology into its overall 
communications strategy.851 The agency uses expert-recommended practices across all 
three platforms to promote its partnership with the community. For example, the SAPD’s 
initial Twitter post was a back-to-school celebration, with an officer greeting “little 
villagers” on the first day of class.852 The agency also provided links to its Collaborative 
Initiate Reform website, updating residents on changes to procedures and policies, in 
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addition to routine crime information, notable arrests, and information on community 
social events. While Twitter is the official social media platform of the SAPD and its sub-
department, the agency duplicates its posts and pictures across other platforms, amplifying 
its community outreach efforts.853 
3. Cynefin Analysis 
Since it did not use social media before Castile’s death, the SAPD did not then 
occupy a Cynefin domain and cannot be categorized. Following the shooting, the agency 
began using multiple social media outlets to engage and interact with the public as policy 
sovereigns recommend, promoting its partnership efforts with the community. Thus, the 
agency entered into the complicated domain, following the “good practices” that experts 
recommend. 
L. ENHANCING TRAINING 
1. Before 
Before Castile’s death, the SAPD’s 2015 Annual Report stated that it had provided 
yearly increases in total training hours every year since 2012, from 1,432 hours to 1,541 
hours.854 On average, SAPD officers attended about 80 hours of training every year, much 
more than the Minnesota minimum requirement of 48 hours every three years. In 
describing the SAPD, Dennis Flaherty, executive director of a statewide Minnesota police 
union said, “It looks like they are indeed a department that places a great emphasis on 
training.”855 However, many of the courses were in tactical operations and enforcement 
areas, such as active-shooter training, hazardous materials instruction, defensive driving, 
and emergency medicine. Additionally, included in the agency’s training program were 
courses on officer survival, specifically the Bulletproof Warrior course, described 
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previously as the antithesis to de-escalation training. The agency’s training ethos lacked a 
values-based approach that taught officers to be responsive to community needs, as policy 
sovereigns recommend, instead focusing on crime prevention and officer safety. As 
mentioned above, for example, Officer Yanez received only four hours of de-escalation 
training compared to over 40 hours of officer survival during his four years with the SAPD, 
evidence of a training imbalance critiqued by policy experts.856 
2. In Response 
The annual report that followed Castile’s death took a different approach in its 
training prioritization than the previous year’s report. In the new report, Chief Mangseth 
describes training as an organizational value that supports the agency’s culture of service, 
teamwork, and accountability.857 As an example of his vision, the 2016 report prominently 
notes that every officer receives training in de-escalation and scenario-based use-of-force 
instruction.858 In addition, exploring and implementing additional instruction on 
de-escalation and community relations is listed as an objective for 2017.859 
The SAPD has broadened its training structure since the shooting. For example, its 
2018 strategic plan notes planning to engage community members and provide education 
to the department on community needs and possible solutions, denoting the agency’s 
commitment to fostering that partnership.860 More recently, the 2019 Annual Report notes 
that the department provides over 1,900 hours of training, but highlights “Crisis/Conflict/
Community Diversity Training” on the same level as “SWAT/Negotiator Training,” 
indicating that the former is as valuable as the latter.861 In fact, the SAPD spent 23 percent 
of its training time allotment, about 440 hours, in the crisis and conflict track, which focuses 
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on de-escalation, implicit bias, and dealing with those in mental crisis.862 Of note, as of 
2017, the SAPD no longer provides officers access to the Bulletproof Warrior program.863 
3. Cynefin Analysis 
While the SAPD’s training program before Castile’s death was robust and 
increasing annually, it was narrowly scoped to the exclusion of sovereign-recommended 
de-escalation techniques and strategies, focused primarily on ways to effectively use force 
rather than seek alternatives. Thus, the agency occupied the obvious/simple domain, as 
evidenced by a simplistic approach to force-related training and entrained thinking that 
precluded implementing modern expert-recommended practices. After the shooting, the 
agency entered the complicated domain, implementing the “good practices” that policy 
experts endorse. 
M. IMPLICIT BIAS AWARENESS TRAINING 
1. Before 
In 2014, the SAPD participated in “Diversity Awareness in Law Enforcement 
Training,” described as teaching how to recognize and minimize unintentional racial 
“micro-aggressions.”864 This version of diversity training continued through 2015.865 
However, the agency described its officers as having difficulty accepting the program as it 
was taught by outside professionals. 
2. In Response 
In the aftermath of Castile’s death, some community residents demanded that the 
SAPD re-examine its training on racial bias, saying that Chief Mangseth would have to 
provide leadership and “jump into this one hundred ten percent.”866 It appears that he 
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responded to the community’s concerns. By the end of 2016, every member of his 
department had attended a course on recognizing and mitigating implicit bias.867 At the 
advice of the Collaborative Reform Initiative, Chief Mangseth arranged for every officer 
to attend Fair and Impartial Policing in September the following year.868 In 2018, Chief 
Mangseth added a procedural justice training program to his officers’ curriculum, building 
on the prior years’ instructional courses.869 To ensure officer compliance, the most recent 
revision to the SAPD department manual makes these training sessions mandatory and 
explicitly forbids bias-based policing.870 
3. Cynefin Analysis 
The SAPD’s diversity training focused on the explicit forms of racist conduct 
before Castile’s death, different from the implicit bias programs it introduced after the 
shooting. Thus, the agency operated in the obvious/simple context, relying on established 
protocols and policies, rather than advancing its anti-bias programs, and including newer 
instructional courses. The agency pivoted to the complicated domain under Chief 
Mangseth’s leadership, incorporating a progressive track of “good practices” in sovereign-
recommended instruction for his officers. 
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DocumentCenter/View/800/2017-Fall-VillageNotes-Article?bidId=. 
869 Jon Mangseth, “St. Anthony Police Receive Training on Procedural Justice,” Saint Anthony Police 
Department, accessed January 31, 2021, http://www.stanthonyvillagewineandspirits.com/DocumentCenter/
View/1178/2018-Winter-VillageNotes-Article. 
870 Saint Anthony Police Department, Policy Manual, 247, 253. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
This thesis applied the Cynefin framework to legitimacy-developing police 
practices before and in response to five police-related civilian deaths that significantly 
challenged each agency’s legitimacy. The analysis supports the answers to the research 
questions detailed in this chapter’s findings and recommendations. 
A. RESPONSES TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Research Question 1: Using the Cynefin framework, what is understood about the 
implementation of police legitimacy policies before and in response to police-related 
civilian deaths? Research data and analysis offer four distinct responses to this research 
question: 
(1) The obvious/simple domain dominated legitimacy-developing policy 
implementations before the civilian fatality—but most shifted into the 
complicated domain in response. 
Of the 60 possible “starting” policy positions—the factor of 12 policy positions 
across five agencies, prior to the police-related civilian death—32 occupied the obvious/
simple context. In other words, over half of all legitimacy-building practices existed in the 
obvious/simple domain before the legitimacy crisis. However, the majority of policy 
dimensions that began in the obvious/simple domain shifted to another context in response 
to the agency’s legitimacy crisis. 
Twenty-nine policy positions that began in the obvious/simple domain shifted to a 
different context. Namely, 21 entered the complicated domain, and 8 entered the complex. 
In fact, obvious/simple to complicated was the most frequent transition across all of the 
agencies’ policy dimensions. Five policy dimensions accounted for most of the obvious/
simple-to-complicated context transitions (see Table 1). 
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Table 1. Obvious/Simple-to-Complicated Context Transitions 
Policy Dimension Police Department 
Adopting Community-Oriented Policing FPD, BPD, BRPD, SAPD 
Increasing Community Engagement BPD, BRD, SAPD 
UOF/De-Escalation NYPD, FPD, BPD, BRPD, SAPD 
Enhancing Training FPD, BRPD, SAPD 
Implicit Bias Awareness Training NYPD, BRPD, SAPD 
 
The vulnerabilities of complacency and entrained thinking found in the obvious/
simple domain necessitated a shift toward the complicated domain, when police 
departments sought expert-recommended strategies in several policy dimensions to help 
them emerge from their crises and restore legitimacy while exploring new ways of 
thinking. For example, after Garner’s death, the NYPD shifted away from a narrow and 
programmatic model of community policing to the fully systemic Neighborhood Policing 
program, conforming to the recommendations of policy experts. As another example, the 
NYPD, BRPD, and SAPD transitioned away from the “best practice” of overt bias and 
diversity training, opting for the implicit bias program created by Fair and Impartial 
Policing, the preference of policy experts. 
As discussed above, the examined police agencies pivoted from eight starting 
policy positions, away from the obvious/simple domain to the complex. Notably, the 
NYPD’s policy dimension shifts after Garner’s death accounted for five of these 
transitions, which were in the areas of adopting community-oriented policing, community 
engagement, media strategy, transparency, and training 
Mayor de Blasio’s decision to retain Commissioner Bratton as the NYPD’s agency 
head after Garner’s death explains the agency’s transition to the complex domain across 
these policy dimensions. As discussed in Chapter III, his post-Garner reform processes 
specifically identified improving these practices. The last three obvious/simple-to-complex 
transitions occurred with the FPD, BPD, and BRPD. Both the FPD and BRPD entered the 
complex domain in the enhancing leadership dimension, with each probing several police 
chiefs after its legitimacy crisis. Lastly, the BPD media strategy entered the complex 
domain after Freddie Gray’s death, when the agency experimented with allowing media 
unprecedented access to the criminal investigation. 
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Only three policy positions remained in the obvious/simple domain in response to 
a legitimacy crisis: the FPD’s media strategy and both the BPD’s and BRPD’s civilian 
oversight board policy. By remaining in the obvious/simple domain, these police 
departments maintained weak implementations of the policy dimensions. Namely, the 
FPD’s media plan was quickly overwhelmed by press information demands after Brown’s 
death, and since then, the agency has not modified policy, nor do its current practices 
leverage the media in a strategic manner to promote the agency’s work. Further, in the 
areas of civilian oversight of police misconduct investigations, both the BPD and the BRPD 
preserved the ineffective systems that existed before the deaths of Freddie Gray and Alton 
Sterling, respectively. 
(2) Additionally, most policy positions that occupied the complicated domain 
before the crisis of a police-related civilian death remained in that context 
in response. 
Ten policy positions occupied the complicated domain before the police 
department’s legitimacy crises, with six remaining in that context in response. These six 
policy dimensions largely conformed to the recommendations of experts in the field, and 
the “sense-analyze-respond” cycle behind each remained unchanged (see Table 2). 
Table 2. No Transition from the Complicated Domain 
Policy Dimension Police Department 
Civilian Boards  NYPD 
Leadership NYPD 
BWC Use BPD, BRPD 
Footage Release Policy BPD 
Implicit Bias Training BPD 
 
For example, Eric Garner’s death had little impact on the NYPD’s policy position 
on civilian oversight boards and leadership. Well before his death, the CCRB was an 
established entity and operated as sovereigns had recommended, and Mayor de Blasio’s 
confidence in Commissioner Bratton’s extensive police experience protected his 
employment. As another example, before Freddie Gray’s death, the BPD had been 
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considering implementing BWCs, while also formulating the associated policies, and had 
already been offering officers implicit bias training. Both of these BPD policy dimensions 
were unaffected by Gray’s death, and no transition from complicated was necessary. 
Four policy positions that originated in the complicated transitioned to other 
domains: two entered the obvious/simple domain, and two entered the complex. In 
response to the crises of their civilian death incidents, both the BPD’s and BRPD’s social 
media policies shifted in the obvious/simple. Prior to the legitimacy crisis, each 
successfully leveraged social media as a community outreach tool as sovereigns had 
recommended and, in response, adopted that “good practice” as part of routine, “best 
practice” agency operations. Finally, the BPD accounted for the two policy positions that 
shifted to the complex domain: first as the agency cycled through several new chiefs to 
replace Commissioner Batts, and then as it experimented with wider transparency efforts 
in its internal planning operations. 
(3) Further, most policy positions occupied the complicated domain in response 
to the legitimacy crisis following a police-related civilian death. 
Of 60 post-crisis policy positions—again, the factor of 12 policy positions across 
five agencies, prior to the police-related civilian death—39 occupied the complicated 
domain. As discussed above, 21 policy positions shifted from obvious/simple into 
complicated, and 6 of 10 policy positions that began in complicated remained there. Table 
3 shows the total “starting” policy contexts that transitioned to (or remained) in the 
complicated domain post-crisis. 
Table 3. Transitions to or Stasis in the Complicated Domain 








As Table 3 shows, one policy position from the complex domain and two from 
disorder entered the complicated domain after the agency’s legitimacy crisis.871 The 
BRPD’s transparency process shifted from the complex to the complicated domain. Before 
Sterling’s death, the agency experimented with greater transparency efforts in its force 
investigations, embedding prosecutors within force investigation teams and leveraging the 
complex domain’s “probe-sense-respond” cycle. After his death, the agency shifted to 
expert-recommended “good practices” of the complicated domain to foster continued 
openness with the community. Two policy positions entered the complicated domain from 
disorder. These were the FPD’s community engagement policy—which before Brown’s 
death predominantly consisted of the agency’s treating Ferguson citizens as a revenue 
stream—and the BPD’s training policy—which officers widely disregarded before Gray’s 
death. As a result of their respective police-related civilian deaths, both the FPD and BPD 
entered into consent decrees with the DOJ, mandating their compliance with expert-
recommended practices and placing them in the complicated domain. 
(4) Nearly one-quarter of all policy positions before a crisis-inducing civilian 
death could not be categorized with a Cynefin context—largely due to 
absent BWC-associated policies—but most shifted into the complicated 
domain in response. 
Before the police-related civilian deaths, 14 policy positions could not be 
categorized as occupying a Cynefin domain. However, of the “null” positions, seven were 
associated with police departments’ not using BWCs or not having a BWC video release 
policy before the fatalities. The NYPD, FPD, and SAPD did not have BWCs before their 
police-related civilian death crises and, therefore, no video release policy; the BRPD was 
testing BWCs before Sterling’s death but had not finalized its release policy (see Table 4). 
 
871 The nine policy positions that entered the complicated domain from “null,” policy dimensions not 
occupying a Cynefin context before a civilian death, are discussed in finding #4. 
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Table 4. Non-existent BWC Use or Footage Release Policies 
 
 
Of these agencies’ 14 null policy positions before their police-related civilian 
deaths, a total of nine entered the complicated domain. As shown in Table 4, six of these 
nine instances occurred as the NYPD, FPD, BRPD, and SAPD aligned their BWC use and/
or video release policies with sovereigns’ recommendations. Separate from BWC-
associated policies, three remaining null-to-complicated transitions occurred. One 
transition occurred when the FPD implemented an implicit bias awareness program in 
response to Michael Brown’s death, having poorly maintained its diversity training prior; 
as mentioned in Chapter III, some officers reported the FPD had not conducted diversity 
sessions since 1995. The SAPD undertook the two other transitions. The agency did not 
use social media before Castile’s death, but thereafter, it began maintaining a social media 
presence as policy experts recommend. Further, the SAPD’s leadership policy position 
does not allow for Cynefin categorization due to Chief Mangseth’s brief period heading 
the agency before Philando Castile’s shooting; however, after Castile’s death, Mangseth 
postured his agency in alignment with the “good practices” that experts recommend. 
Of the original 14 null policy positions before a legitimacy crisis, four remained in 
that category. Minnesota state law limited the SAPD’s ability to establish expert-
recommended policies in both the civilian oversight boards and BWC footage release 
dimensions, thus preventing the agency from entering a Cynefin context. Lastly, the FPD’s 
social media policy and the BRPD’s media strategy each remained unchanged in response 
to the respective police-related civilian deaths. The FPD’s social media presence is non-
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existent, as it was before Brown’s death, and the BRPD does not maintain a media strategy 
to promote the agency, as was the case before Sterling’s death. 
Research Question 2: What type of policy implementation sustained the 
legitimacy challenges that arose from these crises? Research data and analysis point to the 
following response to this research question: 
The findings reveal that legitimacy-developing polices in the complicated domain 
best sustained the challenge of a police-related civilian death among the police 
departments this thesis examined. 
The findings from answering the first research question revealed what was learned 
by applying the Cynefin framework to police-legitimacy policy before and in response to 
police-related civilian deaths. These answers inform the responses second research 
question. These findings show that legitimacy policies in the complicated sense-making 
domain before a police-related civilian death most often withstood the crisis presented by 
the event. For example, the NYPD’s sovereign-recommended “good practice” civilian 
board model was unaffected by the fallout of Eric Garner’s death. As another example, 
both the BPD and BRPD body camera programs remained on course after their respective 
civilian deaths examined in this thesis. Before Freddie Gray’s death, the BPD had already 
commissioned a panel to design a “good practice” regarding its officers using BWCs; after 
his death, the program continued as planned until full roll-out in May 2016. At the time of 
Alton Sterling’s death, the BRPD was in the third phase of its BWC pilot program, which 
continued to a fourth phase after the shooting. The findings above provide evidence that 
policy implementations aligning with the “sense-analyze-respond” cycle while closely 
following expert-recommended practices sustained the legitimacy challenge of a 
controversial civilian death. 
B. VISUAL REPRESENTATIONS OF CYNEFIN ANALYSIS RESULTS 
The following table visually displays the results from applying the Cynefin 
framework to legitimacy-developing policy implementation before and in response to the 
five police-related civilian deaths this thesis examined in Chapters III through VII. In Table 
6, the relevant agencies appear on the X-axis, and the 12 legitimacy-developing policies, 
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as detailed in Chapter II, appear on the Y-axis. The Cynefin domains and their response 
cycles are color-coded as follows: 
Table 5. Color Coding for Cynefin Analysis 
Color Domain Cycle Abbreviation 
Green Obvious/Simple Sense-Categorize-Respond SCR 
Blue Complicated Sense-Analyze-Respond SAR 
Yellow Complex Probe-Sense-Respond PSR 
Grey Disorder N/A  
Salmon Null N/A  
 
The chaotic domain is not represented in this chart, as this thesis found no policy 
implementations in that sense-making context. There is no significance to the colors chosen 
for each domain. Instead, the charts’ color differentiation displays policy implementations 
across each agency and allows a reader to observe transitions or stability across agencies 
and policy. 
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Based on the findings outlined in the previous section, this thesis makes the 
following recommendations for using the Cynefin framework to evaluate and strengthen 
police implementation of legitimacy-developing policies, which answers the third research 
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question: What recommendations does that analysis reveal to effectively implement 
policies that develop police legitimacy? 
1. Survey Policies
First, police leaders should determine which expert-recommended legitimacy-
developing practices their departments incorporate. Chapter II detailed the 12 policy 
dimensions that police sovereigns say support the legitimacy of police institutions, and how 
best to implement them. However, as this thesis suggested, not all police agencies have 
adopted these recommended policies. Police leaders should survey their practices and 
establish which of the 12 policy dimensions their agencies follow. 
2. Use Cynefin to Categorize Policies
Next, police leaders need to find out how they implement their legitimacy-
developing policies and categorize the Cynefin context of each implementation. As this 
thesis highlights, police agencies may claim to have adopted expert-suggested policy 
dimensions yet maintain an implementation style that renders them ineffective. For 
example, each police agency this thesis analyzed claimed to have practiced community-
oriented policing before its police-related civilian death, but each of the obvious/simple 
programmatic implementations operated against policy experts’ recommendations. 
Chapters III through VII provide police leaders with examples of how to categorize the 
context of legitimacy-developing policy implementations. Additionally, police leaders 
can leverage Table 6 to categorize their sense-making contexts. 
3. Shift Away from the Obvious/Simple Domain
Once police leaders assign a Cynefin domain to each policy dimension, they should 
closely examine those in the obvious/simple domain. As discussed previously, this domain 
was dominated by simplistic and unsophisticated legitimacy policy implementations, and 
unlikely to sustain the crisis of a controversial civilian death. Further, policies in the 
obvious/simple domain sometimes caused police agencies difficulty in navigating toward 
stability mid-crisis. For example, before Michael Brown’s death, the FPD had an obvious/
simple media strategy that later collapsed under the weight of press demands in response 
204 
205 
to his shooting. Police leaders must avoid the complacency in thought and action that this 
thesis exposed. Policy dimensions that police leaders believe are “settled business” should 
be among the first re-evaluated to ensure they conform with sovereign recommendations. 
4. Embrace the Complicated Domain 
As this thesis has demonstrated, policy dimensions in the complicated domain best 
align with sovereign recommendations. Moreover, policies in this domain best withstood 
a legitimacy crisis. Additionally, after a legitimacy crisis, police agencies most often 
shifted policy implementations into this domain. Police leaders should embrace policy 
implementations existing in the complicated domain and strive to move all legitimacy-
developing policies there. 
5. Conduct Legitimacy Crisis Drills 
Steps one through four above suggest how police leaders can assess and strengthen 
their legitimacy-building efforts. After police leaders survey their policies, apply the 
Cynefin framework, and transition away from the obvious/simple and into the complicated 
domain, they should conduct a self-assessment to determine whether their legitimacy 
efforts will sustain the challenge of a police-related civilian death. Police leaders should 
challenge themselves and other leaders in the organization during drills that test the 
sustainability of all 12 recommended legitimacy practices. These drills can identify 
potential policy failure points that a leader can adjust before suffering an actual crisis of 
legitimacy. 
D. SUMMARY AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
As this thesis discussed, a legitimacy crisis caused by a police-related civilian death 
can result in deadly retaliation targeting police officers, or in substantial and costly civil 
disorder. Police leaders must recognize and effectively implement expert-recommended 
policies to promote the public’s perception of their agency’s legitimacy. Nevertheless, how 
police agencies implement those policies cannot be taken for granted. As described 
previously, each police department implemented legitimacy-building policies differently. 
For example, with over 35,000 officers, the NYPD’s application of these practices differed 
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greatly from SAPD’s application, with 20 officers. However, examining the sense-making 
of policy implementations across these agencies is possible. 
This analysis revealed the complicated context as more successfully aligning with 
sovereign-endorsed practices, while exposing the obvious/simple domain more common 
before the onset of a crisis but less successful at sustaining policy in response. Police 
leaders should use the Cynefin framework to assess and strengthen their legitimacy-
building policies before suffering their own crises or use it to recover legitimacy after a 
crisis in progress. Future research should focus on improving the perceived legitimacy of 
other functions of the criminal justice system. For example, studies focusing on 
prosecutorial entities and correctional departments could use the Cynefin framework to 
categorize the sense-making behind their legitimization efforts. Leaders in those fields 
could then evaluate which contexts better support their efforts, endeavoring to enhance the 
legitimacy of the criminal justice system writ large. 
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